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The objective of this study is to investigate the effect of regulatory changes on financial 
reporting quality and audit fees and to further test whether this effect was moderated by firm 
characteristics (i.e. abnormal audit fees, political connections and overlapping directorship) in 
Nigeria. This study utilised the data of 90 companies listed on the Nigerian stock exchange 
over the periods 2008-2013. Using Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) technique that 
takes into account the endogeneity nature of financial reporting quality and audit fees model, 
the results indicated that financial reporting quality improved in the regulatory changes period. 
However, abnormal audit fees, political connection and overlapping directorship deteriorated 
the effect. In addition, the study found an increase in the amount paid as audit fees in the 
regulatory changes periods and this varied with the perceived riskiness of firm characteristics. 
Specifically, the increase in financial reporting quality in the regulatory changes periods led 
to a decrease in audit fees while the perceive riskiness of overlapping directorship increased 
audit fees in the regulatory changes periods. Further, the perceived riskiness of politically 
connected firms in the regulatory changes periods did not significantly affect audit 
fees. Accordingly, future regulatory reforms must be cognizant of these factors. Even though 
there are abundant empirical studies on financial regulatory changes and their effects on 
financial reporting quality and audit fees, this study provides additional insights into the 
regulatory change literature by investigating how firms characteristics (abnormal audit fees, 
political connection and overlapping directorship) moderates the effect of regulatory changes 
particularly in Nigeria, one of the less developed and under researched capital markets in the 
world. Further, the findings of this study are robust with respect to the issues of unobserved 
heterogeneity and endogeneity which previous studies had failed to consider.  
 
















Objektif kajian ini adalah untuk meneliti kesan perubahan kawal selia terhadap kualiti laporan 
kewangan dan yuran audit untuk menguji dengan lebih lanjut sama ada kesan ini 
disederhanakan oleh ciri-ciri firma (iaitu, yuran audit yang tidak normal, hubungan politik, 
dan pertindihan pengarah) di Nigeria. Kajian ini menggunakan data 90 syarikat yang tersenarai 
di Nigerian Stock Exchange dari tahun 2008-2013. Menggunakan teknik Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM) yang mengambil kira sifat endogen kualiti laporan kewangan 
dan model yuran audit, keputusan menunjukkan bahawa kualiti laporan kewangan adalah 
bertambah baik dalam tempoh perubahan pengawalseliaan. Walau bagaimanapun, yuran audit 
yang tidak normal, hubungan politik, dan pertindihan pengarah menjejaskan kesan tersebut. 
Juga, kajian ini mendapati peningkatan dalam jumlah yang dibayar sebagai yuran audit dalam 
tempoh perubahan peraturan dan kesan ini berbeza-beza bergantung kepada risiko ciri-ciri 
firma yang ditanggap. Secara khususnya, peningkatan kualiti laporan kewangan didalam 
tempoh perubahan kawal selia  membawa kepada penurunan kepada yuran audit manakala 
risiko pertindihan pengarah meningkatkan yuran audit dalam tempoh tersebut. Selanjutnya, 
risiko syarikat yang berkait dengan politik dalam tempoh perubahan kawal selia  tidak 
memberi kesan signifikan kepada yuran audit. Oleh itu, pembaharuan pengawalseliaan masa 
hadapan mesti mengambil kira faktor-faktor ini. Walaupun terdapat penyelidikan yang banyak 
mengenai perubahan pengawalseliaan kewangan dan kesannya terhadap kualiti laporan 
kewangan dan yuran audit, kajian ini memberikan pandangan tambahan kepada karya 
perubahan kawal selia dengan menyiasat bagaimana ciri-ciri firma (yuran audit yang tidak 
normal, kaitan politik, dan pertindihan pengarah) menyederhanakan kesan perubahan 
peraturan kawal selia terutamanya di Nigeria, salah satu pasaran modal yang kurang maju dan 
kurang dikaji di dunia. Di samping itu, hasil kajian ini adalah teguh mengenai isu-isu 
kepelbagaian dan endogen yang tidak terlihat yang telah gagal diambil kira oleh kajian 
sebelum ini. 
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The rapid pace at which capital markets around the globe are integrating has indeed 
brought about innovative changes to the business environment across the world. These 
changes have also reinforced the need to overhaul financial reporting regimes in most 
countries (Leuz 2010; Griffin, Lont & Sun 2009; Poon 2012; Combarros 2000). Unlike 
before, the consequences of a weak-reporting culture now transcend national borders.  
 
Arguably, the lack of adequate accounting disclosures and corporate governance 
practices are the main issues that contributed to the financial crisis that disrupted the 
capital markets of emerging countries in 1997 and 1998 (Greenspan 1999). The East 
Asian financial crisis that started in Thailand in July 1997 deepened and spread to 
Indonesia, South Korea, Hong Kong, Malaysia, and the Philippines, among others 
were in no small measure due to inadequate accounting disclosures and poor corporate 
governance practices (Arnold 2012). The same factors (i.e., inadequate accounting 
practises and corporate governance failures) were also the causes of corporate failures 
in the widely publicised cases of Enron, WorldCom, and Arthur Andersen in 2001 in 
the United States. Without a doubt, with the globalised nature of capital markets, 
reliable, transparent, comparable, and consistent financial information are necessary 
tools to avert another economic crisis. 
Corporate collapses and the global financial crisis renewed the interests of both 
practitioners and academic researchers in issues of financial reporting quality. As a 
result, reforms directed towards improving financial reporting quality have continued 
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unabated. Corporate governance and financial reporting standards have been at the 
centre of the recent international regulatory reform debate. Different countries have 
initiated regulatory reforms at different periods (Leuz 2010; Okike 2007). Prominent 
among such reforms were the Corporate Auditing Accountability, Responsibility, and 
Transparency Act of 2002, otherwise called the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act in the 
United States. Similar reforms were undertaken in other jurisdictions as preventive 
measures, including the restructuring of the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) in the 
United Kingdom along with the review of the United Kingdom’s Combined Code of 
Corporate Governance (CCG). In emerging markets, South Africa’s King Report on 
Corporate Governance 2002, the Manual of Corporate Governance in Ghana 2002, 
Nigeria CCG 2003, and the Malaysian CCG 2002 were among such efforts. 
One significant reform that has shaped reporting practises over time has been the 
integration of national regulatory financial systems with “supranational” private sector 
standard-setting bodies like the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and 
the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC), and governmental bodies like the 
European Union (Beattie, Fearnley & Hines 2010). One of the first initiatives directed 
towards reducing the differences in financial reporting standards was first conceived 
in the late 1950s1 with an emphasis on the harmonization of regulations. The 
International Accounting Standard Committee, which was formed in 1973, was the 
first international standard setting body. The Accounting Standards Committee (ASC) 
was a group of professional accountancy bodies from ten member states, including 
Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, the United 
Kingdom and Ireland, and the United States. This ASC was reorganized into the 
                                                     




International Accounting Standards Board in 2001 (Leuz 2010). Since that time, the 
use of international standards has increased. As of 2013, the European Union and more 
than 100 other countries either require or permit the use of international financial 
reporting standards issued by the IASB or a local variant of those standards. According 
to the constitution of IFRS Foundation, the goal of the board is to develop a set of 
high-quality accounting standards in the public interest that will be understandable and 
enforceable globally. Most importantly, creating quality, transparent, and comparable 
financial statements will help investors make informed decisions (IFRS Foundation 
Constitution, 2013). 
Interestingly, the board’s efforts have gained international prominence, with the mass 
transition from the General Accepted Accounting Principle (GAAP) at the individual 
country level to the IFRS (Yi Lin, Chee Seng & Graeme 2012) at the international 
level. The global adoption of IFRS marks a paradigm shift in global financial reporting 
practices (Yi Lin, Chee Seng & Graeme 2012). In order to align with international best 
practises, many local stock exchanges have made it imperative for companies listed on 
their floors to draw up financial statements in accordance with the provisions of IFRS 
under the lead of the International Accounting Standard Board (IASB) (Kim, Liu & 
Zheng 2013).  
January 1, 2005 marked the commencement of IFRS adoption in the European Union; 
all listed entities had to draw up their consolidated financial reports in accordance with 
IFRS provisions (Regulation No. 1606/2002). The deregulation of EU capital markets 
and the need to have uniform account language has encouraged the wide adoption of 
IFRS in the region. Regulators and standard-setters believe that a uniform set of high-
quality accounting standards will enhance the transparency and comparability of 
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financial reports within the area and thus lower the costs of capital and attract more 
investors to the area. Notably, as part of its commitment towards the cause of the IASB, 
the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) permitted non-US companies in 
2007 to report applying IFRS instead of the previous reconciliation arrangements 
(Jeanjean & Stolowy 2008).   
In Asia, the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis necessitated the reform of the financial 
reporting frameworks in the region. In Arnold’s (2012) opinion, the financial 
irregularities revealed by the crisis and the need to resolve them made it necessary to 
have a new financial reporting framework. In view of this perceived need, an 
international organization called the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) was established 
in 1999. The purpose of the FSF was to restore financial stability and economic 
development in the region that was tarnished due to the Asian crisis (Arnold 2012). In 
its efforts, the FSF approved twelve financial standards and codes believing that they 
would enhance transparency in the financial reporting process in the region. They 
touted the role of IFRS in solving the global economic crisis partly due to its success 
in Asia (Jacob & Madu 2009). 
Like other continents, African has responded favourably to the idea of uniform 
accounting standards. According to van Rooyen2 (2011), a need existed to deepen 
African capital markets through the creation of an investment friendly environment. 
Therefore, it is now crucial for countries within Africa to be part of the global 
convergence process. In the region, South Africa, in 2005, was the first to adopt IFRS, 
setting precedence for other countries within the region to follow. The journey towards 
                                                     
2 Jeff van Rooyen is a former Vice-Chairman Executive Committee of IOSCO. He delivered his speech 
on African embraces IFRS http://www.ifrs.org/News/Features/Documents/Africaembraces IFRSs.pdf. 
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adoption commenced in Nigeria in 2010 with the inauguration of the Committee on 
Road Map for the adoption of IFRS in Nigeria. Meanwhile, the revision of Code of 
Corporate Governance (CCG) and the establishment of the Financial Reporting 
Council of Nigeria (FRCN) in 2011 preceded the adoption of IFRS in Nigeria. 
However, the issue of sustaining the benefits of the various regulatory changes while 
maintaining a balance in compliance costs remains of concern to policy makers and 
financial statement preparers (Evan Jr & Schwartz 2013). Public analysts, policy 
makers, and researchers sought to understand market reactions, strength of internal 
controls and improvements in financial reporting quality as yardsticks for accessing 
the benefits of new financial regulatory initiatives. Among the most readily observable 
of the various compliance costs are auditors’ fees (DeGeorge, Ferguson & Spear 
2013). Regulatory changes in whatever the form add to audit risks and audit efforts, 
which are the major determinants of audit fees (Yaacob & Che-Ahmad 2012).  
Regardless of the additional risks and complexities attached to audit engagements 
arising from regulatory changes, auditors must reach appropriate judgments (ICAEW 
2004). Hence, some skill transformation might be required to keep abreast of the 
changes on the part of an auditor. For example, the global move from precise to less 
precise accounting standards requires much professional judgement. Consequently, 
this change will necessitate the deployment of financial resources for training and 
retraining to ensure that audit team members are sufficiently equipped in terms of the 
required skills.   
Thus, with the regulatory reforms being carried out in Nigeria, empirically answering 
the question of whether the various regulatory reforms (considering individual 
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company reporting incentives) improve the quality of financial reporting is necessary. 
Most notably, when the question of whether IFRS standards compared to local 
standards lead to less aggressive reporting remains unanswered (Cohen, 
Krisnamoorthy, Peytcheva & Wright 2013). In addition, though an increase in audit 
fees is evident. Nevertheless knowing the percentage of those increases and the 
particular causes will be interesting. Unlike previous studies (Kim, Liu & Zheng 
2012), the current study considers concurrent reforms in corporate governance and 
enforcement mechanisms before the adoption of IFRS.  In essence, this study argues 
that contemporaneous changes in the reporting environment influence the 
effectiveness of IFRS adoption in a weak regulatory setting like Nigeria (Ball 2006). 
1.2 Problem Statement 
 
Financial reporting quality3 and disclosure practises in Nigeria as revealed in 
international and local observer reports are weak and below international best practises 
(Global Competitiveness Report 2013; Nigeria Accounting Standard Board 2010). For 
example, the 2004 Report on Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC 2004; 2011) 
highlighted the insufficiency in the country’s financial reporting and auditing 
framework. According to the report, the code of corporate governance was obsolete 
and the available accounting standards issued by the defunct Nigerian Accounting 
Standard Board (NASB) did not cover all disclosure requirements. According to 
Otunsanya and Lauwo (2010) and Okike (2004), other issues that have contributed to 
the weak reporting culture in Nigeria include auditor independence impairment, 
                                                     
3 Because the primary objective of auditing is to attest to the quality of financial reports and financial 
statements is seen as a joint effort of both the manager and the auditor, the term financial reporting 
quality refers to audit quality in this current study (Antle et al. 2006).  
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political cronyism and weak enforcement mechanisms. In addition, Adegbite (2014) 
and Ofo (2010) noted the ineffectiveness of board audit committees.   
 
With respect to the auditor’s independence issue in Nigeria, Otunsanya and Lauwo 
(2010) alleged that the Nigerian auditors charge exorbitant audit fees and provide some 
non-audit related services that compromise their independence. As a result, auditors 
find it difficult to resist unhealthy financial reporting practises of management (Bakre 
2007). The conflict of interest arising from the dependency on audit fees is cited as 
one significant cause of the corporate scandals in Nigeria. Notable cases of these 
scandals are those involving the top-level management of Afribank and Akintola 
Williams Deloitte in 2006 and the top-level management of Cadbury and Akintola 
Williams Deloitte in 2006 (Bakre 2007). Another case is the questionable accounting 
practises engaged in by executive directors of nine banks in 2009 discovered by the 
Central Bank of Nigeria investigation team after the auditors of the affected banks had 
issued a satisfactory audit report. Lastly, and more recent, is the mismanagement of 
the fuel subsidy scheme in 2012 also involving Akintola Williams Deloitte (Akanbi 
2012)4.  
The Institute of Chartered Accountants of Nigeria (ICAN), whose members dominate 
the audit of listed firms in Nigeria, provides the minimum scale rate for audit fees to 
check low-balling, but no upper limit exists for the amount of audit fees that can be 
charged (Okike 2004). Auditors can charge as much as possible and even take up non-
audit related services in as much as they feel that their independence is not 
compromised. The problem of excessive audit fee charges is further compounded by 
                                                     





the poor disclosure requirements of the amount received for audit fees and non-audit 
fees (Abdulmalik & Che-Ahmad 2016). That is because the amount received by 
external auditors for rendering both services is lumped together as auditor’s 
remuneration in annual reports. Therefore, users of financial statements are unable to 
distinguish between audit-related fees and non-audit related fees.  
The second issue that has been identified is political cronyism. Quite a substantial 
number of listed companies have individuals on their boards who are close to past or 
present government officials. According to Ujunwa and Umar (2013), 75% of 
chairman of Nigerian companies either are retired military personnel or have a close 
connection with those in government who, at a time, held top and sensitive positions 
in the government. The presence of capital cronyism presents a case for concern about 
the quality of accounting information disclosed by firms presumed to have political 
connections.  
According to Gul (2006), capital cronyism influences the reporting incentives of 
external auditors and of the board of directors. Prior studies on political cronyism 
(Bushman, Piotroski & Smith 2004) have posited that politically connected firms are 
associated with poor financial reporting quality. This is linked to the fact that 
politically connected firms suppress financial information to conceal diversionary 
practises stemming from political cronies and corruption (Guedhami, Pitman & Saffar, 
2014). Reported scandals in Nigerian banks like those involving Society Generale 
Bank5, Trade Bank, Intercontinental Bank, and Oceanic Bank are clear cases of the 
                                                     
5 One charge against a former MD of Society Generale Bank was for transactions without collateral and 
the granting of a large sum of money to the ruling party in Nigeria. http://saharareporters.com/ 
2008/07/06/how-saraki-others-looted-societe-generale-bank-nigeria-%E2%80%A2-over-n1b-looted. 
.   
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distortion of financial figures in favour of political cronies. These institutions often 
lobby the government to set-up accounts with them and award them lucrative contracts 
in return for election campaign sponsorships.   
The last issue is audit committee ineffectiveness, which stems from the committee 
structure and composition (Ofo 2010). International standards for best practises require 
membership of the audit committee to comprise independent directors. However, audit 
committee composition in Nigeria often comprises three representatives of the 
shareholders and board of directors respectively. Available empirical evidence reveals 
that Nigeria has a shortage of experienced independent non-executive directors 
(Adegbite 2014). The few available independent non-executive directors are members 
of multiple board committees and thus hold multiple board directorships (otherwise 
called overlapping directorship). A recent development in corporate governance 
literature is the consideration of whether common memberships in committees 
improve the board-monitoring role. Some scholars (see for example, Ferris, 
Jagannathan & Pritchard 2003; Laux & Laux 2009) argue that overlapping directors 
improve monitoring because of the knowledge spill over effect; other scholars 
(Chandar, Chang, & Zheng 2008; Zheng & Cullinan 2010) believe that this practice 
shrinks the monitoring ability of the board because directors become over engaged.  
All of the issues cited above have partly contributed to governance failure in publicly 
listed companies in Nigeria, and ripples from the various governance failures almost 
crippled the activities of the Nigerian stock market. Anecdotal evidence shows that the 
market could not attract quality and sustainable investments because investors had lost 
their confidence in the market (Amaka 2012; Oteh 2010). According to Oteh (2010), 
the market became one of the worst performing in the world after it declined from its 
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peak by 70% in 2008. Available statistics shows that market capitalization and the 
volume of stock traded on the exchange fell significantly from 2008 to 2012. A 
summary of the figures in the respective years is shown in Table 1.1 below. 
Table 1.1 
 
Total Market Capitalization of and Volume of Trade on the Nigerian Stock Exchange   
Year  Market 
Capitalization  




2008 23.9 29.3 
2009 19.7 11.0 
2010 13.9 12.5 
2011 9.5 9.2 
2012 12.2 8.8 
Note. Source, Word Bank Statistics, (2014). 
Consequently, the resulting effects of governance failure accentuated the debate on the 
role of corporate governance and accounting standards in contributing to the efficient 
functioning of the Nigerian capital market. Recently, the revisions of the code of 
corporate governance, the establishment of an accounting standard and enforcement 
body (FRCN) in 2011, and the adoption of IFRS in 2012 were financial regulatory 
initiatives that embarked on an effort to improve the country’s financial reporting 
climate6. However, these reforms only partly addressed auditor independence issues, 
political cronyism and overlapping directorship that are reflected in the reporting 
characteristics of companies. Hence, with the issues of auditor’s independence, 
capitalism cronyism and audit committee ineffectiveness arising from overlapping 
directorship remaining, the question arises as to whether the various regulatory 
initiatives produced the expected results and justified the costs associated with the 
                                                     
6 Note that financial and corporate governance reforms reflected the international institutionalized 
model with no effort to fuse them with practical realities (Adegbite 2014). Resultantly, this failure has 
jeopardized the intentions of the reform effort.  
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reforms. Therefore, in response to Adegbite’s (2014) call for testable hypotheses for 
drivers of sound corporate governance at the firm level, this current study investigates 
the effects of abnormal audit fees, political connection and overlapping directorships 
on the relationships among financial reporting quality, audit fees, and regulatory 
changes.  
Despite the widely held belief that regulatory changes influence the quality of financial 
reports and drive costs, empirical studies examining the relationship between 
regulatory changes, reporting quality and audit fees have reported mixed results. For 
example, Aubert and Grudnitski (2012) and Barth, Landsman and Lang (2008) 
observed improvement in the quality of financial information due to a reduction in the 
magnitude of discretionary accruals under the IFRS regime. In contrast, Ahmed, Neel 
and Wang (2013) observed that reporting quality for a firm in a strong enforcement 
environment did not improve after IFRS adoption due to the inability of the 
mechanisms to absorb the flexibility effects of IFRS. Atwood et al. (2011), using 
analyst forecast accuracy, noted that reported earnings under US GAAP are more 
informative than those reported under IFRS.  
 
Likewise, Cosgrove and Niederjohn (2008) reported that audit fees increased by 51% 
in the United State subsequent to the issue of the SOX and Hoitash, Hoitash and 
Bedard (2008) documented that the increment in audit fees varies with the severity in 
the internal control weakness disclosed by companies using Internal Control for 
Financial Reporting in the United State. On the contrary, Raghunandan and Rama 
(2006) observed that audit fees do not vary with material weakness disclosure. A 
possible explanation for the mixed findings arises from the differences in firm 




For instance, substantial evidence is available pointing out the limited role of 
accounting standards and that firm characteristics are important (Ball, Robbins & Wu 
2003; Burghstahler, Hail & Leuz 2006; Daske & Gebhardt 2006). Ball, Robbins and 
Wu (2003), Burghstahler, Hail and Leuz (2006), and Daske and Gebhardt (2006) have 
suggested that the limitations imposed by firm reporting incentives and country-
specific institutional qualities should be noted when observing the benefits/costs of 
regulatory changes. Ball, Robbins and Wu (2003) said that incentives of preparers and 
auditors influence financial reporting under a set of standards. Accordingly, the 
interaction between market forces and political forces in each jurisdiction affects 
financial reporting practices (Ball, Robbins & Wu 2003).  
 
Although, many studies, for example those of Chi, Lisic and Pevzner (2011), Cohen 
et al. 2013, and Jamal and Tan (2013), are available on regulatory changes. While 
studies on regulatory changes (see for example, Aubert & Grudnitski 2012; Ahmed, 
Neel, & Wang 2013) have established variations of the impact of regulatory reforms 
based on cross-country differences in regulatory frameworks, very few studies like 
Agoglia, Doupnik and Tsakumis (2011), Jamal and Tan (2010) examined the strength 
of both internal and external governance mechanisms in curtailing earnings 
management in the event of regulatory changes and they used experimental approach. 
To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, there are no studies of this nature in Nigeria. 
Therefore, the present study extends prior studies by examining the variation of 
regulatory impact at the level of the firm. Subsequently, this study introduced 
abnormal audit fees, political cronyism, and overlapping directorships as metrics of 
firm characteristics that cause variations in the impact of regulatory reform (Ball, 
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Robbins & Wu 2003; Burghstahler, Hail & Leuz 2006; Daske & Gebhardt 2006). 
Building on Balls (2006) argument, this current study current posits that firm-specific 
characteristics (abnormal audit fees, politically connected firm and overlapping 
directorships) could influence the outcome of regulatory changes (i.e., financial 
reporting quality and audit fees). 
 
Further, an endogeneity problem arising from unobserved heterogeneity, simultaneity, 
and measurement error could also provide a possible explanation for the mixed 
findings (Roberts & Whited 2012). A popular view of audit pricing literature is that, if 
corporate governance mechanisms are sound and protect the best interests of 
shareholders, the production model of audit suggests that these mechanisms reduce an 
auditor’s risk assessment and the extent of an auditor’s efforts (Simunic 1980). 
Another view suggests that internal corporate governance mechanisms could affect the 
demand for audit services (Hay et al. 2006). In other words, sound corporate 
governance may lead to a greater demand for audit services. In this case, the changes 
in audit fees are not the result of changes in the audit process rather they are the result 
of the assurance level demanded of the external auditor (Hay et al. 2006). The two 
perspectives underlying the mechanics of audit production lead to different empirical 
conclusions.  
Many estimation techniques utilized in prior audit pricing literature can be criticised 
for treating firm governance characteristics as exogenous. However, some studies such 
as those of Asthana and Boone (2012), Antle et al. (2006) have noted that audit fees, 
non-audit fees, audit quality and firm governance characteristics are simultaneously 
determined by unobserved firm-specific features. For instance, Asthana and Boone 
(2012) believed that changes in reporting quality and audit fees could be derived from 
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largely unobservable factors such as audit team composition, allocation of work 
between the year-end and the influence of internal audit assistance, and the quality of 
client financial reporting reputation.  
 
Likewise, the present study posits that audit fees, audit quality and firm governance 
characteristics could be simultaneously determined by past and present expected 
characteristics of a firm. For instance, the decision to either retain the old external 
auditor or hire a new external auditor is most often influenced by performance. 
Similarly, the audit experience gained in the audit of a client’s financial system in 
previous years influences an auditor’s approach in the current year. In fact, when 
taking up a new engagement, auditing standards require that the incoming auditor 
seeks the expert advice of the retiring auditor regarding a client’s financial system and 
associated risks before taking up a new audit.  
 
The evidence of the presence of endogeneity issues in the audit-pricing model (see for 
example Antle et al. 2006; Hay et al. 2006) suggests that studies ignoring these 
econometric issues may be difficult to interpret. Endogeneity is an econometric issue, 
and its presence in model estimation affects casual inferences, that is endogeneity 
reduces the validity of empirical testing (Gippel, Smith & Zhu 2014). Roberts and 
Whited (2012) explained, “Endogeneity lead to biased and inconsistent parameter 
estimates that make reliable inferences virtually impossible” (p. 6.)  
Prior papers like that of Antle et al. (2006) employ Two Stage Least Squares regression 
analysis in a bid to overcome the estimation problem mentioned above and improved 
on earlier empirical findings in the literature. This present study adopts the Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM) instrumental approach to circumvent spurious 
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correlations and causal relationships in audit fees, audit quality (herein known as 
financial reporting quality), and corporate governance relationships. The dynamic 
GMM panel specification that Arrelano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover 
(1995) developed can solve econometric issues introduced by unobserved 
heterogeneity, simultaneity, and dynamic endogeneity and produce an unbiased and 
consistent estimation using a set of valid instruments.  
1.3 Motivation and Research Question 
The previous state of financial reporting architecture in Nigeria, which provoked 
financial regulatory reforms in Nigeria and the call for testable hypotheses on drivers 
of sound corporate governance at firm level in Nigeria by Adegbite (2014), provides 
the primary motivation for this study. The focus of this study is to investigate the 
moderating effect abnormal audit fees, political connection and overlapping 
directorship on the relationship between regulatory changes, financial reporting 
quality and audit fees. While most studies in this area have emerged from 
industrialized nations, emerging economies are worth investigating given their 
growing contributions to the development of world capital markets. Hence, the 
important investment position that Nigeria occupies in the African region7 and its 
historical antecedents add to the study’s motivation. Based on the foregoing, the 
research questions addressed in this study are: 
1. Does regulatory changes affect financial reporting quality? 
                                                     
7According to the World Investment Report (2013), Nigeria is the number one investment destination 




2. Do regulatory changes and its interaction with abnormal audit fees affect 
financial reporting quality? 
3. Do regulatory changes and its interaction with politically connected firms 
affect financial reporting quality? 
4. Do regulatory changes and its interaction with overlapping directorship affect 
financial reporting quality? 
5. Do regulatory changes affect audit fees? 
6. Do regulatory changes and its interaction with financial reporting quality affect 
audit fees? 
7. Do regulatory changes and its interaction with politically connected firms 
affect audit fees? 
8. Do regulatory changes and its interaction with overlapping directorship affect 
audit fees? 
1.4 Objectives of the Study 
The main objective of this study is to examine the interacting effects of firm-specific 
characteristics and regulatory changes in the Nigerian audit market. Thus, the specific 
objectives of this study are to examine whether: 
1. To examine whether regulatory changes  affect financial reporting quality;  
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2. To examine whether regulatory changes and its interaction with abnormal audit 
fees affect financial reporting quality; 
3. To examine whether regulatory changes and its interaction with politically 
connected firms affect financial reporting quality;  
4. To examine whether regulatory changes and its interaction with overlapping 
directorship affect financial reporting quality; 
5. To examine whether regulatory changes affects audit fees; 
6. To examine whether regulatory changes and its interaction with financial 
reporting quality affect audit fees;  
7. To examine whether regulatory changes and its interaction with politically 
connected firms affect audit fees; and 
8. To examine whether regulatory changes and its interaction with overlapping 
directorship affect audit fees. 
1.5 Significance of the Study 
The issue of regulatory reform remains an area of interest to academic researchers, 
policy makers, and accounting practitioners. This is due to the conflicting empirical 
evidence available with respect to the various challenges associated with regulatory 
reforms that seem to impede its efficacy (Balls, Robins, & Wu 2003; DeFond & 
Francis 2005). In addition, the need to strike a balance between the cost of compliance 




As an elixir for curing societal ills, the role of academic research of this nature in 
shaping society and its various institutions through providing remedial actions for 
numerous societal problems cannot be overemphasized. Therefore, given the 
international relevance of financial reporting and the state of Nigerian audit market 
before the reforms listed above, an academic inquiry of this nature is worthwhile. In 
line with this argument, the contributions of this study are twofold, namely, 
contributions to existing literature and to practice.  
1.5.1 Significance of the Present Study to Existing Literature  
The study intends to extend and contribute to prior studies in several ways. First, 
Nigeria is among the fastest-growing economies in West African and perhaps the 
largest economy in the region (African economic outlook 2014). The present 
discussion presents an analysis based on the uniqueness of the ownership structure in 
Nigeria corporate entities that is different from hitherto known research emerging from 
the Anglo-American and other advanced financial systems. Institutional settings vary 
widely between countries. In some countries corporate governance monitoring and 
control are sophisticated and advanced. In others, they are not.  
 
This study extends uses data from a historically less-regulated environment. Unlike 
the United States and other European studies, weak institutions and enforcement 
mechanisms have characterised the financial reporting environment in Nigeria. For 
instance, in the event of an audit failure in more regulated systems, auditors might face 
litigation charges and are often prosecuted accordingly. In Nigeria, the opposite is the 
case. Little evidence of litigation charges brought upon auditors exists, and the few 
reported instances end up without adequate penalties accessed upon the liable 
individuals. This is because corporate governance and developments in the legal 
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environment are still in the infancy stage, making the work of regulators less 
pronounced. In the absence of an efficient regulatory enforcement, the independence 
between an auditor and his/her audit client is not clearly distinguished.  
 
The Nigerian reporting and auditing environment as painted above would seem to be 
alien in more developed countries like the United States and the United Kingdom with 
more mature capital markets whose data dominate the literature on the effects of 
regulatory change. To date and to the best of this researcher’s knowledge, no extant 
literature examines the effects of regulatory changes from an auditing perspective in 
Nigeria. Similarly, even though the literature on corporate governance and auditing 
are budding in Nigeria, this literature predominantly focuses on environmental 
determinants of corporate governance in the country. This current study extends 
auditing and corporate governance research by providing additional insights on the 
various happenings in a less-regulated environment.  
 
Second, regulatory changes involving financial reporting anywhere in the world are 
aimed towards improving the financial reporting framework. Thus, empirically 
establishing the extent to which the objectives of these reforms have been 
accomplished and the resultant costs thereof is necessary. One of the most challenging 
tasks auditors must confront is curtailing aggressive reporting by management (Jamal 
& Tan 2013; Tsipouridou & Spathis 2012). A pertinent question under consideration 
in this current study is whether regulatory reforms influence the ability of an auditor 
to constrain aggressive reporting by management, thereby improving the quality of 




Many studies, for example those of Chi, Lisic and Pevzner (2011), Cohen et al. 2013, 
and Jamal and Tan (2013), are available on regulatory changes. While studies on 
regulatory charges have only established variations of the impact of regulatory reforms 
based on cross-country differences in regulatory frameworks, the present study 
extends prior studies by examining the variation of regulatory impact at the level of 
the firm. Subsequently, this study introduced abnormal audit fees (a measure of 
auditor’s independence), political cronyism, and overlapping directorships as metrics 
of firm reporting incentives that cause variations in the impact of regulatory reform 
(Ball, Robbins & Wu 2003; Burghstahler, Hail & Leuz 2006; Daske & Gebhardt 
2006). 
  
Lastly, extant studies on earnings quality and audit fees are plagued with endogeneity 
problems stemming from unobserved heterogeneity effects, a simultaneity problem 
and the effect of past performance on current performance (Roberts & Whited 2012). 
For the econometric issue, this study introduces the estimation techniques of the 
Generalized Method of Moment (GMM) to make the study’s results more robust 
concerning endogeneity issues. To the best of the author’s knowledge, the study will 
be the first to investigate how firm characteristics the effects of regulatory changes on 
financial reporting quality and audit fees taking into consideration the likely 
endogeneity issue that might arise from the effect of past performance on current firm 
performance.  
The GMM estimation approach is more efficient than 2SLS when the problem of 
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation in the error terms is presence (Arellano-Bond 
1991; Wooldridge 2001). Basically, under panel data application, the unobserved 
heterogeneity correlates with the observed covariate, which is then corrected for using 
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the fixed effect or within the estimator. The fixed effect estimator assumes that the 
time varying errors have zero means, constant variance and zero correlation (i.e., 
exogeneity assumption). The GMM estimation technique that Hansen (1982) 
introduced is a non-parametric approach used to estimate model parameters with no 
data distributional assumptions, which is an important assumption under the Two-
Stage Least Squares regression analysis.  
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998)8 developed a system 
dynamic model that incorporates simultaneous difference and level equations. 
Arellano and Bond (1991) proposed two estimators, which are the one-step and the 
two-step. The weighing matrix used in obtaining the estimates explains the differences 
between the two estimates; however, the two-step is optimal9 (Gyimah-Brempong & 
Traynor 1999). The dynamic GMM is consistent and efficient in the absence of second 
order serial correlation between error terms of the first differenced equation.  
1.5.2 Practical Significance 
Africa is increasingly becoming an investment hub, due to many years of consistent 
growth of member states (Economic Report on African 2013). Capital markets play an 
important role in this regard, ensuring efficient allocation of capital and risk among 
competing needs within the economy. In turn, the quality of financial reports is a 
critical tool for achieving efficient capital allocation. A high level of information 
asymmetry will result in severe consequences for market operators. Because of the 
                                                     
8 Xtabond2  
9 GMM is estimated by taking the first-difference of the dependent variable and the independent 
variables. This cancels out the company fixed effect, and the lagged dependent variable is correlated 
with the error term. The result is that further lags of the dependent variable and first difference of the 
exogenous explanatory variable serve as the instrument. Hence, Arellano and Bonds’s (1991) one-step 
estimator with robust standard error is inefficient and marked with a high standard error (Dietz, 
Neumayer, & De Soysa 2007). 
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damning economic consequences of poor financial reporting practices to the aggregate 
economy, policy makers, standard setters, and regulators are more interested than ever 
before on financial reporting issues (Oteh 201010).  
 
Invariably, academic research of this nature will provide further useful evidence to the 
on-going debate regarding financial reporting consequences of regulatory changes. 
This study acknowledges the additional responsibility attached to the recent regulatory 
changes, which will cause change in the quality of financial reports and the costs of 
audit service. The study provides valid empirical evidence for the Nigerian audit 
market and its effects on the operations of the capital market, auditors, and auditees 
(i.e., financial reporting quality and audit fees). Thus, the recommendations of study 
will be forwarded to the relevant regulatory authorities and professional bodies as a 
guide towards future regulatory reforms on financial reporting.  
 
The best interests of the parties involved in audit negotiations require that they sign an 
audit engagement11 contract that will be mutually acceptable. While an auditee needs 
assurance of receiving appropriate value for the amount paid as fees, auditors are 
interested in ensuring that audit fees are commensurate with the risk and complexity 
involved. This study provides an audit price framework in the Nigerian context. The 
results of the study will be of interest to market participants in gaining an 
understanding of how those legal reforms have solved the perceived weak reporting 
structure and the costs arising therefrom. 
                                                     
10 Oteh is the Director-General of Nigeria Security and Exchange Commission. In her speech, A 
Roadmap for Transforming the Nigeria Capital Markets, increased regulatory oversight and enhanced 
disclosure, transparency and accountability were among the key recommendations given for reviving 
the Nigerian capital market.   
11 Audit engagement contract herein refers to the scope of audit work and quality that are proportionate 
to the remuneration of the auditors. 
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1.6 Scope of Study 
The study covers the six-year period from 2008-2013. These include the years before 
and after various regulatory changes. Financial and non-financial data were hand 
collected from the annual reports of 90 listed companies. Annual reports used for the 
study were retrieved from the library of the Nigerian Stock Exchange Commission 
(NSE). The study analysis focuses on financial reporting quality and audit fees across 
two main periods: 1) the pre-regulatory change period and 2) the regulatory changes 
period. The pre-regulatory period extends from 2008 through 2010, and the post-
regulatory period extends from 2011 through 2013. Figure 1.1 below shows the 
different periods analysed. 
     2008     2010                   2011                           2013
              
 
        Pre-IFRS implementation                     Post- IFRS Implementation 
           Pre-Regulatory Period                             Post-Regulatory Period 
           (CCG Review & FRCN)            (CCG review & FRCN Implementation period) 






This chapter discusses literature related to financial reporting quality (audit quality) 
and audit fees. As the purpose of any research of this nature is to advance the state of 
knowledge, a prior understanding and insights into related areas are necessary to 
produce quality research. Thus, the essence this chapter is enhancing both the 
researchers’ and the readers’ understanding of past work and to establish how the 
current study relates to previous research and extends the boundaries of knowledge.   
 
The first part of the chapter gives an overview of financial reporting and corporate 
governance initiatives in Nigeria; followed by discussions on significant regulatory 
changes around the globe that influenced financial reporting process in the Nigerian 
context. This includes discussion on recent developments on convergence and 
harmonization of accounting standards as well as those arguments for and against 
uniform reporting language. The chapter proceeds with a discussion of corporate 
governance developments across the globe and then narrows down to the Nigerian 
case. Although, many studies are available in this area, those reviewed here are central 
to the scope of this study.  
 
Finally, the last section of this chapter addresses the theories that underpin the study. 
These theories explain the relationship between the identified dependent variables and 
independent variables in accordance with past studies. This is necessary in order to 
provide justification for the relationship between and among the variables of interest.  
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2.2 Overview of Nigeria Financial Reporting and Corporate Governance        
        Initiatives in Nigeria  
 
A close linkage exists between corporate entity collapse and poor financial reporting 
practices resulting from governance failure. This argument is justified in light of 
reported cases like Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing and a host of others too 
numerous to mention. Combined together, the effects of these scandals have 
contributed a great deal to the credibility crisis rocking the accounting profession 
(Beattie, Fearnley & Hines 2013; DeFond & Francis 2005).  
 
Although good corporate governance and disclosure practices do not necessarily 
guarantee the perpetual existence of companies, they do minimise the occurrence of 
business collapse arising from deceptive financial reporting resulting from the failure 
of corporate governance. For this reason, past and on-going legal reforms of corporate 
governance and financial reporting help to promote sound corporate governance 
principles. Two prominent reforms that have gained international prominence are the 
convergence to single financial reporting standards and the detailed prescriptive 
guidelines contained in the Sarbanes Oxley Act 2002 issued in the wake of Enron saga. 
Both reforms represent significant regulatory changes in the history of accounting and 
audit practises around the world. In the subsequent subheadings, the study discusses 
business and legal environments in Nigeria, and the effects of regulatory changes on 
financial reporting environment.  
 
2.2.1 Business and Legal Environments in Nigeria 
Nigeria is the fourteen largest country in West Africa by square kilometres, and the 
most populous country in the Africa continent with 177 million people (CIAfactbook 
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2014). Nigeria’s landmass stretches 700 miles from west to east and 650 miles from 
south to north and has a coastline of about 839 kilometres boarding the Atlantic Ocean. 
The population comprises more than 200 ethnic-linguistic groups. However, three 
main ethnic groups (Hausa Yoruba and Igbo) are prominent (National Population 
Commission of Nigeria 2006). Nigeria has abundant natural resources; prominent 
among them is the crude oil and is the thirteen largest producer of oil in the world, 
pumping about 2.4 million barrels daily. Crude oil contributes about 90% of the 
country’s GDP. However, before the discovery of petroleum, agriculture was the major 
economic activities of most Nigerians.  
 
Since the time Nigeria gained independence from the United Kingdom in 1960, the 
country has witnessed a series of upheavals in its political system with various coups 
unseating popularly elected governments. Nigeria has a long history of rule by 
dictatorship, until recently when a stable democratic elected government was 
established. British colonisation, along with the various military interruptions 
witnessed in the country, greatly influenced government policies on corporate 
ownership, hence on the financial reporting process.  
 
Hitherto, Nigeria business and legal environment mirrored that of the British system. 
The main legal regulatory framework for Nigeria companies is the Companies and 
Allied Matters Acts (CAMA 1990). The Companies and Allied Matters Acts predated 
the country’s independence. The Companies Ordinance law introduced in 1922 was 
the first company law in Nigeria. This was subsequently repealed after independence, 
and the Companies Act of 1968 was introduced though still a reflection of the United 
Kingdom’s Companies Act of 1948 (Okike 2007). Various socio-political and 
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economic occurrences subsequently led to the repeal of 1968 companies act by the 
Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA 1990)12. The new law provided guidelines 
for the regulation of companies in Nigeria and established the Corporate Affairs 
Commission13. Major provisions on company formation, company structure, and 
dissolution are contained in the Act. The provisions of the Act as well set the tune for 
corporate governance practices, most specifically, director’s responsibilities, calls for 
annual general meetings and formation of audit committee. In fact, rules and 
regulations guiding publication of financial statements are included in the Act and the 
various disclosures as well as auditing requirements that are contained therein.  
 
Before the advent of NSE code of corporate governance, CAMA 1990 made adequate 
provisions for good corporate governance practises for board of directors, Chief 
Executive Officers (CEOs), and statutory auditors of listed companies. Besides the 
CAMA 1990, the Investment and Securities Act 1999 and Bank and Other Financial 
Institution Act 1999 (as amended) guide the operations of corporate enterprises. The 
next section gives an overview of financial reporting and corporate governance 
initiatives in Nigeria.   
2.2.2 Corporate Governance Initiatives in Nigeria  
The passage of the SOX Act created global awareness on the importance of good 
corporate governance practice. Many national government responded to this act by 
reviewing existing codes or initiating new ones to strengthen the reporting 
                                                     
12 Before independence, British companies dominate the socio-economic landscape of the country. In 
the post-colonial era, the need to reduce the strong grip of the colonial master on the country’s economy 
led to the promulgation of the Nigeria Enterprise Promotion Act of 1972 and 1977. The act regulates 
foreign participation in the economy to around 40% to 60% depending on the industry.     
13 The Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) is the body charged with the responsibility of registering 
companies, corporate bodies and related matters. 
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environment. In Nigeria, global awareness spurred the development of corporate 
governance initiatives presumed to improve corporate governance practises. Common 
knowledge suggests that good corporate governance would curb corruption and 
unethical business practises that bewitched business norms in the country (Ogbechie, 
Koufopoulos, & Argyropoulou 2009). 
 
Corporate governance practise in Nigeria is still at the developmental stage with only 
40% of the Nigerian listed companies’ cognisance of what corporate governance 
entails (Wilson 2006). Even though corporate governance as a “distinct concept” is of 
recent origin in Nigeria, regulation, control and governance of public listed companies 
in Nigeria is articulated in the Companies and Allied Matter Act 1990 (CAMA 1990). 
Practically speaking, between the periods after independence until the early part of the 
new millennium, CAMA 1990 produced the code of corporate governance.  
 
Renewed interest in effective corporate governance started in June 2000, when the 
NSE set up a seventeen member committee led by Atedo Peterside to develop a Code 
of Best Practises for Corporate Public listed Companies in Nigeria (Nigeria Vision 
2020 Program 2009). Among other things, the committee had the mandate to review 
corporate governance practises in Nigeria, identify weakness contained in the existing 
system and make recommendations in line with international best practises. Factors 
that fast tracked the review, apart from global events, included the country’s transition 
to civilian rule in the late 1990s. The civilian government needed to restore lost 
confidence in the country’s economy to spur foreign direct investment. Effective 




Some recommendations contained in the code outlined the duties and responsibilities 
of the board of directors, the composition of the board of directors, the separation of 
the responsibilities of the CEO and the managing director, and the establishment of 
board committees, among other recommendations. Key provisions of the Organisation 
for Economic Corporative and Development (OECD), a worldwide organisation, on 
principles of corporate governance alongside other global codes provided cues for 
drawing the code (Oso & Semiu 2012). Whilst the new code preaches sound business 
practises, compliance with the provisions of the Nigerian SEC codes of corporate 
governance is voluntary (Wilson 2006). However, the NSE is empowered to monitor 
and sanction erring listed public companies through withdrawal of registrant certificate 
and suspension of companies on the trading floor. 
The review of the 2003 Code of Corporate Governance in 2008 rendered it obsolete 
and insufficient in addressing new developments and corporate challenges in the 
corporate environment. As a result, in subsequent year industry-specific codes of 
corporate governance emerged. Industry-specific codes included the Code of 
Corporate Governance for Banks in Nigeria Post-Consolidation (2006 CBN), the Code 
of Corporate Governance for Licensed Pension 2008 (PENCOM 2008) and the Code 
of Corporate Governance for National Insurance Commission 2009 (NICOM 2009). 
Unlike the SEC code of corporate governance, industry-specific codes are mandatory 
for companies operating in their specific sectors (Wilson 2006).  
A revised code of corporate governance came into effect on the 1st of April 2011 and 
repealed the 2003 code of corporate governance. The new code made significant 
provisions for the need for a financial expert to be a member of the audit committee, 
for the presence of at least one independent non-executive director on the board and 
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for the separation of the position of chairman and managing director. The code also 
made provisions for the creation of additional board committees like the risk 
governance committee and the corporate governance committee. The revised code of 
corporate governance sought to promote corporate transparency and accountability 
through good corporate governance practices (NSE code 2011). 
However, weak enforcement and regulatory mechanisms and inadequate penalty 
measures to deter listed companies from non-compliance on the part of NSE have 
always been a major challenge to the successful implementation of any code of 
corporate governance in Nigeria. Practically speaking, the benefits of non-compliance 
far outweigh the costs; hence, most publicly listed companies prefer to contravene the 
provisions (Wilson 2006). Another challenge impeding effective compliance with the 
Nigerian’s SEC code for corporations is the multiplicity of codes of corporate 
governance and the distinctive provisions of each code. For instance, companies 
trading on the floor of the Nigeria Stock Exchange and those operating in other 
regulated sectors face the problem of complying simultaneously with the two codes 
(Idornigie 2010 as cited in Demaki 2011). The passage of the Financial Reporting 
Council of Nigeria Act in 2011 was seen as a potential solution for addressing these 
challenges.  
2.2.3 Nigerian Accounting Standards Board (NASB) 
The NASB is a private sector initiative14 established in 1982 as an advisory body for 
developing, issuing, and constant reviewing of statements of accounting standards in 
the country. Later in 1992, the body became a government agency under the Federal 
Ministry of Trade and Tourism. Between its establishment and 2003, accounting 
                                                     
14 The body is a brainchild of ICAN and was housed in the ICAN secretariat for almost ten years.    
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standards issued by NASB lacked constitutional backing because the body itself 
operated in the absence of legal authority. As a result, stakeholders in the accounting 
industry did not comply diligently with the accounting standards issued by the board. 
Consequently, variations in the application of accounting standards by publicly listed 
companies and their auditors existed. Preparers of financial statements, most especially 
foreign companies listed in Nigeria, generally comply with United Kingdom’s GAAP 
or accounting standards the International Accounting Standard Board (IASB) issues 
depending on the professional body to which the auditors belong.  
 
NASB received national recognition in the 2003, with the passing into law of an 
enabling act that guided the operation of the body. The coming into force of the NASB 
Act in 2003 made compliance with statements of accounting standards issued by the 
body mandatory. Making compliance with these standards mandatory was necessary 
to ensure uniformity in the application of accounting standards so that accountants 
could discharge their functions in accordance with the General Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP). Accounting standards issued by NASB are the only standards 
legally recognised under Section 335(1) of CAMA 1990 based on which publicly listed 
companies should draw financial statements. During its existence, NASB issued thirty 
accounting standards consistent with IAS (Proshare New 201315). The limited number 
of accounting standards issued by NASB reveals weakness in its institutional capacity 
(ROSC, 2004; 2011). Recently, the act enabling the NASB was repealed with the 
passage of the Financial Reporting Council of Nigeria Act No. 6 of 201 in 2011.   
 
                                                     




2.2.4 Financial Reporting Council of Nigeria (FRCN) 
The Financial Reporting Council of Nigeria Act, 2011 Act No. 6 established the 
Financial Reporting Council of Nigeria (FRCN) in 2011. The Act repealed the 
Nigerian Accounting Standard Board (NASB) Act No. 22 of 2003. The FRCN Act 
recognised the limitations and obsoleteness in the exiting reporting framework and 
provisions of the act that had established NASB. Primarily, the FRCN Act created a 
quasi-governmental body to oversee and ensure the accuracy and reliability of 
financial statements of publicly listed companies and unified the existing 
heterogeneous regulatory and professional bodies hitherto responsible for corporate 
governance and financial reporting regulation in the country.  
 
FRCN operates through its directorate, which oversees accounting standards for 
private sectors, accounting standards for the public sector, auditing practise standards, 
actuarial standards, inspection and monitoring, valuation of standards and corporate 
governance. The enactment of FRCN act also provides for the establishment of ethical 
standards for all those involved in the financial reporting process and is specifically 
directed towards achieving the independence, objectivity, and integrity of external 
auditors. The act also move towards achieving financial reporting transparency; 
individual professionals involved in the preparation of financial statements of publicly 
listed companies and government agencies must register with the council.  
 
As set out under Section 23-27 of the FRCN Act, local standards were converged with 
IFRS, and all public entities were to adopt the new standards. Similarly, the FRCN 
issued an exposure draft on 15 April 2015 soliciting comments on the draft National 
Code of Corporate Governance that will contain provisions for all companies 
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regardless of sector. The comments received so far suggest that the FRCN needs to 
revise several aspects of the draft NCCG before it can achieve the intended purpose of 
protecting minority shareholders. Based on comments issued by KPMG Nigeria, the 
draft NCCG is incomplete due to the absence of a transitional arrangement. In the view 
of PWC Nigeria, the drafted NCCG suffers from “Regulation Creep” due to so many 
ambiguous details. 
 
In short, since the inception of FRCN, several measures have been put into motion to 
improve corporate transparency. However, the commitment of the council itself to 
enforce it rules and to sanction violators will ultimately determine the extent of 
compliance in this new regime. The FRCN has taken some steps in this direction. In 
fulfilment of its statutory role in Section 62 of the FRCN 2011 Act No. 6, the FRCN 
suspended the Chairman and the Managing Director of Stanbic IBTC bank along with 
several KPMG officials and presented those officials from vouching for the integrity 
of any financial statement issued in Nigeria. This sanction arose due to accounting 
irregularities and improper disclosure the council discovered in the bank’s 2013 and 
2014 audited financial statements. In the meantime, a regulatory enforcement impasse 
has developed between the Central Bank of Nigeria and FRCN regarding the 
disclosures requirements that led to the sanction imposed on the Director of Stanbic 
IBTC bank along with the KPMG officials. The CBN berated the actions taken by 
FRCN claiming that the FRCN had failed to follow due process.  
 
2.2.5 Overview of Audit Services in Nigeria  
In Nigeria, accounting professional bodies recognised under the Nigerian law along 
with the federal government regulate the accounting and auditing professions. Before 
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1990, the Nigeria audit market was unregulated. During the period, auditors and 
professional accountant adopted professional codes and standards of the country 
professional bodies that had inducted them (Okike 2004). For example, in the early 
days of the accounting profession in Nigeria, being a former British colony, the 
majority of the accountants practised under the codes of ethics of the Institute of 
Chartered Accountant England and Whales (ICAEW).  
The first indigenous accounting profession body was The Institute of Chartered 
Accountants of Nigeria (ICAN) that came into being in 1965. ICAN Act mandated 
that the body conduct professional accounting examinations for those intending to be 
accountants, issue certificates to those who passed the institute’s qualifying exams and 
give a licence to practice as a public accountant to those who passed. Until 1989, no 
standards or guidelines were in existence to regulate the audit profession. However, 
ICAN regulated the affairs of its members through its code of ethics and Professional 
Practice Monitoring Committee (PPMC) (Okike 2004). 
In 1982, ICAN established the NASB, and in 1989 formed the Auditing Standard 
Committee (NSC). NASB remained under the full control of ICAN until 1992 when 
NASB became a government agency under the Federal Ministry of Trade and Tourism. 
In 2003, NASB fell under Section 335 (1) of CAMA, which mandated that financial 
statements be in accordance with accounting standards the Nigeria Accounting 
Standards Board issued. Due to various operational challenges, the NASB did little to 
improve the reporting quality, and, in fact, lacked adequate power to enforce its 
standards. During its existence, the NASB only issued 30 auditing standards.  
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ICAN remains the only recognised indigenous professional body whose members are 
given the responsibility of auditing the financial statements of publicly listed entities 
in Nigeria. Partly due to the “legitimacy crisis” (Okike 2004), the Association of 
National Accountants of Nigeria (ANAN) was chartered on 25 August 1993 under 
Decree 70. Accordingly, Section 335 (1) of CAMA 1990 (as repealed in 2004) 
replaced the clause giving ICAN the sole right to audit publicly listed companies with 
the clause stating that members of professional accounting bodies recognised by the 
law from time to time could audit companies. Even though the law permits members 
of ANAN and ICAN to audit the accounts of publicly listed companies, members of 
ICAN dominate the audit of publicly listed firms in Nigeria by virtue of its early 
existence and contributions towards the accounting and auditing profession in Nigeria.   
Due to the operational deficiencies of NASB and the coming into being of FRCN in 
2011, accounting, auditing and actuarial, valuation and corporate governance and 
compliance and monitoring in Nigeria remains the responsibility of FRCN. Presently, 
one areas of focus for FRCN is the quality of audit service. Public practise accountants 
and auditors along with key company’s directors and CEOs are to register with the 
council. Auditors are now required to sign off on their audit work with their FRC 
numbers along with the name of the firm. Meanwhile, the ruling of the Court of Appeal 
Lagos delivered on December 9, 2013 in the case of KPMG Professional Service & 
Guinness Nigeria Plc Vs Mazi O. Unegbu provoked a new SEC directive. Subsequent 
to the rule, the Nigerian Security and Exchange Commission directed that all 
documents submitted by an audit firm should carry the personal name and signature of 
the auditor/partner (Egene 2014). With the new initiative, the Chief Executive Officer 




Control in the early days of the Nigeria audit market was solely in the hands of the 
professional bodies. However, public dissatisfaction became apparent after the 
collapse of enterprises without warning signs from auditors led to government 
intervention in from the early 1990s and until the present (See Okike 2004 for further 
details). Presently, the Big 4 international audit firms of Akintola Williams Deloitte, 
PwC Nigeria, Ernst & Young, and KPMG, have offices in Nigeria, and they control 
more than 60% of the Nigerian audit market. This stifles entry into the market, and, as 
some literature has claimed, the charging of exorbitant prices (Olatunde & Lauwo 
2010). While moves are on to ensure more participation of indigenous firms in the 
Nigerian audit market through joint audits and mergers, nothing much is available to 
checkmate the rising audit fees. The only provisions available so far are minimum 
scale rates ICAN has issued.  
2.3 Global Adoption of IFRS 
Burning vigorously on the front burner of global financial reporting is the rapid 
abandonment of the rule-based standards for principle-based standards (Jeanjean & 
Stolowy 2008; Schipper 2003). Issues relating to economic benefits and cost of 
adoption remain unresolved (Kaya & Pillhofer 2013). So far, more than 128 reporting 
jurisdictions have permitted the use of IFRS for domestically listed companies, and 
those jurisdictions that have not permitted its use have shown commitments in some 
form to the possibility of its adoption in the future (Ball 2006; Deloitte Touche 
Tohmatsu 2006).  
 
Notable among those is the U.S. Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB), which 
has expressed a willingness to explore the possibility of converging the U.S. GAAP 
and IFRS in the 2002 Norwalk Agreement. The Norway Agreement eliminated 
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reconciliation requirements for non-U.S. registrants that drew up their financial 
statements in accordance with IFRS provisions after November 2007 (SEC 2007).  
Some other significant events in the history of standard convergence is the widespread 
early adoption of IFRS by all European Union member states and several countries in 
Asia and Africa. The rapid growth in cross-country investments (Yip & Young 2012) 
induced by the globalization of international financial markets fuelled the 
developments in the restructuring of financial reporting architecture across the globe 
(Leuz 2010).  
 
The institutional political, legal, and economic environment of an individual country 
help shape it’s accounting reporting practises (Soderstrom & Sun 2007). The resulting 
dissimilarities in institutional environments made corporate reporting vary accordingly 
before the advent of IFRS. That variation is why countries from developing regions 
are often characterised by inadequate accounting practises, poor financial governance, 
and lack of transparency and was the result of a lack of strong institutional frameworks 
(Arnold 2012). Poor financial governance and lack of transparency caused the East 
Asian financial crisis. In an effort to avoid or attenuate future reoccurrence, the 
Financial Stability Forum (FSF) made recommendations in 2008 to strengthen 
financial reporting architecture and bring that architecture in alignment with 
international best practises (Arnold 2012). This later saw to the endorsement of IFRS 
as a set of high-quality global accounting standards for some countries in Asia.  
 
Nevertheless, supporting and opposing views exist pertaining to the benefits of global 
convergence. Proponents of a principle-based system (IFRS) base their arguments on 
the concept of “professional judgment” (Bova & Pereira 2012; Schipper 2003). Jamal 
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and Tan (2010) noted that principle-based standards offer fewer implementation 
guidelines and bright-line tests. By implication, IFRS eliminates the structuring of 
financial transactions for just for the sake of compliance (Schipper 2003). Rather, IFRS 
permits the use of a manager's professional judgement to convey information in the 
best manner reflecting the economic reality that is prevailing in his company (Leuz 
2010). Another proclaimed benefit of IFRS adoption is that the system eliminates 
international differences in accounting language. With the rapid globalization of 
capital markets, uniform accounting language is seen to promote the comparability of 
financial reports across jurisdictions (Leuz 2010; Yip & Young 2012). In Yip and 
Young’s (2012) line of argument uniform reporting helps investors easily compare 
firms with similar fundamentals. Consequently, uniform accounting language is seen 
as a way to reduce informational externalities arising from non-comparability thus 
making the cost of capital relatively cheap (Balls 2006). 
 
Despite the widely acclaimed benefits of principle-base standards such as IFRS in 
terms of transparency, comparability, and financial reporting quality, some scholars 
have reservations. Ball (2006), Kaya and Pillhofer (2013) and Jeanjean and Stolowy 
(2008) noted limitations in the extent to which quality accounting standards improve 
financial reporting quality. According to Leuz (2010), institutional complementarities 
and institutional fit are important concepts that help explain the variation in reporting 
regulations across countries. Leuz (2010) believed that financial reporting regulations 
were just a component of the many interlinked institutional frameworks existing in a 
country. Therefore, the presence of these complementarities might necessitate 
adjustment to all the constituent parts and not just the financial regulatory aspect. 
Failure to do so will erode the perceived benefits of new financial reporting regulations 
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or even make the quality of financial reporting worse than before. In this regard, a 
uniform set of accounting standards does not necessarily drive good financial reporting 
quality. 
 
Atwood et al. (2011), Ball (2006), Kaya and Pillhofer (2013), and Jeanjean and 
Stolowy (2008) explained quality accounting standards and reporting incentives at 
both the country and firm levels that drive financial reporting quality. They believe 
that creating quality financial accounting as touted in IFRS without developing a 
corresponding change in the incentives of preparers or prevailing realties at the country 
level might not result in improved financial reporting quality. The facts underlying this 
assumption are that political and economic institutions remain localized and reporting 
incentives of firms varies with them. Consequently, Ball (2006) argued that practise 
and reporting quality are not the same across all reporting jurisdictions. Furtherance, 
the suggestion was made that the reporting incentives of preparers and auditors rather 
than the quality of accounting standards such as IFRS drive high-quality reporting.  
 
Other issues raised in the literature include the consequences of vesting standards 
setting in one body, funding issues, and limited oversight functions of the body (Kaya 
& Pillhofer 2013). Cohen et al. (2013) and Schipper (2003) also mentioned the issue 
of reporting discretion that IFRS provides to preparers and auditors in the form of 
professional judgement and the tendencies of that discretion to lower the quality of 
financial reporting.   
2.4 Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 
Reforms supposedly aimed at enhancing audit and accounting quality have been 
ongoing for years (Bettie et al. 2010). Nevertheless, the collapse of Enron in 2001 and 
 
 40 
other companies early in the millennium reinforced the need to strengthen financial 
reporting regulations. The many unprecedented financial irregularities and weaknesses 
in corporate governance among SEC registrants in the United States triggered the 
legislative events surrounding the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002. 
The passage of SOX brought a paradigm shift to the responsibilities of management 
and extended the scope and nature of the statutory responsibilities of auditors. 
 
SEC registrants and accountants of public reporting entities were the most affected by 
the various provisions of SOX geared towards improving internal control systems over 
the financial reporting process. Section 404 of SOX specifically relates to the 
disclosure and evaluation of internal controls by SEC registrants to drive good 
financial reporting culture. According to the provisions of the section, management is 
to assess the adequacy of internal controls on the financial reporting process and report 
any deficiencies thereof. Aside from the fact that the disclosure and evaluation of 
internal control encourages firms to set aside resources to maintain that control, this 
assessment as well gives a warning sign of the potential weaknesses and deficiencies 
in internal control (SEC 2003).  
 
Similarly, SOX has sought to increase auditor’s independence by eliminating any 
perceived threats to their independence. One measure taken in this regard was the 
setting up of a quasi-governmental body called the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board (PCAOB). The body monitors external auditors and imposes stiff and 
consequential penalties on auditors who contravene the law. In addition, the SOX 
proscribed certain non-audit related services, which statutory auditors for an existing 
audit client must not render. The act imposes stringent punishment for corporate 
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malfeasance for any auditor who contravenes the law and demands a more 
comprehensive and timely disclosure of financial information. Statutory auditors are 
required to attest to client internal control systems.  
 
With the increased oversight role, stiff penalties for fraudulent practices and calls for 
mediation where conflict of interest arises ensure that investor’s rights are protected 
and trust is restored to the audit profession (Lobo & Zhou 2006; Zhang 2007; Mitchell 
2003). Meanwhile, the passage of SOX lead to a series of corporate governance 
initiatives across the globe, including a the review of UK Combined Code of Corporate 
Governance (CCG), South Africa’s King Report on Corporate Governance 2002, the 
Manual of Corporate Governance in Ghana 2002, Nigeria CCG 2003, and the 
Malaysian CCG 2002.  
 
The passage of SOX came under serious criticism. In spite of its many benefits, critics 
argued that it was “motivated by political expediency,” hastily passed, and did not 
addressed the actual problems that caused breakdowns in the financial reporting 
process (DeFond & Francis 2005). Others tagged it a “costly regulatory overreaction” 
whose costs might outweigh the intended benefits (Coates 2007).  
 
Because of the conflicting viewpoints, it is of interest to regulators and academic 
researchers to gain an understanding of the costs-benefits of SOX passage. Block 
(2004), Engel, Hayes and Wang (2006), and Zhang (2007) documented a negative 
capital market reaction to its passage. Their findings suggested that the costs imposed 
by SOX implementation exceeded its expected benefits. Specifically, Zhang’s (2007) 
empirical finding revealed that investors found the cost of SOX implementation to be 
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high, which eventually led many publicly listed companies to go private. Zhang’s 
(2007) findings are consistent with those of Block (2004). Hsu (2004) addressed 
whether the decision of a firm to go private was associated with SOX passage. Engel, 
Hayes and Wang (2006) contended that publicly listed firm decided to go private when 
the required compliance costs of SOX exceeded the benefits engendered by SOX. 
Most especially, Engel, Hayes and Wang (2006) noted that the number of smaller and 
less liquid firms that went private increased after the passage of SOX. Iliev (2010) 
documented that the buy and hold returns for fillers of internal control assessment 
reports was 17% less than those of non-fillers, suggesting that compliance costs of 
SOX far exceeded its benefits. 
 
2.4.1 The Effect of Regulatory Reform on Financial Reporting Quality/Audit 
Quality  
For purpose of clarity, the study structures the discussion in this section based on the 
two prominent reforms that shaped reform of financial reporting regulations in 
Nigeria: 1) SOX and 2) IFRS.   
 
2.4.1.1 The Effect of SOX on Financial Reporting Quality/Audit Quality  
A significant amount of academic literature is available that has investigated the effects 
of the new regulations on the strength of internal controls and financial reporting 
quality of complying firms (Ge & McVay 2005; Doyle, Ge & McVay 2007; Nagy 
2010). Some researchers including Zhang (2007), Beneish, Billings and Hodder 
(2008), Iliev (2010), and Harmmersley, Myers and Shakespeare (2008) examined 
market reaction to SOX while Raghunandan and Rama (2006), Hoitash, Hoitash, and 
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Bedard (2008), Krishnan, Rama and Yinghong (2008), and Hogan and Wilkins (2008) 
focused on the costs.  
 
Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, Kinney and LaFond (2008), Cohen, Dye and Lys (2008), 
Iliev (2010), and Lobo and Zhou (2006) examined the effects of Section 404 and other 
aspects of SOX provisions on financial reporting quality. Lobo and Zhou (2006) 
investigated the effects of SOX and SEC requirements that CEOs and CFOs of firms 
should certify two measures of conservatism: 1) financial statements on the magnitude 
earnings management and 2) the coefficients of the firm’s stock returns. Results 
obtained by comparing discretionary accruals across the two periods suggests a 
decrease in the magnitude of earnings management.  
 
In addition, differences between earnings coefficients for firms with positive stock 
returns and those with negative stock returns indicated an increase in conservatism in 
the post-SOX era. Overall, Lobo and Zhou’s (2006) results suggest an increase in the 
quality of financial statements. Iliev (2010) provided additional evidence by using a 
“quasi experiment” to isolate other contemporaneous events and based on his findings 
Section 404 increased reported earnings conservatism.     
 
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2008) examined the quality of reported accruals subsequent to 
the mandatory disclosure of internal control weakness and external auditor attestation 
thereof. Evidence from their study suggested that firms that disclosed internal control 
weakness and received unqualified audit opinions after Section 404 was passed 
demonstrated a decline in the magnitude of absolute discretionary accrual relative to 
the time the weakness was first disclosed. Their results indicated that the disclosure of 
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internal control weakness was useful to market participants. Similarly, Cohen, Dey 
and Lys (2008) also examined the magnitude of discretionary accrual in the post-SOX 
period using both accrual earnings management and real earnings management. 
Although consistent with earlier studies, Cohen, Dey and Lys (2008) documented a 
decrease in accrual earnings management in the post-SOX period; however, real 
earnings management increased during the period. Cohen et al.’s (2008) results 
provided more compelling evidence, suggesting a management switch to more costly 
and not easily detectable earnings management method called real earnings 
management methods due to SOX. 
 
Using another research design, Krishnan, Su and Zhang (2011) investigated how the 
prohibition of harmful non-audit services affected an auditor’s independence, hence 
financial reporting quality. Contrasted with previous studies that compared pre- and 
post-periods, Krishnan et al. (2011) used the decline in non-audit services to identify 
companies that probably engaged in earnings management behaviour in the pre-SOX 
period because of the impairment of the auditors’ independence. The authors expected 
that the extent of decline would reflect the level of auditors’ independent impairment 
in the pre-SOX period.  Based on this research design, the study documented that the 
probation of certain kinds of non-audit related services reduced the impairment of 
auditors’ independence. They found a decrease in downward earnings in the post-SOX 
period when NAS was reduced.  
Likewise, the increased monitoring and scrutiny by regulators and audit committees 
further reduced the magnitude of accrual earnings management in the post-SOX 
period. Nagy (2010) examined the effect of SOX compliance on the likelihood of a 
firm issuing a materially misstated financial statement. Using logistic regression, the 
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results showed a significant and negative relationship between Section 404 compliance 
and the issuance of a materially misstated financial statement; hence Section 404 
improved financial reporting quality.  
 
Some other studies have examined market reaction to the provisions of SOX. The 
literature on market reaction to SOX provisions has yielded mixed empirical results. 
Berger, Li and Wong (2005) investigated how firm value and external monitoring 
activities of foreign private issuers responded to corporate governance and securities 
laws. Base on the study’s findings, the effect of SOX on foreign private issuers varied 
in accordance with the strength of investor protection in the home country of investors. 
For instance, stock market reaction was more positive for foreign privately listed firms 
from weak private enforcement of investor’s rights. Overall, SOX improves investor’s 
protection and enhances firm’s value for foreign private issuers as intended.  
 
Jain and Rezaee (2006) studied capital market reaction to the series of legislative 
activities in the period of SOX implementation. The authors found a positive abnormal 
return in the SOX implementation period and reported that SOX imposed higher costs 
on non-complying companies.  In the same vein, after separating the effects of 
contemporaneous events, Harmmersley, Myers and Shakespeare (2008) documented 
that stock market reaction negatively affected disclosure of internal control weakness 
and material weakness. However, the response varied with the severity exhibited in 
internal control weakness. Some characteristics related to companies exhibiting 
internal control weakness identified in the literature include small companies, 
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financially weak companies and companies experiencing unprecedented a growth rate 
or undergoing restructuring.  
Because SOX provisions affect and auditor’s work, other studies investigated its 
passage on audit quality. DeFond and Lennox (2011) examined how SOX passage and 
implementation affected the quality of service provided by small audit firms. DeFond 
and Lennox reported that Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) 
inspection improved audit quality by indirectly forcing low-quality auditors out of 
market. According to the authors, compliance with SOX requirements imposes high 
costs on low-quality auditors in the sense that low-quality auditors are likely to 
contravene the provisions of the PCAOB and thus be exposed to penalties.  Carcello, 
Hollingsworth and Mastrolia (2011) investigated the effects of PCAOB inspection on 
audit quality provided by Big 4 auditors proxied by accrual earnings management. The 
findings from their study revealed that PCAOB inspection improved audit quality by 
virtue of a reduction in the magnitude of accrual earnings management in the post-
SOX period.  
In another interesting study, Manry, Mock and Turner (2008) examined the effect of 
SOX mandatory rotation of audit lead partners and reviewing partners on audit quality 
as measured by discretionary accruals. The authors documented a significant negative 
relationship between lead partner tenure and estimated discretionary accrual for a 
small client with a partner tenure of greater than seven years. Specifically, the author 
reported that, as the tenure of an audit partner increases, the audit partner become less 
tolerant of aggressive earnings management by the client. However, the findings were 
insignificant for a large client. Hence, their study revealed that audit partner rotation 
might not enhance audit quality but rather it negatively affects audit’s quality. In a 
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more recent study, Asthana and Boone (2012) said that SOX enhanced auditor’s 
independence hence audit quality in the post-SOX period as the magnitude of absolute 
discretionary accrual and meeting earnings forecast declined during the period.      
 
2.4.2.2 The Effect of IFRS on Financial Reporting Quality 
Another regulatory reform that stimulated this researcher’s interest was the adoption 
of IFRS. As discussed in Section 2.3, the main objective of IFRS in countries of 
adoption is to enhance the quality of reported financial figures by ensuring 
transparency and adequate disclosure of accounting information, hence limiting 
aggressive earnings management (IFRS Foundation Constitution 2013). Whether these 
objectives are achieved in light of the prevailing reporting incentives at the firm level 
and country levels are questions for empirical research.  
 
Much empirical research (Aubert & Grudnitski 2012; Agoglia, Doupnik & Tsakumis 
2011; Barth Konchitchki & Landsman, 2012; Cohen, Krisnamoorthy, Peytcheva & 
Wright 2013; Chan, Farell & Lee 2008; Carcello, Hollingsworth & Mastrolia 2011; 
Dimitropoulos, Asteriou, Kousenidis & Leventis 2013; Florou & Pop 2012; Wu & 
Zhang 2010; Yi Lin, Chee Seng & Graeme 2012) has been conducted to study the 
attainment of IFRS objectives. Researchers have conducted empirical investigations 
in this area based on the effects of IFRS on financial reporting, the capital market effect 
of IFRS and macro-economic effects of IFRS (Bruggemann, Hitz and Sellhorn 2013). 
Empirical investigation in relationship to financial reporting effects has examined how 
the financial statement component was adjusted with respect to standard changes while 
both capital market and macro-economic effects examined the response of users of 
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financial statements to the changes. Based on these perspectives, this study reviews 
the results of previous empirical studies.  
 
Empirical studies on financial reporting effects study the level of noise and extent of 
bias in reported figures in predicting future cash flow under the IFRS regime (Aubert 
& Grudnitski 2012; Agoglia, Doupnik & Tsakumis 2011; Cohen, Krisnamoorthy & 
Wright 2012). Some other studies have examined the value relevance of financial 
information (Barth, Konchitchki & Landsman 2013; Wu & Zhang 2010; Florou & Pop 
2012) and the extent of compliance by firms (Glaum, Schmidt, Street & Vogel 2013; 
Cascino & Gassen 2012) in the IFRS reporting regime. Most of these studies were 
conducted using data from the capital markets of developed countries (Chan, Farell & 
Lee 2008; Carcello, Hollingsworth & Mastrolia 2011; Dimitropoulos, Asteriou, 
Kousenidis & Leventis 2013; Yi Lin, Chee Seng & Graeme 2012).  
 
Mostly, these studies have compared accounting figures prepared in accordance with 
US GAAP or non-US GAAP with those of IFRS (Barth 2008). The ensuing empirical 
studies have yielded mixed findings due to differences in enforcement mechanisms 
and reporting incentives (Ball 2006). Thus, financial reporting quality is likely to 
remain unaffected except in the instance of a simultaneous change in a firm’s 
institutional environment and reporting incentives (Ball 2006; Soderstrom & Sun 
2007). Dimitropoulos, Asteriou, Kousenidis and Leventis (2013), Yi Lin, Chee Seng 
and Graeme (2012), Liu, Yao, Hu and Liu (2011), Zeghal, Chtourou and Sellami 
(2011), and Barth, Landsman and Lang (2008) all reported that the magnitude of 
earnings management was reduced under the IFRS regime. Aubert and Grudnitski 
(2012) also observed a decline in the magnitude of the proxy for earnings manipulation 
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that was coincidental with the adoption of IFRS, suggesting that a uniform financial 
reporting regime may have contributed to exposing the use of temporary activities to 
manipulate earnings. 
 
In contrast, some studies have reported that IFRS did not improve financial reporting 
quality but rather decreased it (Barth, Landsman & Lang 2008; Christensen, Hail & 
Leuz 2013; Callao & Jarne 2010; Daske & Gebhardt 2006; Jeanjean & Stolowy 2008). 
Some of these studies proved that management incentives and the reporting 
environment matter most (Christensen, Hail & Leuz 2013). Ahmed, Neel and Wang 
(2013) observed that the financial reporting quality of firms in strong enforcement 
environments did not improve after IFRS adoption due to the inability of the existing 
mechanisms to tie in with IFRS reporting.  
 
In another study, Atwood et al. (2011), using analyst forecast accuracy, noted that 
reported earnings under US GAAP were more informative than reported earnings 
under IFRS. Some studies examining earnings persistence and the explanatory power 
of earnings and earnings components have provided evidence to suggest that IFRS 
does not improve the persistence of earnings and earnings component (Doukakis, 
2014). Callao and Jarne (2010), focusing on the effect of IFRS on earnings 
management, found that discretionary accrual in the period after adoption increased.  
 
Some studies conducted their investigations using an experimental research approach. 
In separate studies, Agoglia, Doupnik and Tsakumis (2011), Cohen, Dey and Lys 
(2013) and Jamal and Tan (2010) examined the strength of both internal and external 
governance mechanisms in curtailing earnings management in the event of regulatory 
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changes. Consistent with findings obtainable from archival studies, Agoglia et al. 
(2011) documented that CFOs were less likely to report aggressively in a less precise 
environment and in the presence of strong audit committee. First, Agoglia et al.’s 
(2011) findings are consistent with the second-guess hypothesis whereby the thought 
of being critically evaluated and held responsible for the consequences of an action 
makes the manager conscious of his reporting decisions. Second, the IFRS reporting 
regime imposes more litigation risks on managers.  
 
In a follow up study, Cohen, Krishnamoorthy, Peytcheva, and Wright (2013) produced 
a result consistent with that of Agoglia et al. (2011). By focusing on an auditor’s 
judgment with respect to regulatory changes and the strength of the reporting 
environment, Cohen et al. (2013) documented an increase in reporting conservatism 
regardless of the strength of reporting environment. However, in Jamal and Tan’s 
(2010) view, auditors must be principle oriented to achieve the intended purpose.  
 
Another stream of research has documented empirical evidence in relationship to the 
impact of IFRS on the value relevance of accounting figures. Study of value relevance 
is necessary because some theorists have claimed that the traditional GAAP blurs the 
true value of firms (Devalle, Onali & Magarini 2010). Aharony, Barniv and Falk 
(2010) examined whether changes in accounting standards affected the 
informativeness of accounting numbers. Consistent with their hypothesis, the authors 
found that the accounting items examined in their study ha greater relevance in the 
post-adoption period. Using the extent of differences between local GAAP and IFRS 
in treating goodwill, research and development expenses (R&D), and asset 
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revaluation, they documented that a wide difference between IFRS and local standards 
resulted in more value relevance in accounting figures.  
 
From another perspective, Florou and Pope (2012) investigated the effect of IFRS 
adoption on institutional investors’ demands for equities. Their empirical findings 
suggested a positive relationship between mandatory IFRS adopters and institutional 
holdings and this is highly significant for institutional investors that have faith in the 
objectives of IFRS and countries with strong enforcement and reporting incentive. 
Meaning that, changes in institutional shareholdings is associated with regulatory 
changes. 
  
Devalle, Onali and Magarini (2010) introduced the Chow test to measure for a 
structural break in the coefficient to control for other contemporaneous events. Unlike 
prior studies, the authors reported that the effect of IFRS on value relevance varied 
with stock market location. In Germany, Spain and Italy, a decrease in value relevance 
of accounting information was exhibited. However, they found a decrease in the value 
relevance of accounting figures in France and the United Kingdom. Armstrong, Barth, 
Jagolinzer and Rieldl (2010) documented negative market reaction for firms operating 
in code law countries. Leung and Clinch (2014), on the other hand, studied the effect 
of firm specific reporting incentives proxied by family- controlled ownership. The 
findings from their study proved that family-controlled firms with poor reporting 
incentives prior to regulatory changes were unlikely to have high financial reporting 
quality in the post-regulatory environment. 
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Table 2.1  
 
Summary of Studies Investigating the Relationship between Changes in Regulation and Financial Reporting after SOX 
Paper Issue  Hypothesis 
variable 
Sample  Single/Multiple 
study 
Year(s)  Research Design Main findings 
Cohen et al. 
(2008) 
SOX Pre- and Post- 
SOX 
87,217 firm years 
observation 




based to real- 
based earnings 
management after 
the SOX period. 
 
Lobo & Zhou 
(2006) 
SOX Conservatism in 
Pre- and post- 
SOX 
14,396 firm years 
observation 
United States Years? Multiple 
regression 













Table 2.1 (continued) 
 
Paper Issue  Hypothesis 
variable 
Sample  Single/Multiple 
study 
Year(s)  Research Design Main findings 




1,499 firms United States 2003-2004 Regression 
Discontinuity  
Reported that 

















Country? 2013 Experiment  IFRS improved 
reporting quality. 























2.5 Audit Pricing Literature 
The main thrust of Agency Theory is the separation of ownership from management, 
which makes the agent act in a manner inconsistent with the interests of the principal 
(Jensen & Meckling 1976). As a result, doubt arises regarding the reliability of the 
stewardship rendered by the agent. The situation brought about with the separation of 
ownership from management highlights the need for external verification of financial 
reports (Watt & Zimmerman 1983). An independent external verification of financial 
statement by a third party is believed to enhance accountability and restore trust and 
confidence in the financial reporting process (Fan & Wong 2005). However, the 
contractual interaction between the auditee and auditors brings into focus other issues 
revolving around audit pricing. Accordingly, the need to assess the competiveness of 
the audit market and the independence of auditors motivates empirical inquiries into 
audit pricing (Hay, Knechel & Wong 2006; Simunic 1980).  
 
Past research of audit pricing has been buoyed using data from different regulatory 
and judicial settings; however, evidence from developed nations has dominated the 
field. Early studies emerged from United States (Simunic 1980; Palmrose 1986; Rubin 
1988; Felix, Gramling, & Maletta 2001) and Australia (Carson, Fargher, Simon & 
Taylor 2004; Craswell, Francis & Taylor 1995; Goodwin-Stewart & Kent 2006). 
Researchers from other countries like the United Kingdom (Chan, Ezzamel & 
Gwilliam 1993; Lennox 1999; Mathews & Peels 2003), the Netherlands (Langendijk 
1997), Canada (Chung & Lindsay 1988) Norway (Firth 1997), Japan (Fukukawa 2011) 
Bangladesh (Waresul Karim & Moizer 1996; Ahmed & Goyal 2005), Kuwait (Al-
Shammari, Al Yaqoat & Al-Hussaini 2008), Jordan (Matarneh 2012; Naser & 




fees model. The majority of these empirical studies on audit pricing have built on 
Simunic’s (1980) audit price model by regressing audit fees against a variety of client 
attributes, auditor attributes and engagement attributes as explanatory variables (Hay, 
Knechel & Wong 2006). In the seminal work of Simunic (1980), total assets, number 
of subsidiaries, type of industry, ratio of foreign sales to total sales, ratio of account 
receivables to total assets, ratio of inventories to total assets, losses in the past three 
years and audit opinions were all documented to be drivers of audit fees. Interestingly, 
such drivers have been found to influence audit fees in the different jurisdictions in 
which there were used (Hay 2013).  
 
Simunic’s (1980) work investigated the level of competition and the determinants of 
audit fees in the audit market of the United States. Using data from a survey of 397 
publicly listed companies in 1997, Simunic (1980) used Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
regression and found that the US market for audit service was competitive regardless 
of market segment, with big audit firms exhibiting economies of scale. Similarly, his 
study discussed variables associated with variations in audit fees such as: total assets, 
number of subsidiaries, type of industry, ratio of foreign sales to total assets, ratio of 
account receivables to total assets, ratio of inventories to total assets, losses in the past 
3 years and audit opinions.  
 
For more than two decades now numerous studies have investigated the determinants 
of audit fees replicating the Simunic audit production model. Many of these studies 
have used a regression model to investigate the relationship between audit fees and 
other likely independent variables, which have substantially increased in recent years. 




affect auditors pricing decisions. The following sub-sections give an insight into the 
empirical literature on audit fees classified on basis of the variables used to investigate 
audit price determinants.   
 
2.5.1 Client Attributes 
Commonly researched client attributes when investigating variations in audit fees 
model are client size, client complexity and client riskiness and more recently how 
corporate governance regulations and changes to them affect audit pricing. 
 
2.5.1.1 Audit Client Size  
Client size is a major explanatory variable that almost all studies include in the audit 
fees model and a high percentage of audit fees literature has documented that client 
size affects audit fees positively (Hay, Knechel & Wong 2006). The argument made 
with respect to this positive relationship is that external auditors need to conduct more 
substantive compliance tests as client size increase. This leads to more billable hours 
and increased costs because more audit personnel are required to resolve the potential 
agency conflict. This argument holds true for all audit firms irrespective of the cost 
strategies adopted (Fukukawa 2011).  
 
Common proxies for size include total assets, total sales, and number of employees. 
Almost all studies have empirically proven that these three proxies vary with audit fees 
(Firth 1997; Chan, Ezzamel & Gwilliam 1993; Swanson 2008). However, most studies 
use transformed figures of size. According to Chan, Ezzamel and Gwilliam (1993) and 
Firth (1985), economies of scale in the auditor’s production function and the presence 




between audit fees and audit size non-linear. For instance, Banker, Chang, and 
Cunningham (2003) documented the presence of economies of scale among large 
public audit firms. As a result, extant studies introduced the square root transformation 
of size (Eliott & Korpi 1978; Firth 1985; Simunic 1980; Taylor & Baker 1981) or the 
log of total assets to improve the statistical fit in order to capture this effect (Firth 1997; 
Pong & Whittington 1994; Taffler & Ramalinggman 1982). 
  
In replications of Simunic’s (1980) audit fees model, Carcello, Hermanson, Neal and 
Riley (2002), Chan, Ezzamel and Gwilliam (1993), Choi, Kim, Kim and Zang (2010), 
Eliott and Korpi (1978), Firth (1985), Godwin-Stewart and Kent (2006) and Taylor & 
Baker (1981) used total assets to proxy auditee size. The empirical results indicated 
that a large auditee requires more effort of an auditor, resulting in a positive 
relationship. Using the number of employees as a proxy for auditee size, Naser and 
Nusiebeh (2008) in Jordan and Mitra, Dies and Hossain (2009) in the United States 
produced findings that were consistent with other earlier studies that found a positive 
relationship. Likewise, other studies like Simunic (1980) and Taylor and Baker (1981) 
used firm total sales and concluded that a firm’s total sales was an important 
explanatory variable that affect audit fees.  
 
2.5.1.2 Audit Client Complexity 
Auditee complexity is another important variable, which reflects an auditor’s effort 
due to either audit client scope of operations or its balance sheet composition.  Chan, 
Ezzamel, and Gwilliam (1993) explained that, due to variations in reporting and 
because auditors might require disclosure between subsidiaries and the holding 




inquiry costs are incurred when related-party transactions, different tax policies, and 
diversified operations are involved between subsidiaries and the parent company. For 
instance, inventories and accounts receivable are complex items that are susceptible to 
management manipulation. Thus, auditors need additional hours and skilled personnel 
to evaluate a client (Pong & Whittington 1994). Arguably, as an auditor’s effort 
increases due to the complexity involved in an audit task, so also will be the audit fees 
charged. 
 
Several methods have been used to capture complexity. Commonly employed 
measures of complexity capturing the scope of client operations include the number of 
subsidiaries (local and international), the number of business segments, industrial 
diversification, and industry type. Other studies have proxied complexity using 
balance sheet items such as the inventory to total assets ratio, the accounts receivable 
to total assets ratio, and the extent of extraordinary items. Regardless of the proxies 
employed to measure complexity, previous empirical findings have revealed a 
significant positive relationship between audit fees and audit complexity. This 
suggests that audit hours and requirements for expertise increase with the level of 
complexity. 
 
Chan et al. (1993), Chung and Lindsay (1988), Carson, Fargher, Simon and Taylor 
(2004); Craswell, Francis and Taylor (1995), Firth (1997), Palmrose (1986), Simunic 
(1980), Carcello, Hermanson, Neal and Riley (2002) have examined these 
relationships. Firth (1985) found that the percentage of accounts receivable deflated 
by total assets increased with audit fees. However, inventory, loss, and the number 




contrary to that Chung and Lindsay (1988) who used Canadian market data and found 
that the number of subsidiaries and the proportion of company assets located in foreign 
countries were significant determinants of audit fees. Palmrose (1986) introduced both 
client and client industry as measures of audit complexity, and his findings revealed 
that the two variables positively affected audit fees.  
 
However, arguments do exist concerning the exactness of some of these proxies in 
capturing the effects of complexity. Chan et al. (1993) noted that, because the 
regulatory exposure of subsidiaries were different, issues that affect audit fees cannot 
be directly observed. The Herfindahi (1950) Index (HHI) addresses diversification 
issues. The HHI accounts for the number of firms in a market, as well as concentration, 
by incorporating the relative size (that is, market share) of all firms in a market. It is 
calculated by squaring the market shares of all firms in a market and then summing 
the squares. Even though the proxy differs from that of Simunic’s (1980) measure of 
diversification, both studies produced consistent results.  
 
2.5.1.3 Audit Client Risk 
Every audit engagement comes with an uncertain return (Simunic & Stein 1990). In 
the course of performing various audit tests, some irregularities and misstatements may 
go undetected due to audit risk. They may be uncovered later after the issuance of an 
audit report (Simunic & Stein 1990). The consequences of such revelations are that 
auditors are exposed to litigation risks and, in extreme cases, reputational loss 
(Simunic & Stein 1990). In addition to audit risk, auditors evaluate client business 
risks and auditor business risked (Basioudis 2007). Arguably, the extent of client 




Auditors may respond to high risk by increasing their efforts or purchasing insurance 
premium covers (Chan et al. 1993; Jones & Raghunandan 1998). Alternatively, the 
pre-engagement evaluation of client inherent and control risks might result in the 
rejection of a client that falls above the audit firm’s risk tolerance level (Jones & 
Raghunandan 1998). 
 
The impact of risk on audit fees has been investigated in many studies. The major audit 
risk is proxied by the probability of a client’s financial condition deteriorating in the 
near future after the issuance of audit report. Other proxies are used for indicators of 
firm business risk as well. These include the level of a firm’s profitability (Chan et al. 
1993; Francis 1984; Naser & Nuseibeh 2007), poor liquidity and solvency status 
(Francis 1984; Mitra et al. 2009; Godwin-Stewart & Kent 2006), operating losses, and 
the issuance of modified audit opinions (Simunic 1980). Gul, Chen and Tsui (2003) 
found a positive relationship between discretionary accrual and audit fees due to the 
assessed audit risk associated with such firms. It is posited that auditors of client 
companies exhibiting any of these traits are susceptible to legal risks; for example, the 
management of such firm are likely to manipulate earnings. Because of the increased 
risk, auditors need to be more sceptical and detailed in their audit approach, which in 
turn increases audit fees.  
 
2.5.1.4 Corporate Governance 
Incomplete contracts and agency conflicts have resulted in corporate governance 
issues (Hunt 1995).  In order to resolve corporate governance issues, both internal and 
external corporate governance mechanisms are in place to serve as check and balance 




scepticism has developed about the effectiveness of the mechanisms (Hunt 1995). As 
a result, recent extent studies have incorporated corporate governance variables into 
the audit fees model. The hypotheses underlying studies in this area hinge on the 
effectiveness of corporate governance characteristics, which influence an auditor’s 
assessment of overall audit risk and procedures (Carcello, Hermanson, Neal & Riley 
2002).  
 
The findings of an auditor’s assessment regarding the adequacy of the various internal 
control systems determines the extent of the reliance to be placed on internal audit 
function. For instance, some studies contend that an effective audit committee provides 
a substitute to the external auditor’s work, thus reducing audit effort and the overall 
audit fees. In a counter argument, some studies have suggested that, an effective audit 
committee could compliment external audit efforts, thus resulting in demand for a 
high-quality audit to protect their reputational capital (Abott, Parker, Peters & 
Raghunandan 2003; Collier & Gregory 1996; Goddard & Masters 2000). In cases like 
this, the board of directors through the audit committee can engage the services of 
reputable audit firms or industrial specialists. Alternatively, the client demands a 
greater audit effort from the incumbent auditor (Carcello & Neal 2000). This 
resultantly affects audit fees charged. Bliss (2011), Boo and Sharma (2008), Carcello, 
Hermanson, Neal and Riley (2002), Felix, Gramling and Maletta (2001), Stewart and 
Munro (2007), Stewart and Kent (2006), and Vafeas and Waegelein (2007) all tested 
the proposition that corporate governance effectiveness would affect audit fees using 
different proxies for board characteristics and audit committee characteristics. 




positive and significant relationship between corporate governance and audit fees (Boo 
& Sharma 2008).   
 
Carcello, Hermanson, Neal and Riley (2002) studied the effects of different board 
characteristics on audit pricing. In addition to board independent, their study 
documented that board diligence and expertise resulted in demands for high-quality 
external monitoring mechanisms to protect their reputational capital and avoid future 
legal liability. In a more recent study, Bliss (2011) examined the effect of CEO duality 
(one person serving as CEO and chairperson) on the association between board 
independence and audit pricing. The results of the study indicated that financial 
reporting quality as proxied by audit fees increased with the number of independent 
directors sitting on the board of directors. However, CEO duality affects the extent of 
the relationship and previous studies have reported that this situation is detrimental to 
good governance practises. Furthermore, the study provided evidence, which 
suggested that audit fees increased with increased board size. This finding reveals that 
larger boards portend higher risks due to inefficiency and poor firm performance.  
 
Boo and Sharma (2008) used a sample of firms subjected to specific industrial 
regulations and reported the presence of a substitution effect between internal 
corporate governance mechanisms and audit fees. By implication, the results 
suggested that companies under stringent regulatory oversight are more transparent, 
hence, reducing expensive external monitoring. Likewise, Boo and Sharma (2008) 
tested the moderating effects of regulatory oversight on the association between 
multiple directorships and audit fees. They found, that in order to protect their 




from auditors. This finding is in line with the findings of Godwin-Stewart and Kent 
(2006) about the complementariness between corporate governance frameworks.    
 
Some other studies have examined the relationship between audit fees and the audit 
committee because an audit committee supposedly affects the client-auditor 
relationship. The function of an audit committee is to mediate between management 
and external auditors regarding annual reports and audit fees charges (Collier & 
Gregory 1996). Collier and Gregory (1996) investigated this and concluded that the 
audit committee was able to discharge its oversight function over both the management 
and external auditors and this explains the reason for the lower fees observed in their 
study. In an experimental setting, Stewart and Munro (2007) provided evidence that 
the existence of an audit committee resolved agency conflicts and improved reporting 
quality due to the presence of an external auditor and the frequency of meetings. With 
the additional audit effort require, audit fees are expected to increase with the 
frequency of an auditor’s attendance at such meetings.  Stewart and Munro’s findings 
are consistence with Abott, Parker, Peters and Raghunandan (2003) who as well that 
found audit committee independence and financial expertise was positively related 
with audit fees.  
 
Vafeas and Waegelein (2007) provided evidence suggesting that audit committee 
effectiveness (independent, expertise, meetings, and size) positively affected audit 
fees. Vafeas and Waegelein’s findings confirmed the argument that an effective audit 
committee compliments the work of external auditors. However, the findings contrast 
with that of Carcello, Hermanson, Neal and Riley (2002) who reported that audit 




committee. However, Godwin-Stewart and Kent (2006) did not find a significant 
association between audit fees and audit committee independence or expertise.  
 
In another vein, other studies have examined the relationship of internal audits to audit 
fees. By regulation, when relying on internal controls, auditors can reduce the extent 
of their substantive tests. However, an auditor will increase the number of substantive 
tests in situations in which his assessment of client internal controls reveals weakness. 
Therefore, investigation into this area seeks to understand the extent to which internal 
audit fees can predict audit fees. The findings of Felix, Grambling and Maletta (2001) 
and Godwin-Stewart and Kent (2006) suggested that internal audits contribute to the 
reduction of audit fees and that an auditee can invest more in internal audit procedures 
to get additional audit fee discounts. The earlier study of O’Keefe, Simunic, and Stein 
(1994) reported that the extent of an external auditor’s reliance on internal controls 
had no net effect on audit fees for financial clients and industrial firms. The reason for 
the differences in the findings of these studies lies in the proxy used in measuring 
internal control. The use of a dichotomous variable in both studies might fail to capture 
the extent of the contribution of internal controls.   
 
Another variable of interest in audit fees studies is political cronyism. Empirical 
evidence suggests that political cronyism aggravates agency problems, and, therefore, 
increases the demand for external auditing (Guedhami, Pittman & Safer 2013). The 
quality of reported earnings of politically connected firms is low compared to similar 
non-connected companies (Faccio 2006). The controlling interest in such a firm alters 
reported earnings to conceal inside dealings with political cronies. Two opposing 




Guedhami, Pitman and Saffer (2014) noted that political cronyism worsened the 
agency problem. The literature explains that controlling shareholders exploit minority 
shareholders because the controlling shareholders are privy to certain inside 
information. Politically connected firms often try to protect their cronies who have 
received illicit wealth gained by siphoning money from their company by distorting 
accounting figures. Therefore, financial their reports are not likely to reflect the actual 
state of affairs in politically connected companies. Politically connected firms engage 
in related party transactions to divert funds in order to compensate for the costs 
incurred in establishing such links. These transactions distort the earnings quality of 
companies. In turn, these distorted earnings subject auditors to increased risk exposure 
because non-detection of material misstatements can result in severely negative 
publicity that damages their reputations.  
 
Recent studies of financial reporting and auditing have sought to investigate auditor’s 
responses to political cronyism. Gul (2006) shows that audit fees for firms with 
political connections were greater than those of non-politically connected firms due to 
the Asian financial crisis. According to Gul (2006), politically connected firms appear 
to be at high risk due to their poor performance. However, when connected firms 
received government bailout funds, the audit fees of connected firms declined.  
Similarly, Yatim, Kent and Clarkson (2006) discovered that corporate governance 
practises in Bumiputera companies, most of which were politically favoured, was 
weak. Therefore, Yatim et al. (2006) found that audit fees charges for Bumiputera 
firms were very high due to weak corporate governance practises. Aside the above-
mentioned agency problems associated with connected firms, empirical evidence has 




With their political connections, the board of directors and management of connected 
firms are able to receive various concessions and policy waivers from the government. 
In addition, connected firms have better access to capital and receive government 
intervention during economic crises.  
 
2.5.2 Auditors Attributes 
In addition to the above client attributes, extant studies have documented that a number 
of auditor’s attributes significantly affect the contractual relationship between auditors 
and their clients, which in turn affects audit fees charges (Pong & Whittington 1994; 
Simunic 1980). For instance, an auditor’s brand name and industry-specialization are 
important market characteristics. Prior research has provided evidence of a price 
premium with respect to both (Craswell, Francis & Taylor 1995). A substantial amount 
of empirical evidence is consistent with the assertion that Big 4 auditors render high-
quality service (DeAngelo 1981; Memis & Cetenak 2012; Davidson & Neu 1993). The 
Big 4 auditing firms invest in their reputations as supplier of high-quality audits. This 
relationship is consistent with the deep pockets hypothesis and the auditor reputation 
hypothesis (Lennox 1999). Indeed, DeAngelo (1981) argued that big sized auditors 
have less incentive to behave opportunistically; thus, they engage in product 
differentiation through high-quality audits.  
 
2.5.2.1 Auditors Size 
Results of previous empirical studies on the effect of auditor size on audit fees have 
been inconsistent. Existing studies argue that Big 4 audit firms charge more due to the 
high quality ascribed to their work and the cost involved in the event of litigation 




creates a sort of monopoly pricing, which generates economic rent (Palmrose 1986). 
Conversely, some have argued that large auditing firms have lower costs associated 
with an audit engagement because they achieve economy of scale in audit production 
(Pong & Whittington 1994). The reason is due to a large customer database, which 
permits big sized auditors to spread their risks. Testing this hypothesis, Francis (1984), 
Francis and Stoke (1986), and Palmrose (1986) documented a positive association 
between an auditor’s brand name and audit fees. The results suggested a competitive 
market structure with product differentiation in the audit market. However, Palmrose 
(1986) did not find an industry-specific audit fee premium. Palmrose associated her 
findings with the confounding effect between brand name reputation and the industry 
specialization premium. Francis and Stokes (1986) found that product differentiation 
related to a big sized audit firm is only applicable in the small market segment. Their 
finding, according to the authors, is consistent with product differentiation by Big 8 
firms in a competitive market.  
 
Interestingly, the confounding effect was later restricted in Craswell et al. (1995) by 
limiting the brand name test to client industries not having specialist auditors. In a 
sample of 1,484 publicly listed companies in Australia, they found that specialist Big 
8 auditors earned a 34% premium over non-specialist Big 8 auditors, and the Big 8 
brand name premium over non-Big 8 auditors averaged around 30%. DeFond, Francis, 
and Wong (2000) provided evidence of an audit fees premium for brand name and 
industrial specialization using Hong Kong data. However, in the large auditee market 
segment, Francis and Stokes’s (1986) empirical evidence showed that there was no 
price differentiation in auditee large market segment due to diseconomies of scale for 




that no difference existed between the pricing of big and non-big audit firms in the 
United States. Gul (1999), however, faulted the findings and justifications of Francis 
and Stokes and Simunic due to their inconsistency with efficiency and long- run 
economic equilibrium. In his own findings, Gul reported competition and product 
differentiation in both the small and large market segments of clients.  
 
Past studies have used dichotomous measures such as. Big 4 and non-Big 4 firms to 
examine financial reporting quality and have documented a positive relationship 
between financial reporting quality and audit firm size (Niemi 2004; Jong-hag, Kim, 
Jeong-Bon & Yoonseok 2010; Colbert & Murray 1998). Francis and Yu (2009) found 
that big audit firms were associated with high financial reporting quality as evinced by 
less earnings management and the issuance of ongoing concern reports. However, 
Boone, Khurana & Raman’s (2010) findings suggested that, while little actual 
difference existed in audit quality of Big 4 and second-term firms, a more pronounced 
difference existed in perceived audit quality. 
 
By implication, first-tier firms are seen as being diligent in preventing opportunistic 
reporting. These findings are consistent with the notion that Big 4 firms possess more 
in-house experience, which assists them in detecting fraud. Also big audit firms are 
financial buoyant enough to acquire audit technology and train personnel to improve 
competency (Boone, Khurana & Raman 2010). In another line of inquiry, Burnett, 
Cripe, Martin, and McAllister (2012), Francis and Yu (2009), and Balsman, Krishman 
and Yang (2003) used industrial specialist auditors as a surrogate for audit quality. 
Their findings revealed that clients of industry specialist auditors were associated with 




share of the auditor or the number of clients for that auditor (Balsman, Krishman & 
Yang 2003).  
 
A unique future of auditor size is that it is a fixed characteristic of an auditor and is 
mostly adopted by studies as a surrogate for financial reporting quality due to construct 
validity. However, the measure suffers from measurement errors as it fails to capture 
variations in financial reporting quality (DeFond & Zhang 2014). Empirical studies 
have examined variations in audit fees according to auditor size. The audit market is 
assumed to be competitive and comprising small sized auditees audited by a large 
number of auditors and large sized auditees serviced by a limited number of auditors 
(Carson, Fargher, Simon & Taylor 2004). 
 
 However, research findings in this area have been inconsistent (Carson et al. 2004). 
Using data from the United Kingdom and Ireland, Lennox (2002), found evidence of 
a premium for large sized audit firms. Reynolds and Francis (2000) investigated how 
client size influenced auditors reporting decisions. They found that the Big 5 auditors 
did not report more favourably for larger firms. Barton (2005) documented that 
auditors charged higher audit fees for clients with higher visibility incremental to other 
determinants of fees. The evidence also suggested that auditors responded to risks 
driven by press coverage, and, through its monitoring influence, the press also affects 
financial reporting. 
  
2.5.2.2 Auditor Industrial Expertise 
Carson (2009) found that global specialist auditors were associated with audit 




knowledge and the ability to perform better compare with non-specialists (Bonner & 
Lewis 1990). This assertion is consistent with Bedard and Biggs (1991) who reported 
that auditor’s specialists in the manufacturing sector detected errors better than those 
without experience in the sector. Likewise both Johnson (1999) and Krishnan (2003) 
concluded that industry-experienced auditors were able to detect fraud and material 
errors. This suggested that specialist auditors invest more in hiring staff, in training 
and in updating their audit technologies (Krishnan 2003). Consequently, industry 
specialization enhances credibility and auditor’s effort (Krishnan 2003), which in turn 
increases audit fees. 
 
2.5.2.3 Non-Audit Services 
The third aspect of auditors’ attributes that have generated conflicting views regarding 
its influence on audit fees is the joint provision of audit and non-audit services 
(Simunic 1984). Some studies, for example, Palmrose (1986) and Simunic (1984) 
found a positive relationship between fees for audit services and non-audit services. 
The positive findings provided evidence that the joint provision of audit and non-audit 
services creates knowledge spillover, which results in greater efficiency. More recent 
studies such as those of Antle et al. (2006), Ezzamel, Gwilliam and Holland (1996), 
and Felix et al. (2001) have provided further evidence supporting this hypothesis. 
Antle et al. (2006) found a spillover from audit services to non-audit services, which 
at the time was a new result 
 
However, Wang and Hay (2013) argued that the joint provision of both services may 
impair auditor’s independence, due to close ties between both parties, otherwise called 




restrain auditors from objecting to accounting choices that are opportunistic. In their 
findings, Wang and Hay (2013) observed that auditors receiving higher audit fees in 
New Zealand were likely to compromise reporting quality. Using the proportion of 
non-audit fees to audit fees, Frankel, Johnson and Nelson (2002) documented that the 
provision of non-audit services tied the auditor financially to the auditee, which, in 
turn, compromised independence.  
 
2.5.2.4 Auditor’s Tenure 
Simunic (1980) argued that a longer tenure enhances an auditor’s knowledge about 
client operations and systems. It has been hypothesised that an auditor with a longer 
tenure will earn a premium (Hoitash & Markelevich 2007). However, findings of 
studies investigating the relationship between an auditor’s tenure and audit fees have 
been mixed with studies like Simunic (1980), Antle et al. (2006) reporting a non-
significant relationship, Felix et al. (2001), Hoitash and Markelevich (2007), and 
Wang and Iqbal (2009) reported a significant relationship.  
 
2.5.3 Audit Quality 
The accounting and auditing fraternity has widely agreed that quality audit adds 
credibility to financial reporting. Despite its importance, the factors, which inform 
quality audit and how audit quality is measured, are still subject to different 
interpretations despite decades of research (DeFond & Zhang 2014; Knechel, 
Krisman, Pevzner, Shefchik & Velury 2013; Kilgore, Radich & Harrison 2011). As 
Redmayne (2013) noted, the causes of discrepancies in the definition of financial 
reporting quality are due to different perceptions and the views taken into 




financial reporting quality is in the eyes of the beholder. What constitutes financial 
reporting quality varies with financial informational needs of users. From the 
perspective of accounting practitioners, financial reporting quality is accessed based 
on the outcome of the audit (Hussein & MohdHanefah 2013). The International 
Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) classified factors that affect 
financial reporting quality as inputs, outputs, interactions and contextual factors. 
Definitions and measurement of financial reporting quality revolve round inputs and 
outputs.  
 
DeAngelo (1981) defined financial reporting quality as “the market-assed joint 
probability that a given auditor will both (a) a discover breech in the client’s 
accounting system and (b) report the breach" (p. 186). DeAngelo’s (1981) definition 
highlighted two important features that drive quality audit, namely, auditor 
competence and auditor independence. These components are critical parts of the input 
process.   
 
Even though the definition has been widely cited, the definition has been faulted on 
the grounds that it is characterised financial reporting quality as a “binary process” 
(DeFond & Zhang 2014). That is, an audit procedure leads either to audit failure or to 
audit success. An audit failure is said to occur when an auditor erroneously issues a 
clean report or is perceived not to be independent.  
 
The going-concern approach is another perspective used in defining audit quality. In 
Lennox’s (1999) assertion, an audit failure occurs when an auditor’s report does not 




faulted the binary approach to defining financial reporting quality on a number of 
grounds. That is because, according to Francis (2011), audit quality is “a continuum 
ranging from very low quality to very high quality which is in contrast to the binary 
view of audit quality” (p. 127). Knechel et al. (2013) noted that the binary approach 
does not incorporate the audit risk model and its perceptions of market participants are 
wrong.   
 
Several authors have attempted to more adequately define financial reporting quality. 
Knechel et al. (2013) defined financial reporting quality as a “well-designed audit 
process by motivated and trained auditors who understand the inherent uncertainty of 
the audit and appropriately adjust to the unique condition of the client” (p. 407). The 
International Federation of Accountant (IFAC) sees an audit an expression of 
independent opinions with respect to the drawing of financial statements in accordance 
with applicable financial reporting structures. The expectation is that an audit should 
increase a user’s understanding about the reliability of the audit (Murray 2013). The 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision held this same view. In its External Audit 
Quality and Banking Supervision report issued in 2008, audit quality is 
 
about delivering an appropriate, independent professional opinion on 
financial statements that is supported by the necessary evidence and 
objective judgments. To achieve this objective, the auditor must 
comply not only with audit requirements but also with ethical 
requirements to ensure integrity, objectivity, professional competence 






2.5.3.1 Determinants of Audit Quality 
Financial reporting quality is an “elusive concept” with no consensus on how it is 
measured (DeFond & Zhang 2014; Davidson & Neu 1993). Past studies have used 
several proxies to measure financial reporting quality (Knechel & Vanstraelen 2007). 
DeFond and Zhang (2014) grouped these proxies into output-based and input-based 
measures. Interestingly, DeFond and Francis (2005) maintained that, despite the 
shortcomings of all these measures, they remained justifiable and appropriate for 
measuring audit quality. The next paragraph will review the past empirical research 
based on DeFond and Zhang’s (2014) the classification of outputs and inputs based 
measures as surrogates for audit quality.  
 
2.5.3.1.1 Going Concern Opinion 
An auditor’s report is a channel of communication between the auditor and the 
shareholders of an auditee company. The expression of an uncertain going concern 
opinion by external auditors signals the possibilities of the client company’s inability 
to operate into the unforeseeable future (Knechel & Vanstraelen 2007). Due to the 
negative implications of such report (i.e., reductions in share prices and management 
compensation), auditors can be pressured or threatened with termination of the audit 
engagement by management that does not want the issuance of such a report (Krishnan 
1994; Chow & Rice 1982). According to Ronen (2002), management determines both 
the engagement and remuneration of an auditor. The fear of losing a portion of his 
overall audit fees can incentivize an auditor to issue a clean bill of health even when 
such an issuance is unmerited. Indeed, Chow and Rice (1982) found that firms in the 




Therefore, issuing a going concern opinion despite the prevailing circumstances shows 
that the fundamental condition of auditor independence has not been breached.  
 
Previous studies have used the dichotomous modified going concern/non-modified 
going concern as a proxy for the variation in audit quality. DeFond and Lennox (2011) 
observed going concern as a proxy for financial reporting quality from the perspective 
of regulatory changes. Knechel and Vanstraelen (2007), Chow and Rice (1982), 
Krishnan (1994), and Francis and Yu (2009) examined the effect of an auditor’s tenure 
on audit quality. Andrew, Michael and Peter (2008) and Geiger and Raghunandan 
(2002) looked at the effect of audit firm rotation on audit quality.  
 
Despite the widespread use of going concern as a proxy for audit quality, researchers 
have highlighted some of its limitations.  Jackson, Moldrich and Roebuck (2003) noted 
that the propensity to issue a going concern opinion was conditioned on the need for 
such a report. A going concern report is rarely issued, thus samples are mostly drawn 
from financially challenged companies, and this restricts the general application of 
findings from this study (DeFond & Zhang 2014).   
 
2.5.3.1.2 Earnings Management/ Earnings Quality 
Another output-based measure used as surrogate for financial reporting quality is 
earnings quality. Academic researchers (Jamal & Tan 2010; Nelson, Elliot & Tarpley 
2002) hold the view that a high-quality audit will detect and constrain opportunistic 
behaviour of management. Accounting standards give room for accounting choice, 
judgment, and assumptions when preparing a financial report. Therefore, the rationale 




in the financial statement (Boone, Khurama & Raman 2012). However, the validity of 
this view depends on the researcher’s perception of what financial reporting quality is 
and how earning quality is defined (DeFond & Francis 2005). Burnett, Cripe, Martin 
and McAllister (2012) found that firms with high financial reporting quality have little 
incentive to engage in accrual-based earnings management to meet or beat analyst 
forecasts. In other words, high financial reporting quality constrains earnings 
management.   
 
Previous studies mostly employ Jones’s (1991) discretionary accruals model and 
Dechow and Dichev’s (2002) accruals quality model to measure earnings management 
(Kaya & Pillhofer 2013; Dimitropoulos, Asteriou, Kousenidis & Leventis 2013). The 
most famous accrual estimation model is the Jones model (1991). The Jones model 
has been criticised on the grounds that it suffers from measurement errors due to its 
assumptions. The Jones model assumes that revenues are non-discretionary. Based on 
this assumption, Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) claimed that the model was 
wrongly specified for earnings management that involved income shifting from future 
periods. As a result, the adapted Jones model included unexpected changes in account 
receivables. The adapted Jones model assumes that all credit revenues are 
discretionary. However, this model was also criticised because not all changes in 
revenue result from earnings management (Jeter & Shivakumar 1999).  
 
Other accrual earnings management estimation models include the modified Jones 
model with book-to-market value and cash flow from operations and the modified 
Jones model with current-year ROA. These models control for firm performance. Prior 




Leone and Wasley (2005) have documented that estimated discretionary accruals are 
correlated with stock price and firm performance measures.  
 
High levels of the discretionary accruals component signal earnings management 
practices and low earnings quality. However, aside from the accrual-based methods, 
managers can also use real earnings management, and this usage has attracted the 
attention of researchers recently. Chen, Chen, Lobo and Wang (2011) noted that 
management has resorted to the manipulation of real activities in place of discretionary 
accruals, which has been rendered unattractive due to high audit quality. 
Roychowdhury (2006) provided evidence, which showed that managers manipulate 
price discounts to improve sales, engage in excessive production to reduce costs of 
production, and reduce discretionary expenditure to improve reported earnings.  
 
Compared to other proxy of audit quality, earnings quality measures are those that are 
the most in the literature because they capture financial reporting quality, which is the 
primary reason that an audit is conducted (DeFond & Zhang 2014).  
 
2.5.3.1.3 Other Proxies 
Aside the above-discussed proxies, other proxies that fall under the categorization of 
the output-based method include material misstatements and perception-based 
measures. A misstatement in the financial report is material if its omission or inclusion 
affects a user’s perceptions. Misstatement is measured by accounting restatements and 
Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs) and is a more direct proxy 
of financial reporting quality (DeFond & Zhang 2014). This is because it captures the 




misstatement in the audited annual report. Perception-based measures are indirect 
measures of the quality of an audited report as perceived by users. The literature has 
addressed this from the perspective of market reaction to earnings response 
coefficients, audit-related information and the cost of capital (DeFond & Zhang 2014).  
 
2.5.3.1.4 Input Based Measures 
Input-based proxies of audit quality indicate the characteristics of the individual audit 
firm with respect to size, fees, and industrial specialization of audit firm. These 
measures were discussed under the determinants of audit pricing. 
 
2.6 Empirical Studies on the Effect of Regulatory Changes on Audit Fees  
While issues concerning the sustaining benefits of regulatory reform are of concern, 
issues as well arise on matching the costs associated with the various regulatory 
changes with the expected benefits (Evan Jr & Schwartz 2013). Following significant 
changes in accounting regulations, observers have provided evidence suggesting a 
considerable increase in transition costs (Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
England and Wales 2011). Of concern is the cost charged by external auditors in the 
event of regulatory change.  
 
The cost charge is a function of an auditor’s expected risk resulting from regulatory 
changes and the complexity involved (Simunic & Stein 1996). Yaacob and Che-
Ahmad (2012) noted the ambiguousness in measurement and recognition attributable 
to IFRS, which makes the work of auditors more complicated. The complexity arises 
from the nature of accounting standards, including IFRS and the local GAAP. Under 




exposure to litigation risks is less because written guidelines back up an auditor’s 
judgement (Schipper 2003). The guidelines followed by auditors are tenable evidence 
in a court of law. However, in a less precise reporting environment, litigation risks of 
auditors are high. Similarly, accounting changes of this nature impose training costs 
on an auditor in order to be acquainted with the new rules.  Therefore, auditors need 
to adjust for the increase risks and costs by changing the amount charged as audit fees 
(Taylor & Simon 1999).  
 
Empirical evidence has confirmed the association between regulatory changes and 
audit costs. In the context of IFRS adoption, De George, Ferguson and Spear (2013) 
provided empirical evidence on the costs incurred with respect to audit fees during the 
transition to IFRS in Australia. The study also surveyed aspects of IFRS reporting 
requirements as perceived by professional accountants. Their findings showed a 23.7% 
increase in audit fees in the year of adoption. This result is consistent with the argument 
that firms with significance IFRS adjustments are charged more than those firms that 
did not report any significant difference in IFRS adjustments. Small firms in the 
sample were observed to have witnessed an increase in audit fees of about 30% in the 
IFRS transition period compared to a 19.8% increase for large firms.  
 
Similarly, using Australian data, Griffin, Lont and Sun (2009) investigated the effects 
of regulatory changes at the local and international level on audits and non-audits from 
2002 to 2006. These changes included the spillover effect of SOX 2002 in the United 
States, the Corporate Law Economic Reforms Act of 2004 in Australia and the 
transition to IFFRS in New Zealand effective from 2005. Based on their empirical 




requirements under New Zealand Stock Exchange governance rules in 2004 rather 
than the spillover effect of SOX contributed greatly to the shift in audit fees during the 
period, whereas non-audit fees declined during periods examined. 
 
Kim, Liu and Zheng (2012) built an analytical model to investigate the economic 
consequences of mandatory IFRS adoption in selected countries in the European 
Union. The wide adoption of principle-based accounting standards in the region was 
expected to improve financial reporting quality. However, the researchers posited that 
that this would bring changes in audit tasks and audit complexity. Based on this, they 
hypothesised that audit fees would increase along with increased audit complexity and 
would decrease with improved reporting quality. Interestingly, the results of the OLS 
regression run supported the two prepositions after controlling for other concurrent 
reforms carried out during the period. 
 
Another regulation that affected the accounting profession greatly across the global 
was the Sarbanes Oxley Act 2002 (SOX).  As mentioned in previous section, the act 
was created to enhance corporate governance and increase transparency in the 
financial reporting process. With the extensive requirements of the act, researchers 
queried whether the costs of compliance would be higher than its intended benefits. 
Definitely, audit fees remain a direct observable compliance cost, reflecting additional 
efforts of auditors because of the new act. Hoitash, Hoitash and Bedard (2008), 
Cosgrove and Niederjohn (2008), Raghunandan and Rama (2006), and Krishnan, 
Rama and Zhang (2008) provided empirical evidence of the association between 
internal control weakness disclosure as required under Sections 302 and 404 of SOX 





Most of the studies that have been conducted have revealed adjustments in audit fees 
due to the additional risks and audit efforts introduced by SOX Act implementation.  
Cosgrove and Niederjohn (2008) documented a 51% increase in audit fees in the 
United States while Hoitash, Hoitash and Bedard (2008) reported that audit fee risk 
adjustment varied with the severity in internal control weakness disclosed by 
companies using the Internal Control for Financial Reporting (ICFR) in the United 
States. Specifically, the study found a significant association between audit fees and 
material weakness. However, using a sample of manufacturing companies using 
December 31, 2004 for a fiscal year end, Raghunandan and Rama (2006) observed that 
audit fees do not vary with material weakness disclosure.  
 
In Korea, Jeong, Jung and Lee (2005) investigated the effect of the revised Act of 
External Audit (AEA) in 1989. The AEA directed the mandatory assignment system 
for firms susceptible to earnings management and opinion shopping. The study posited 
that assigned auditors had great bargaining power and would charge more than a self-
selected auditor would. The results supported the hypothesis that mandatorily selected 
auditors led to higher audit fees compared to freely selected auditors. Testing the effect 
of the new created Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG) in 2001 on 
audit pricing, Abdul Wahab, Zain and James (2011) found a negative relationship 
between the interaction of the reform period and the MCCG disclosure index. This 
suggests that the newly introduced code reduced auditor risk perceptions and improved 
internal control of firms.  Compared to other studies on the effect of regulatory change 




helps to correct the problem of heteroscedasticity and contemporaneous correlation in 
each cross section. 
 
From another perspective, some studies have focused on audit fees discounting 
(lowballing) for the initial audit engagement. Huang, Raghunandan and Rama (2009) 
examined the effect of regulatory changes on audit pricing, focusing on more audit 
fees during initial audit engagement. The findings of the study did not find support for 
auditor lowballing for initial year of engagement in the periods after SOX, rather 
auditors became more conservative in their client acceptance and pricing decisions. 
Using a more recent data set, Desir, Casterella and Kokina’s (2014) findings contrasted 
with those of Huang, Raghunandan and Rama (2009). Their results suggest that audit 
firm discounted audit fees in the initial audit engagement after SOX. Events during the 
period of study such as the financial downturn might have caused the sudden 
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Analysis   
74% increase in audit fees 
in the post-SOX period and 
a decline in non-audit fees.  
Small audit firms continue 
with fees discounting in the 
post-SOX period. 
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The cost of complying with 
Section 404(b) of SOX is 
huge. The cost is 
disproportionately higher 




2.7 Gaps in Past Studies 
Several studies starting from the seminal work of Simunic (1980) established that 
client riskiness and client complexity were important factors that affected audit fees 
regardless of the regulatory or institutional settings. Accordingly, research on audit 
pricing until now has taken into account factors that are likely to increase client 
complexity and riskiness. One factor that has attracted researcher’s attention of late is 
the effect of regulatory changes across the globe on audit pricing and financial 
reporting quality (De George, Ferguson & Spear 2013; Griffin, Lont & Sun 2009; Kim, 
Liu & Zheng 2012; Yaacob & Che-Ahmad 2012).  
 
Previous studies have pointed out that stringent regulatory rules are corrective actions 
supposedly embarked upon to strengthen reporting environment. Consequently, audit 
work becomes more complex and too risky. De George, Ferguson and Spear (2013), 
Griffin, Lont and Sun (2009) and Yaacob and Che-Ahmad (2012) considered the 
overall effects of regulatory changes on an audit. The specific factor of complexity or 
increased risk associated with these regulatory changes was not considered. Though 
Kim, Liu and Zheng (2012) and Mitra, Deis and Hossain (2009) investigated the 
specific factors later, firm-specific reporting incentives as well as the issue of 
endogeneity between the measures of risk associated with regulatory changes and audit 
fees were not considered in their studies. 
 
Ball, Robbins and Wu (2003), Burghstahler, Hail and Leuz (2006), and Daske and 
Gebhardt (2006) asserted that firm-level reporting incentives caused variations in the 




(2014), considered the effect of these regulatory changes using family-controlled 
companies in Hong Kong. Other studies focussed on institutional differences on the 
cross-country level (Daske & Gebhardt 2006). Accordingly, this current study will 
focus on overlapping board directorships and politically connected firms, which prior 
studies have highlighted as being associated with severe agency problems as a proxy 
for firms reporting incentives and investigating the interaction of overlapping 
directorships with regulatory changes in Nigeria to how they affect audit fees and 
financial reporting quality. To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, no empirical 
evidence is available that has investigated the effects of overlapping directorships on 
audit pricing in Nigeria.  
 
In addition, limited studies have tested the joint determinants of financial reporting 
quality as an explanatory variable in the audit fees model or audit fees as an 
explanatory variable in the financial reporting quality model. Studies, for instance 
those of Kim, Liu and Zheng (2012) and Mitra, Deis and Hossain (2009) that included 
these explanatory variables in either the audit fees or financial reporting models treated 
both as exogenous. Treating these explanatory variables as exogenous might make the 
coefficient and standard error suffer from simultaneous equation bias. Empirical 
studies like Antle et al.16 (2006) suggested that treating audit fees, non-audit fees, and 
financial reporting quality as endogenous variables was appropriate.   
 
In estimating the effect of regulatory changes on the audit market, the present study 
treats both variables as endogenous by using the dynamic panel data (GMM estimation 
                                                     
16 Antle et al. (2006) employed a simultaneous regression model in their methodology. However, Drakos 
and Bekiris (2010), noted that simultaneous equations do not necessarily solve the endogeneity problem 
arising because, in principal, this is a problem of missing variables but it primarily deals with 




method). Thus, the present study takes into consideration the various gaps in past 
studies highlighted in the discussion above. 
 
2.8 Underpinning Theories 
Prior studies have outlined different theories to explain the relationship between the 
independent variables and dependent variables used in audit fees model. Despite 
decades of research on audit pricing, multiple different theories have been used to 
explain the relationship between the independent variable and dependent variables 
introduced in audit fees model. In the words of Palmrose (1986), “I know of no theory 
which specifies the determinants of audit fees” (p. 99). Regardless of this, the 
following theories, namely, Agency Theory, Economic Bonding Theory and Brand 
Name Theory guide the current study’s hypotheses.  
 
2.8.1 Agency Theory and Audit Market  
Agency Theory is the oldest theory in accounting explaining the contractual 
relationship between agent and principal arising from separation of ownership from 
control (Watt & Zimmerman 1983). The theory stressed the significance of monitoring 
the performance of the firm (Watt & Zimmerman 1983). Because agents possess more 
information than the owners do by virtue of their daily involvement in the firm, 
information asymmetry is created (Jensen & Meckling 1976). As a result, managers 
have the incentive to pursue self-interest goals to the detriment of the shareholders’ 
interests (Watts & Zimmerman 1983). 
 
For instance, managers could alter reported accounting figures through excessive 




contractual relationships of the firm such as debt covenants, tax obligations and credit 
suppliers. These actions introduce bias into reported figures. Intuitively, the contract 
between principal and agent could cause severe agency problems. The resulting agency 
problems, in turn, would lead, to agency costs that include monitoring costs, bonding 
costs and the residual losses. Audit fees take a significant proportion of monitoring 
costs (Adam 1994). Agency Theory posits that the more the information asymmetry 
between the principal and agent the higher the monitoring costs.    
 
Agency Theory proposed several mechanisms to minimize information asymmetry 
and maintain sanity in the financial reporting process (Jensen & Meckling 1976). 
These mechanisms included the oversight functions of the board of directors via its 
various committees and attestation services provided by an independent auditor. 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), because shareholders are constrained from 
getting involved in the daily affairs of a company, independent verification of the 
stewardship rendered by the management is necessary. 
 
 Thus, external auditing provides an important mechanism for shareholders to monitor 
the actions of managers. External auditors have the responsibility of providing a 
certain level of assurance that a firm’s resources are being managed in a consistent 
manner with shareholders’ interests. Moreover, stewardship audits employ contractual 
standards and fiduciary obligations to resolve agency problems and therefore better 
reflect a firm’s economic reality (Watts & Zimmerman 1983). Practically speaking, 
then, auditing is one of the approaches available to reduce help problems (Jensen & 





The literature on audit fees (Chan et al. 1993; Nikkinen & Sahlstrom 2004; Schwartz 
& Menon 1985; Simunic 1980) asserts that the risk of an audit engagement is a 
function of the severity the agency problem. Francis and Wilson (1988) provided 
empirical evidence showing a positive relationship between agency costs and the 
demand for a high-quality audit. Parkash and Venable (1993) tested auditee non-audit 
service purchase behaviour consistent with Agency Theory. They argued that an 
auditee has the incentive to reduce the purchase of non-audit services due to the 
additional costs imposed when the objectivity in an audit diminishes. Their study 
revealed that expected agency costs determined the variation in demands for non-audit 
services.  
 
Schwartz and Menon (1995) posited that firms in distress might consider switching 
from a small audit firm to big firm as a means of reducing agency costs. Agency cost 
is reduced because big audit firms provide investors and other stakeholders with the 
impression that management is efficiently operating the firm. Using data that cut 
across seven different countries, Nikkinen and Sahlstrom (2004) tested whether 
Agency Theory explained the audit fees model and found empirical evidence 
suggesting that agency helped explained audit pricing behaviour.  
 
2.8.2 Theory of Process Accountability  
Although the Theory of Accountability Process emerged from psychology literature, 
accounting researchers (Emby & Gibbins 1987; Gibbins & Emby 1984; Kennedy 
1993; Johnson & Kaplan 1991) have applied the theory to test decision making in an 
audit setting. Tetlock (1983) explained process accountability, as the expectation of 




outcome. According to Johnson and Kaplan (1991) when such expectation arises, 
those who are responsible for a specified decision are more thorough and vigilant in 
information processing. That is because, the pressure of being held accountable 
encourages subjects to consider carefully the alternatives and employ more analytical 
techniques (Kennedy 1993).  
 
The process of accountability is an important decision tool in an auditor’s decision 
operating environment. Accountability is the watchword of auditors (Gibbins & Emby 
1984; Emby & Gibbins 1988). Therefore, an auditor’s decisions are reached with a 
preconceived mind-set of being second guessed by others and being able to make 
appropriate justifications for their reporting decisions (Kaplan & Johnson 1991). 
Accordingly, Kennedy (1993) asserted that process accountability promoted cognitive 
effort. Therefore, process accountability enhances performance and improves 
judgement consistency and consensus. Consistent with this argument, Emby and 
Gibbins (1988) observed that process accountability improved an auditor’s evaluation 
of a situation, which in turn led to good judgement. Johnson and Kaplan’s (1991) 
findings are consistent with those of Emby and Gibbins (1988). Specifically, Peecher, 
Solomon, and Trotman (2013) found that process accountability improved audit 
quality.  
 
Interestingly, researchers have adopted the Process Accountability Theory to explain 
auditor’s judgment in a principled-based regime (Agoglia et al. 2011; Cohen, 
Krishnamoorthy, Peytcheva & Wright 2013; Jamal & Tan 2010). Most specifically, 




of being held accountable influences a preparer’s decision to report more or less 
aggressively.  
 
2.8.3 Economic Bonding Theory   
Antle and Nalebuff (1991) and Gibbins, Salterio and Webb (2001) have examined 
financial statements produced from a joint negotiation between the management and 
an auditor from the perspective that both parties must agree on the various estimates 
and accounting principles adopted in drawing up the financial statement. Although the 
auditor has the final prerogative to determine the negotiated outcome, the extent of 
influence an auditors displays is determined by his independence (Jamal & Tan 2010). 
In line with the Economic Bonding Theory, the impairment of an auditor’s 
independence negatively affects the quality of a financial statement (Antle et al. 2006). 
Non-audit service engagement and excessive fees from audit-related services can 
weaken the negotiation strength of an auditor (Antle et al. 2006). This is because 
auditors feel threatened by possible future revenue loss when a client chooses to 
disengage from their services.  
 
Prior empirical studies have employed different indicators to measure the extent of an 
auditor’s economic bond and financial reporting quality. Antle et al. (2006), 
Ashbaugh, LaFond and Mayhew (2003) and Frankel, Johnson, and Nelson (2002) have 
established a link between audit fees and any perceived link with the impairment of an 
auditor’s independence. The findings of Ashbaugh, LaFond and Mayhew (2003) and 
Frankel, Johnson and Nelson (2002) suggest that audit fees, most especially non-audit 





2.8.4 Insurance Theory 
The Insurance Theory extends the role of auditors beyond the mere expression of an 
audit opinion to include the provision of a form of insurance to cover financial 
statement (Wallace 1980). The literature has identified information value and option 
value as major attributes of audit pricing. For instance, the informational role of an 
audit requires an assurance of the quality of financial information (Peursem & Hauriasi 
1999), thus reducing investor’s risk. Investors demand audited financial statements to 
guide their investment decisions. Therefore, in the event of an audit failure, the 
Insurance Theory contends that investors will seek to enforce a claim over the auditor 
to the extent of the loss suffered in a proven case of noncompliance with auditing 
standards or financial reporting procedures of auditing standards (Dye 1993). Thus, 
auditors provide some level of assurance that the financial statement is free from 
material misstatements (Menon & Williams 1994).  
 
On the other hand, the management might want to limit its exposure to liability 
(Schwartz & Menon 1985). Schwartz and Menon (1985) documented that the 
management of a financial distressed firm purposely switched to a big audit firm to 
get additional insurance against claimants in the event of bankruptcy. However, this 
leads to professional liability exposure for an auditor, which is reflected in higher audit 
fees as a result of expected liability (Willenborg 1999). Using a mathematical model, 
Dye (1993) studied audit fee pricing based on the value of the audit and concluded that 
an audit provides information that also constitutes an option on an auditor’s wealth in 
the case in which an audit is determined to be substandard. Willenborg (1999), using 
a sample of IPO firms, studied both the information signalling role and the insurance 





The Insurance Theory is deeply rooted in audit studies, and the theory has been shown 
to influence the pricing of an audit service. Consistent with the Insurance Theory, 
when litigation risks are high, auditors increase audit fees due to the resulting 
professional liability exposure. Interestingly, the Deep Pocket hypothesis explains that 
large audit firms charge more for their services because of the need for an insurance 
premium, and studies have shown that they are more exposed to litigation risks.   
 
2.8.5 Product Differentiation/ Brand Name Theory 
It is widely held that the incentive to provide high quality audit varies among audit 
firms. The Quality Differentiated Theory and the Brand Name Theory explain why 
variation exists in the quality of audit services that auditors provide (Francis & Wilson 
1988). Klein and Laffler’s (1981) Brand Name Theory posited that firms operating in 
a competitive market build brand names by investing in their reputations as suppliers 
of high-quality services. As a result, audit firms perceived to provide high-quality 
audits receive quasi rent by a charging price above the minimum average cost of 
producing a high-quality audit (Klein & Laffler 1981). Thus, the threat of future loss 
of this quasi rent/future business incentivises brand name firms to render high-quality 
services.   
 
Today, in auditing, the term brand name is associated with the Big 4 audit firms. 
According to DeAngelo (1981), this type of firm has client specific-quasi rents, which 
serve as collateral, or a bond that guarantees an auditor’s independence and its ability 
to supply a high-quality audit. The reputational effect of branded Big 4 audit firms 




firms provide assurance beyond statutory requirements, and empirical studies have 
provided evidence suggesting that the Big 4 audit firm are able to charge a fee premium 
due to product differentiation (Francis 1984; Francis & Stokes 1986; Simunic 1980). 
A huge investment in modern audit technology and training by Big 4 firms are major 
reasons for the resounding quality of their performance.   
 
2.9 Summary  
The first part of this chapter gives an overview of the business and legal environments 
in Nigeria and how global financial regulatory changes impacted corporate governance 
regulations in Nigeria. Nigeria is a multiracial society that has experienced various 
forms of political instability and not until recently has the country witnessed political 
stability. All the events happening in the political realm and internal regulations in 
addition to external regulatory influences such as SOX and the adoption of IFRS have 
affected the ownership structure of public companies.  
 
The second part of this chapter reviewed the relevant literature on the effect of 
regulatory changes on financial reporting quality. Empirical findings from this 
literature are inconsistent and vary from one regulatory regime to another. Most 
importantly, the legal and political environments of a particular country have played 
significant roles in determining the success of a new regulatory framework imported 
from a foreign land. In a continuation of the study of the effects of regulatory changes, 
the current study discussed the literature related to audit pricing. This included a 
review of the various determinants of audit fees ranging from client- specific factors 
and to those associated with the attributes of auditors. The study also reviewed the 




literature has documented that audit fees were increased due to new regulatory 
requirements. However, the extent of these changes has varied from country to 
country. 
 
Overall, the literature on both audit fees and financial reporting quality suggests that 
new regulations tightened the regulatory environment due to complex legal 
requirements. All things being equal, the literature suggests that more stringent 
requirements should improve financial reporting quality and increase audit fees. Leung 
and Clinch (2014) considered the effect of these regulatory changes using family-
controlled companies in Hong Kong. Other studies focussed on the institutional 
differences on a cross-country level (Daske & Gebhardt 2006).  
 
This current study exploits the gap in literature to hypothesize that reporting incentives 
at the firm level moderate the effect of regulatory changes at the individual country 
level on financial reporting quality and audit fees. This study uses the Agency Theory 
along with Economic Bond Theory and the Auditor Product-Differentiation Theory as 
identified in prior studies to explain the relationship between the variables of choice. 
The next chapter presents the theoretical framework and related hypotheses that were 




CHAPTER THREE  
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESIS 
DEVELOPMENT 
3.1 Introduction 
In Chapter Two, the related literature on financial reporting quality and audit pricing 
was reviewed and gaps in the literature were identified. The present chapter gives 
theoretical support for the stated objectives and the basis upon which the study’s 
hypotheses are developed. This chapter begins with a discussion of the theoretical 
framework in Section 3.2. Section 3.3 includes a discussion of the theoretical and 
empirical evidence that guides the development of hypotheses, which are included in 
that section.  
 
The theoretical framework for the financial reporting quality model and audit fees 
model has its basis in the Agency Theory, the Insurance Hypothesis, Auditor 
Economic Bond, Product Differentiation Theory, and the Theory of Process 
Accountability. The Agency Theory is widely used in corporate governance and 





3.2 Theoretical Framework   
Figure 3.1 below illustrates the theoretical framework of the potential effects of firm 
characteristics on the relationship between regulatory changes and the quality of 















Figure 3.1. Theoretical Framework of the Effect of Abnormal Audit Fees, Political 
Connection and Overlapping Directorship on the Relationship between Regulatory 
Changes and Financial Reporting Quality in Nigeria. 
Figure 3.2 below posits the relationship of the effects of firm specific characteristics 
on the relationship between regulatory changes and audit fees in the post-regulatory 
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Figure 3.2. Theoretical Framework on the Effect of Financial Reporting Quality, 
Political Connection and Overlapping Directorship on the Relationship between 
Regulatory Changes and Audit Fees in Nigeria. 
3.3 Hypotheses Development 
3.3.1 The Effect of Regulatory Changes on Financial Reporting Quality (RQ 1) 
Events17 in the last few years, which raised concerns about the effectiveness of 
financial reporting process, resulted in new regulatory initiatives designed to address 
                                                     
17  Auditing professionals as well as regulators came under intense pressure to restore public trust in 
auditing and governance due to a series of corporate collapses and reported accounting scandals like 
Society Generale Bank and Trade Bank in 2008. 
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these issues. Generally, financial reporting- and auditing-related regulatory 
enforcement guides preparers and auditors’ judgments in drawing financial statements. 
Because the essence of any regulatory change is to improve the quality of a financial 
statement, this current study postulates that the reporting incentives of preparers and 
auditors will most likely change after regulatory reform resulting in the improved 
quality of reporting. This assertion is consistent with DeFond and Lennox (2011) who 
opined that auditors have an incentive to adopt audit measures that are of better quality 
in the presence of regulatory pressure to avoid penalties. 
 
For instance, preparers and auditors can use accounting bright-lines contained in a 
rule-based reporting regime to structure transactions (Schipper 2003). Then, later use 
these rules as justifications to avoid potential criticism for aggressive reporting 
(Benston, Bromwich & Wagenhofer 2006). However, in the absence of bright-lines, 
preparers and auditors are concerned with the burden of explaining their reporting 
choices to the regulators. Such is the case with IFRS because IFRS involves using 
professional discretion and judgements on accounting measurement choices and 
estimates. Therefore, justifying aggressive financial reporting becomes difficult. In 
other words, the risks of being second-guessed for aggressive reporting by regulators 
and the resulting litigation costs shape preparers incentives not to engage in aggressive 
reporting (Agoglia, Doupnik & Tsakumis 2011).  
 
A few studies using an experimental design have explored preparers and auditors 
incentives in light of regulatory changes (Agoglia, Doupnik & Tsakumis 2011; Cohen 
et al. 2013; Jamal & Tan 2010). Cohen et al. (2013) examined the monitoring 




regulatory regimes. They employed an experimental setting involving 97 auditors and 
their choice of lease classifications using two different regulatory regimes. They 
reported that, with respect to the strength of the regulatory regime, auditors were more 
likely to constrain aggressive reporting under a principle-based regime than under a 
rule-based based regime. This conclusion supported the findings of Agoglia, Doupnik 
and Tsakumis (2011), who studied how the strength of internal enforcement 
mechanisms constrained the aggressive reporting of preparers under principle-based 
and rule-based standards. They found that CFOs were less likely to report aggressively 
under a less precise (more principles-based) standard than under a more precise (more 
rules-based) standard.  
 
Agoglia, Doupnik and Tsakumis (2011) posited that a financial statement preparer 
would be less likely to engage in aggressive reporting using a less precise standard. 
Consistent with expectations, they found that financial statement preparers were less 
likely to report aggressively when applying IFRS. In another vein, Jamal and Tan 
(2010) tested whether auditor-reporting orientation influenced the reporting decisions 
of financial managers in principle-based and rule-based regimes. Overall, their 
findings revealed that a shift in auditors’ reporting orientation toward principles 
enhances reporting quality in a principle-based regime.  
 
Empirical findings from Dimitropoulos, Asteriou, Kousenidis and Leventis (2013), Yi 
Lin, Chee Seng and Graeme (2012), and Barth, Landsman and Lang (2008) provide 
further support. Dimitropoulos et al. (2013) reported that IFRS improves earnings 
quality. In another study, Chambers and Payne (2011) reported that the passage of 




auditor’s independence and the quality of reported earnings. Nelson, Elliot and Tarpley 
(2002) reported that IFRS prevented the manipulation of financial results through 
transaction structuring. Extrapolating from the points discussed above, this current 
study expects that the risk of being second-guessed for aggressive reporting and the 
resulting penalties due to regulatory change will cause preparers and auditors to adopt 
procedures that improve reporting quality.  
 
As suggested in the Process Accountability Theory, cognitive effort and attention to 
detail are exercised in producing financial statements. Preparers and auditors are more 
likely to agree on accounting choices that best reflect the true financial state of a firm. 
In Nigeria, the framework of FRCN, which added to the regulation of corporate 
reporting in Nigeria, meant that the organization could take consequential actions 
through its directorate on errant auditors and their clients. This oversight will 
incentivize them to improve on the quality of financial statements. Similarly, the 
adoption of IFRS could as well lead to high-quality reporting (Agoglia, Doupnik & 
Tsakumis 2011). Based on this reasoning, the study current postulates the following 
hypothesis:    
H1: Regulatory changes will positively affect financial reporting quality.   
3.3.2 The Effect of Regulatory Changes and its Interaction with Abnormal 
Audit Fees on Financial Reporting Quality (RQ 2) 
The nexus of contracts between manager, equity holders, and creditors creates 
information asymmetries. The agent takes undue advantage of the other parties 
(principal) often exploiting the information gap created by the nexus. However, 




performance are often in place to alleviate this problem (Armstrong, Guay & Weber 
2010). Unfortunately, this arrangement can have negative consequences as well. 
Because managers have the discretion to apply accounting rules and standards, the 
rules may be aggressively applied and transactions may be structured to meet targets 
(Nelson, Elliot & Tarpley 2002). For instance, a huge discretionary write-off can alter 
the compensation plan of managers at a particular point in time (Nelson, Elliot & 
Tarpley 2002; Leuz 2010). 
  
In order to reduce aggressive reporting, Agency Theory suggests using an external 
auditor to verify a financial statement (Jensen & Meckling 1976). Auditors have the 
statutory responsibility to prevent aggressive financial reporting by ensuring the 
appropriate application of accounting standards (Cohen et al. 2013; Nelson, Elliot & 
Tarpley 2002). In addition, auditors are required to exercise due care, professional 
scepticism and maintain a high level of independence in their dealings. The absence 
of these features could lead to a moral hazard that would compromise the quality of a 
financial statement.  
 
Other factors can lead to compromised financial statements as well. One factor that 
could lead an auditor to compromise reporting quality is the amount of remuneration, 
which is the summation of audit related fees and non-audit related fees. Another is 
client-auditor social interaction. As Francis (2006) observed, client-auditor social 
interaction could lead to unconscious reporting bias. Hoitash, Markelevich and 
Barragato (2007) argued that the amount received by auditors could lead to auditors’ 
intentional tolerance of a client’s aggressive reporting. This happens most especially 




a lucrative audit engagement might cause an auditor to succumb to client pressure and 
thus to issue low-quality financial reports (Antle et al. 2006; Choi, Kim & Zang 2010). 
Moreover, the benefits of retaining such a client might exceed the litigation and 
reputational costs in the event of an audit failure (Choi, Kim & Zang 2010). 
 
Early empirical studies (e.g., Frankel, Johnson & Nelson 2002, Ashbaugh, LaFond & 
Mayhew 2003) tested for a linear association between abnormally high audit fees and 
audit quality. Frankel, Johnson and Nelson (2002) reported a negative association 
between the magnitude of discretionary accrual and percentile of audit fees, suggesting 
that non-audit fees did not impair independence. Meanwhile, Ashbaugh, LaFond and 
Mayhew (2003), and Chung and Kallapur (2003) reported an insignificant 
relationship. However, Krishnan, Sami and Zhang (2005) observed a decline in 
earnings response coefficients as the ratio of non-audit fees to the earnings response 
coefficient increased. Hoitash, Markelevich and Barragato (2007) found a positive 
association between abnormal audit fees and restatement, accounting fraud, and SEC 
comment letters. Mitra, Deis and Hossain (2009) found that both normal and abnormal 
audit fees increased earnings quality from 2000 to 2003, which implies that the 
auditor’s independence was preserved.   
 
Recent studies, however, submitted that the relationship between audit quality and 
audit fees is non-linear and that the association depends on the sign of the abnormal 
audit fees (Choi, Kim & Zang 2010). Consistent with this view, Choi, Kim and Zang 
(2010) documented a positive association between absolute discretionary accruals and 
positive abnormal audit fees and no relationship with negative audit fees. In another 




economic view to explain further the relationship between abnormal audits fees (still 
conditioned on sign) and audit quality.  
They also found that clients paying abnormally high audit fees exhibited a higher 
magnitude of discretionary accrual and will possibly meet or beat EPS suggesting that 
abnormally high audit fees lower financial reporting quality. However, contrary to 
Choi et al.’s (2010) findings, Asthana and Boone (2012) reported that absolute 
discretionary accrual and the probability of meeting or beating earnings forecasts 
increased with negative abnormal audit fees. This finding suggests that negative 
abnormal audit fees were due to the strong bargaining power of a client that 
undermines the ability of the auditor to conduct a high-quality audit. Using a sample 
of firms whose managers had an incentive to use discretionary accrual, Eshleman, and 
Guo (2014) noted that auditors for clients with negative audit fees tolerated earnings 
management from their client.  
 
In a regulatory reform setting such as that which is the focus of the current study, 
Asthana and Boone (2012) and Mitra, Deis, and Hossain (2009) reported that the effect 
of the auditor-client economic bond on reporting quality was reduced in post-SOX 
thus enhancing the independence of the auditor. This current study would as well 
expect that the effect of auditor-client economic bond on financial reporting quality 
should attenuate in the post-regulatory period. However, because the new regulation 
was not geared towards strengthening auditor’s independence, the study does not 
expect the relationship to reverse.  
 
This is because the issue of non-disclosure of non-audit fees persists and rejection of 




pressure an auditor to tolerate questionable accounting practices. By not strengthening 
the independence of the auditor, the risk of a potential economic bond between auditor 
and client goes unchecked. Earlier on, Otunsanya and Lauwo (2010) had linked most 
corporate scandals in Nigeria to the excessive fees Nigerian auditors received. Noting 
that a collapse of a business occurred after an audit report was issued without any 
glimpse suggesting a threat to the company’s existence indicates that auditor’s 
independence has been compromised and financial quality battered. This current study 
argues that corporate reporting regulatory reforms done in isolation with respect to 
other pertinent issues will yield an ineffective result (Ball 2006). In line with the 
preceding conjecture, the study posits that: 
 
H2: The interaction of regulatory changes with abnormal audit fees will negatively 
affect financial reporting quality.  
3.3.3 The Effect of Regulatory Changes and its Interaction with Politically 
Connected on Financial Reporting Quality (RQ 3) 
Political patronage is widely acknowledged as a factor affecting firm performance. As 
matter of fact in corruption-ridden countries (Faccio 2006), the degree of a firm’s 
political patronage has a strong link with the profitability and the value of the firm 
(Fisman 2001). Politically linked firms gain a competitive advantage, which arises 
from preferential treatments received from government. These preferential treatments 
include the ability to circumvent bureaucratic constraints, access to low-cost capital, 
tax waivers as well as monopoly control of an industry (Faccio 2006). Moreover, from 
their rent-seeking behavior, the politically connected receive government-funded 





Further, several empirical studies have shown how the share prices of politically 
connected firms react to political news. Fisman (2001) studied the return on shares of 
politically connected firms in Indonesia during President Suharto’s last days in office. 
He found that the return on shares for politically connected firms was lower than for 
non-connected firms. In another context, Faccio (2006) examined the market reaction 
to news of officers or controlling shareholders entering into politics and the boards that 
politicians had just joined. Their findings add further empirical support to Fisman 
(2001).  First, the study found a significant increase in the corporate value for firms 
whose officers or controlling shareholders were just joining politics. Second, the stock 
price of firms increased, either when officers or controlling shareholders were elected 
as prime minister or when large controlling shareholders entered politics. Johnson and 
Milton (2003) studied events in the aftermath of the Asian crisis in 1997, observing 
that connected firms experienced a decline in their share value. However, with the 
introduction of capital controls in 1998, connected firms witnessed an increase in stock 
prices.  
 
Despite the performance advantage of connected firm, their rent-seeking behavior 
worsened the agency problem (Guedhami, Pittman & Saffar 2014). That is because the 
controlling insiders are eager to reap benefits far exceeding the costs of their rent-
seeking activities. As a result, financial information is suppressed. The literature on 
the role of the political economy in financial reporting provides compelling evidence 
to support this assertion. In a cross-country analysis, Chaney, Faccio and Parsley 
(2006) reported that the earnings quality of politically connected firms was poor due 
to the incentives of controlling insiders to gain from their rent-seeking activities at the 




far exceed the cost of their rent-seeking activities. In the process, the controlling 
shareholders manipulate financial figures. Moreover, because politicians offer 
protection to connected firms, the management of connected firms is less concerned 
with the quality of their earnings.  
 
In another study, Bushman, Piotroski and Smith (2004) investigated the degree of 
corporate transparency of government-owned enterprises and politically linked 
companies. Their study reached the conclusion that a negative association existed 
between stated-owned enterprises and corporate transparency. Their findings suggest 
that, in the process of concealing their rent-seeking activities, state-owned enterprises 
reduce their disclosures. Using Indonesian data, Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee (2006) 
documented that, due to obscurity in the financial statements of connected firms and 
the need to comply with regulations of foreign markets, connected firms were less 
likely to raise funds in international financial markets. Guedhami, Pitman, and Saffar 
(2014) extended the literature on political connection by examining its effect on choice 
of auditors. They provided empirical evidence supporting the argument that, when 
controlling insiders in connected firms want to signal to outside investors their 
commitment to high-level transparency and the absence of rent-seeking activities, they 
engage the services of a Big 4 audit firm, suggesting that connected firms are 
associated with high-quality report.  
 
Apparently, the majority of the empirical findings point to the fact that politically 
connected firms are associated with poor reporting quality. One question that this 
current study aims to answer is whether regulatory reforms attenuate the negative 




regulatory reforms (i.e., the new code of corporate governance, establishment of 
FRCN and the adoption of IFRS) greeted the period between 2011 and 2012 in Nigeria. 
These reforms sought to improve corporate governance and enhance the quality of 
financial report. However, past literature (Ball 2006) has suggested that financial 
reporting incentives vary at the country and firm level. Because of these variations, the 
effect of regulatory reform might not be the same across all industries. At the firm 
level, the level of managerial discretion exercised by preparers and an auditor’s 
acceptance of such control influences the quality of financial reports. Because 
politically connected firms have unique agency problems, which lead to poor reporting 
cultures, this study posits that:  
 
H3: The interaction of regulatory changes with politically connected firms will 
negatively affect financial reporting quality.  
 
3.3.4 The Effect of Regulatory Changes and its Interaction with Overlapping 
Directorships on Financial Reporting Quality (RQ 4) 
The board of directors has diverse functions, especially in this new era of regulatory 
reforms that have added to their responsibilities. Therefore, codes of corporate 
governance make provisions for the delegation of board functions to various sub-
committees to strengthen governance (Laux & Laux 2009; Liao & Hsu 2013). Two 
prominent subcommittees of a board with conflicting goals are the audit committee 
and the compensation committee. Due to the sensitivity of this relationship, codes of 
corporate governance emphasis their mutual independence. The audit committee 
oversees the financial reporting process while the compensation committee adjusts a 




performance. However, the shortage of independent directors has led to a situation in 
which members of one committee also sit on other committees in a firm creating the 
situation of overlapping directors. In recent times, overlapping director membership 
has been subject of policy debate.  
 
Conflicting theoretical arguments exist on the impact of multiple committee 
memberships with respect to audit and compensation committees. One the one hand, 
because of the conflicting objectives of the two committees, the recommendation is 
often made that the two committees be completely independent and have different 
individuals (Liao & Hsu 2012). Failure to create this separation will lead to suboptimal 
decisions being taken by both committees (Laux & Laux 2009). The 2003 Higgs 
Report forbad vesting compensation and audit committee responsibilities with the 
same individuals because to do so leads to a concentration of power. Moreover, 
multiple committee membership adds to the duties of directors and extends their 
commitments, and thus could have adverse effects on their monitoring roles (Mendez, 
Pathan, & Garcia 2015). For example, Ferris, Jagannathan and Pritchard (2003) opined 
that common committee membership shrunk the time that a director would have for 
monitoring duty.  
 
On the other hand, in a contrary argument, some believe that common committee 
membership leads to better coordination between the two committees. The argument 
is that because the functions of both committees overlap, a knowledge spill over effect 
brought about by common membership will result in goal congruence between the two 
committees (Chandar, Chang & Zheng 2008; Zheng & Cullinan 2010). Liao and Hsu 




enable audit committee members to design monitoring strategies consistent with a 
manager’s reporting incentives. For example, the two committees can easily agree on 
compensation package that does not encourage earnings manipulation and will be 
commensurate with individual board member performance.  
 
Laux and Laux (2009) provided compelling empirical evidence, which suggested that 
multiple committee memberships in their model reduced CEO incentives to 
manipulate earnings by providing a higher base pay and lower incentives. According 
to them, this leads to time saving and is cost effective with respect to the personnel 
costs associated with the committee structure. Hoitash and Hoitash (2009) and Zheng 
and Cullinan (2010) provided further empirical support that overlapping committee 
membership led to a high proportion of non-incentive based compensation packages 
for board of directors. The knowledge spillover effect explains the findings of the two 
studies.  
 
Consistent with the various theoretical assertions, the empirical evidence of the effect 
of overlapping directors on financial reporting has produced mixed findings. The 
settings and various proxies adopted by previous studies might have contributed to the 
mixed findings. Chandar, Chang and Zheng (2008) investigated audit committee 
monitoring effectiveness when their work overlapped with that of the compensation 
committee for firms in the United States. They found that firms with common 
committee memberships produced high-quality financial reports. Their argument was 
that, when an audit committee member has a sufficient understanding of the CEO 
compensation structure by virtue of membership on the compensation committee, the 




tendencies to opportunistically manage earnings. However, the beneficial effects 
subsist to extent that such does not create a free rider problem. Wan-Hussin and 
Bamahros (2012) provide empirical evidence consistent with Chandar et al. (2008) 
using Malaysian data. Their findings also suggested that common committee 
membership lowered earnings management, thus, improving financial reporting 
quality.  
 
Similarly, Mendez, Pathan and Garcia (2015), using Australia data, reported that 
overlapping directorships were beneficial to monitoring effectiveness, most especially 
in firms in which director’s positions are not that time demanding. Recently, Habib, 
Bhuiyan and Uddin (2016), investigated the effect of overlapping directorship on 
financial reporting quality using Australia data. They found that companies that are 
listed on the Australian Stock Exchange that have common committee membership 
have better financial reporting quality compared to those companies that do not have. 
However, the improvement in financial reporting quality experienced by firms with 
common committee membership is adversely affected by the equity holding of 
directors with common committee membership.   
 
On the other hand, some studies such as that of Liao and Hsu (2012) reported a 
negative effect of common committee membership on audit committee monitoring. 
Liao and Hsu (2012) examined the effects of multiple committee membership on 
corporate governance effectiveness. They documented that common committee 
membership was prevalent in companies with weak corporate governance, lack of 
financial resources, and low demand for synergy between the two committees. Further, 




quality and were sensitive to pay-for-performance. Their findings suggested that 
common committee membership had adverse effects on corporate governance 
effectiveness. Chang, Luo and Sun (2011) documented findings consistent with the 
view that common committee membership does not improve financial reporting 
quality. Likewise, Van der Zahn, Mitchell and Tower (2005) using Singaporean data 
found that common committee memberships did not constrain earnings management 
and those firms with different individuals on their key sub-committees were better at 
constraining earnings management.  
 
In Nigeria, where the shortage of independent directors is critical and the performance 
of audit committees is abysmal (Adegbite 2014), audit committee members who also 
sit on compensation committees are likely to compromise their independence and 
provide weak monitoring over the financial reporting process (Higgs 2003). The extent 
to which regulatory reform is able to curb this ineffectiveness is of interest to this 
current study, most especially, when compelling evidence exists that the beneficial 
effects of common committee members decline at some point (Wan-Hussin & 
Bamahros 2012). In furtherance to the above theoretical and empirical support, the 
present study posits that: 
 
H4: The interaction of overlapping directorship with regulatory changes will 
negatively affect financial reporting quality.  
 
3.3.5 The Effect of Regulatory Changes on Audit Fees (RQ 5) 
Every audit engagement is associated with an uncertain level of risk of return (Simunic 




evaluate the risks associated with that engagement by referring to several client risk 
indicators. This assessment enables an auditor to ascertain the level of audit risk and 
the extent of verification needed by the auditor during the engagement (Pratt & Stein 
1994). Accordingly, the traditional audit fees model that Simunic (1980) developed 
incorporates an expected cost component representing the level of audit risk and the 
expected audit effort. Consistent with the Simunic model (1980), auditors consider 
client complexity, client riskiness, and client size to arrive at audit fee charges. Several 
studies such as those of Che-Ahmad and Houghton (1996) and Gul and Lynn (2002) 
have provided evidence that these three client characteristics have a positive 
relationship with audit fees across regulatory regimes.  
 
Therefore, consistent with the audit fees model, audit risk represents the cost of 
material misstatement, which is the likelihood of a client applying the wrong 
accounting principles and the detection risk that explains the probability of an auditor 
failing to discover and report misstatements in a client’s financial statement (Kim, Liu, 
& Zheng 2012). The more complex the client’s business and operating environment, 
the greater the auditor’s detection risks for failing to discover and report misstatements 
that, in turn, will increase litigation risks.  
 
However, the detection risk decreases with auditor’s effort. The assessment of these 
factors by an auditor influences the overall audit plan. Hence, auditors will strive to 
minimize total audit costs. Thus, any changes in the client-reporting environment 
resulting from financial and corporate regulatory reforms will increase an auditor’s 
detection risks as well as effort (Yaacob & Che-Ahmad 2012). Consequently, these 




a sharp increase in audit fees in 2001-2002 due to the passage of SOX both in the 
United States and Australia.  
 
Regulatory reform comes at a cost to an auditor. Auditors will put in more effort to 
reduce the possibility of detection risk and future litigation costs (Ghosh & Pawlewicz, 
2009). In addition, new regulations at times require that auditors undergo training or 
upgrade their information technology systems (De George, Ferguson & Spear, 2013). 
For instance, the departure from a rules-based accounting system to a principle-based 
system increases an auditor’s risk exposure (Schipper 2003). Unlike before when 
detailed guidelines existed to protect auditors from litigation charges in situations in 
which guidelines were duly complied with, principle-based accounting standards 
provide fewer implementation guidelines.  
 
Therefore, auditors rely on professional judgement and discretion, which makes them 
more susceptible to litigation charges. Schipper (2003) mentioned that the lack of 
detailed implementation guidelines would increase auditors’ costs of dealing with 
regulatory enforcement agencies. In addition, auditors will have to pass through a skill 
transformation process for the new regime (Audit & Assurance Faculty 2004). In 
another instance, regulatory reform such as SOX creates additional oversight 
responsibilities for the auditing profession and imposes stiff penalties on an auditor 
(Ghosh & Pawlewicz 2009).  This as well serves as another plausible reason why 
regulatory reforms drive audit fees up.  
 
The impacts of any new corporate governance and accounting regulations on audit 




Redmayne & Laswad 2013). Cameran and Perotti (2014) examined the regulatory 
effect of IFRS adoption in the Italian banking industry. Their result revealed a 19.29% 
increase in audit fees due to financial derivatives held for hedging purposes. Redmayne 
and Laswad (2013) as well found an increase in audit fees for the first year of IFRS 
adoption in New Zealand’s public sector. Several other studies from different 
regulatory settings and examining different regulatory reform have observed that audit 
fees significantly increased in the post-regulatory period (Griffin, Lont & Sun 2009; 
Ghosh & Pawlewicz 2009; Kim, Liu & Zheng 2012; Vieru & Schadewitz 2010). The 
increase in auditor’s responsibilities due to compliance and uncertain litigation risks 
explained the increases in audit fees in the majority of the studies.  
 
From the discussion above, the current study expects that audit fees will be higher in 
the regulatory changes period due to an increase in agency costs. Therefore, the study 
posits that: 
 
H5: Regulatory changes will lead to increased audit fees. 
 
3.3.6 The Effect of Regulatory Changes and its Interaction with Financial 
Reporting Quality on Audit Fees (RQ 6) 
At the inception of an audit engagement, the auditor ascertains the susceptibility of 
client financial reporting to misstatements and other risk indicators based on the 
decision of which audit strategy to adopt, and the pricing of the engagement is reached 
accordingly. Audit fees are adjusted in response to the client risk level (Charles, Glover 
& Sharp 2010). In accordance with the audit risk model, an auditor should access a 




and control for risk increase the probability of misstatements in a client’s financial 
reporting. A high magnitude of both should lead to a lower acceptance of detection 
risk by the auditor. Intuitively, an auditor responds by increasing the substantive tests 
and audit evidence to be gathered, hence reducing detection risks but achieving this 
reduction at increased costs.  
 
Simunic (1980) audit production function noted that a client deemed to be risky paid 
higher audit fees to compensate for additional efforts of the auditor and the expected 
costs of risks. Such included litigation risks and risks of reputational damage for poor 
quality audit services, which are common losses that auditors price into their billing.   
Several studies (e.g., Charles, Glover, & Sharp 2008; Lyon & Maher 2005; 
Seetharaman, Gul, & Lynn 2002) have provided empirical evidence on client risk 
drivers and auditor’s responses them through audit pricing.  
 
Seetharaman, Gul and Lynn (2002) studied how the cross listing of firms from the 
United Kingdom in the United States affected auditors pricing decisions. The found 
that firms trading in a more litigious environment like the United States paid more in 
audit fees than those firms that cross-listed in a less litigious environment. Lyon and 
Maher (2003) studied the effect of client business risk in relationship to bribing foreign 
government officials by businesses based in the United States. They reported a 
significant relationship between the payment of a bribe to foreign government officials 
and increased audit fees.  
 
Bedard and Johnstone (2004), Charles, Glover and Sharp (2008), and Kim, Liu and 




earnings management and audit fees as proxies. These studies provided evidence 
suggesting that auditors evaluated the risks associated with earnings management and 
incorporated those into their planning and pricing decisions. Bedard and Johnstone 
(2004) documented that auditors responded to a high magnitude of client earning 
manipulation risks and corporate governance risks by increasing auditing hours and 
planned billing rates. Charles, Glover and Sharp (2008) investigated the association 
between financial reporting risks and audit fees in the period surrounding the passage 
of SOX. They reported that the significant positive relationship between financial 
reporting risks and audit fees strengthened in the wake of SOX passage.  According to 
the auditors, the increased responsiveness of audit fees reflected the increase in 
business and litigation risks brought about by the passage of SOX. In another 
regulatory change-related study, Kim, Liu and Zheng (2012) found that, due to the 
adoption of IFRS, audit fees decreased because of the improvement in the quality of 
financial reporting.  
 
The number of significant regulatory changes that have occurred in the Nigerian 
financial reporting environment will surely affect the auditing profession. Although 
this current study did not attempt to link the effect to any specific regulatory event that 
had occurred due to complexity of the auditing environment, the various regulatory 
changes discussed in Section 2.2 and the empirical evidence shown above predict that 
audit fees will be adjusted in response to changes in the client risk environment. For 
instance, this current study expects that the creation of FRCN in 2011 and the adoption 
of IFRS in 2013 should improve the quality of client financial reporting. This 
improvement should reduce financial reporting quality risks that auditors risk 




expects to find evidence that audit fees are associated with financial reporting risks. 
Consistent with the above theoretical and empirical justifications, this study posits 
that: 
 
H6: The interaction of regulatory changes with financial reporting quality will 
positively affect audit fees. 
3.3.7 The Effect of Regulatory Changes and Its Interaction with Politically 
Connected Firms on Audit Fees (RQ 7) 
Studies on the impact of political economy have been enlarged in recent times to cover 
all the facets of the financial reporting process, starting with the literature that 
investigates the linkage between political cronyism and firm performance to those that 
have impacts the quality of financial reporting. More recently, auditing literature has 
begun to understand the linkage between political connection and the pricing 
behaviour of auditors. The underlying theoretical assumption is that political 
connection is associated with financial misstatement and the high probability of 
business failure (Chaney, Faccio & Parsley 2006; Gul 2006). Business failure, in turn, 
imposes great litigation and reputational risks on external auditors. In line with the 
audit risk model and audit fees model, auditors respond to greater control and inherent 
risks by lowering detection risks. Consequently, more audit effort is expended, which 
translates into increased audit fees.  
 
Gul (2006) examined auditors pricing behavior in politically connected firms during 
and after the Asian financial crisis. Gul’s findings revealed that, before government 
intervention through capital controls, politically connected firms ranked high in their 




intervention, the audit risk of connected firms dropped and audit fees were realigned 
accordingly. In another study, Bliss, Gul and Majid (2011) investigated whether 
political connection attenuated the relationship between the independent audit 
committee and demands for a high-quality audit. According to their findings, political 
connection weakens the association between the independence of the audit committee 
and the demand for high quality.  This is because of the high-agency costs and rent-
seeking activities of connected firms. Abdul Wahab, Zain and Rahman (2015) 
provided further empirical support to Gul’s (2006) study. The finding of Abdul Wahab 
et al. (2015) also suggested that auditors perceived politically connected firms to be 
riskier, which, in turn, led to high audit fees.  
 
Because the general view is that politically connected firms do not practice transparent 
reporting (Bushman, Piotroski & Smith 2004) leading to a poor quality of financial 
reporting, the current study further tests whether the regulatory reforms changed the 
auditor’s perceptions of the riskiness of connected firms. As the various theoretical 
arguments and empirical evidence suggest, the study expects the auditor’s perceptions 
of connected firms will remain in the post-regulatory period. First among the reasons 
for this is that the various reforms add to the risk exposure of the auditor. Therefore, 
the auditor will want to attenuate the risk by carrying out more substantive and control 
tests in connected firms to ameliorate the risk associated with those firms. In 
furtherance of this argument, the study posits that:  
 
H7: The interaction of regulatory changes with politically connected firms will 





3.3.8 The Effect of Regulatory Changes and its Interaction with Overlapping 
Directorships on Audit Fees (RQ 8) 
Due to events in the recent past, the functions of boards of directors have expanded 
beyond the traditionally recognised ones. Their functions now go beyond mere 
endorsement of managerial actions to active monitoring and risk tasking. Anything 
less than meeting market expectations attracts severe penalties in terms of litigation 
and reputational loss for the board of directors. For the effective discharge of its duties, 
the various codes have recommended delegating various functions of the full board to 
sub-committees (Wan-Hussin & Bamahros 2012). Prominent among these sub-
committees and, of concern to this study, are the nomination, audit, and compensation 
committees. 
A number of studies have investigated how the structures of these sub-committees 
have affected corporate governance (Pincus et al. 1989; Vafeas 2000). In addition, 
studies have sought an understanding of how a director’s membership on the board of 
company A affects his performance on a committee of company B. Generally, such 
multiple memberships are believed to limit the managerial monitoring function 
because such directors become over-occupied. In addition, studies have placed an 
emphasis on the effectiveness of the committees and sagacity of committee members. 
Moreover, some of these studies have noted that committee effectiveness is contingent 
on the percentage of independent members (Abbott, Parker & Peters 2006; Carcello & 
Neal 2000). Generally, extant studies found that improving the coordination of audit 
and compensation committees could help improve the quality of financial reporting 





Recently, issues have emerged about the impacts on board functions of a director’s 
dual membership (overlapping directorship) on board committees within the same 
company (Laux & Laux 2009; Hoitash & Hoitash 2009; Zheng & Cullinan 2010). The 
argument supporting overlapping directors uses the Knowledge Spillover Theory. The 
logic is that knowledge gained from the compensation committee could be transferred 
to the audit committee resulting in the congruence of board goals. According to 
Chandar et al. (2010) and Zheng and Cullinan (2010), the knowledge spill over effect 
will improve financial reporting quality. Other studies such as those of Hermanson et 
al. (2012) have observed that overlapping directorship reduced potential committee 
conflicts that might arise from inconsistent objectives of audit committee and 
compensation committee18. Judging from the knowledge spillover effect perspective, 
the auditor’s perceptions of client risk of material misstatement would be low, and 
therefore, auditors are more reliant on client internal control and an audit requires 
reduced effort, which translates to lower audit fees.   
 
In the countervailing argument, some authors have argued that overlapping directors 
dampen board effectiveness (Liao & Hsu 2012). This strand of literature documents 
that overlapping membership places additional work and time pressure on directors 
and makes them over-committed (Fich & Shivdasani 2006). Consequently, the 
monitoring efficiency of the board of directors is negatively affected. For instance, 
Fich and Shivdasani (2006) reported that firms with over-committed directors are 
linked to weak corporate governance and poor performance. Recently, Mendez, 
Pathan, and Garcia (2015) reported that directors who are too busy negatively affect 
                                                     
18 Conflicts arise when the compensation committee favors performance-based remuneration, which 
could trigger earnings manipulation for an incentive package that reduces such and which is more 




the monitoring capacity of the board and its committees. In line with this reasoning, 
weak internal board monitoring increases the auditor’s detection risks. Accordingly, 
the auditor is led to conduct substantive tests and gather more evidence, which will 
lead to increased audit fees. Specifically, Karim, Robin and Suh (2016), observed that 
committee overlapping is associated with weak governance because the monitoring 
effort of the audit committee is ineffective.   
 
The discussion so far points out the benefits and costs associated with overlapping 
memberships of board members on various committees in a firm. Empirical evidence 
emerging from Nigeria has shown that the board audit committee often lacks the 
required independence to diligently carry out their oversight function of the financial 
reporting process. According to Adegbite (2014), “the relationship between board 
audit committee members and managements of companies have long been too cordial” 
(p. 23). As a result, executive directors have an overbearing influence on the audit 
committee. Dual committee membership might further exacerbate the ineffectiveness 
of the audit committee as its concentrates power in the hands of a few directors. 
Consequently, overlapping memberships portend a high risk for external auditors. 
Even though regulatory change might strengthen audit committee independence, the 
preconceived notion about their riskiness might persist. This is because the regulatory 
reforms already impose additional risk on the auditor. Therefore, they will take 
precautions most especially in a principle-based regime wherein the chances of being 
second-guessed are high. Based on the preceding theoretical and empirical arguments, 
this study posits that:   
H8: The interaction of overlapping directorships and regulatory changes will 




3.4 Summary  
In summary, based on the theoretical framework presented in Section 3.2, eight 
hypotheses were developed. Each hypothesis is directed towards answering the 
research questions and objectives raised in Chapter One. Table 3.1 below summarizes 






Links between Research Questions, Objectives, and Hypotheses  
S/N Research Question  Objective  Hypothesis  
1 Does regulatory changes affect financial reporting quality? To examine whether regulatory 
changes affect financial reporting 
quality. 
H1: Regulatory change will positively affect 
financial reporting quality.  
2 Do regulatory changes and its interaction with abnormal audit fees 
affect financial reporting quality? 
To examine whether regulatory 
changes and its interaction with 
abnormal audit fees affect financial 
reporting quality. 
H2: The interaction of regulatory changes 
with abnormal audit fees will negatively 
affect financial reporting quality. 
3 Do regulatory changes and its interaction with politically connected 
firms affect financial reporting quality? 
To examine whether regulatory 
changes and its interaction with 
politically connected firms affect 
financial reporting quality. 
H3: The interaction of regulatory changes 
with politically connected firms will 
negatively affect financial reporting quality. 
4 Do regulatory changes and its interaction with overlapping 
directorship affect financial reporting quality? 
To examine whether regulatory 
changes and its interaction with 
overlapping directorship affect 
financial reporting quality. 
H4: The interaction of overlapping 
directorships with regulatory changes will 
negatively affect financial reporting quality. 
 
5 Do regulatory changes affect audit fees? To examine whether regulatory changes 
affects audit fees. 
H5: Regulatory changes will lead to 
increased audit fees. 
6 Do regulatory changes and its interaction with financial reporting 
quality affect audit fees? 
To examine whether regulatory changes 
and its interaction with financial 
reporting quality affect audit fees. 
H6: The interaction of regulatory changes 
with financial reporting quality will 
positively affect audit fees. 
7 Do regulatory changes and its interaction with politically connected 
firms affect audit fees? 
To examine whether regulatory changes 
and its interaction with politically 
connected firms affect audit fees. 
H7: The interaction of regulatory changes 
with politically connected firms will 





Table 3.1 (continued) 
  
S/N Research Question  Objective  Hypothesis  
8 Do regulatory changes and its interaction with overlapping 
directorship affect audit fees? 
To examine whether regulatory 
changes and its interaction with 
overlapping directorship affect audit 
fees 
H8: The interaction of overlapping 
directorships and regulatory changes will 








This chapter discusses the research approach used to achieve the study’s objectives 
and develop models to test the various hypotheses developed in Section 3.3. In order 
to accomplish the research objectives and test the study’s hypotheses four-regression 
models were developed in Section 4.2. Six years of panel data are used to ascertain the 
effects of regulatory changes on financial reporting quality and audit fees. The first 
regression models tests Hypotheses 1 while the second model tests the interacting 
effects of abnormal audit fees, political connected firms and overlapping directorship 
on financial reporting quality. These are Hypotheses 2, 3 and 4. The third model tests 
Hypothesis 5 while the fourth model tests Hypotheses 6, 7 and 8. Section 4.3 describes 
the variables used in the regression model and their measurement. Section 4.4 
discusses the population and sample selection procedures. Finally, Section 4.5 presents 
the methods of data analysis.  
 
4.2 Research Model and Measurement  
4.2.1 Financial Reporting Quality Model  
Consistent with prior research (e.g., Ashbaugh, LaFond & Mayhew 2003; Choi, Kim 
& Zang 2010; Eshleman & Guo 2014) the current study estimates the following 
multivariate panel data regression models to test the hypotheses on the effect of 





FRQit = αit + β1 FRQt−1 + β2POSTit + β3ABNRAFit + β4POLIit + β5OVERLAPit + β6BIG4it
+ β7CFFO2TAit + β8RLAGit + β9SALESGit + β10LEVERAGEit + β11LAGROAit
+ β12BUSISEGit + β13ACCRUALTAit+β14LOGTAit + β15TEMPLOYit
+ β16BSIZEit + β17NONEXC_it + β18INDP_it + β19FDIRit + β20FSHRit
+ β21INSTITSHRit + β22YEAREFFECTit + β23INDUSTRYEFFCTit
+ μRQ … … … … … … … … … … … … … … . . Model 1 
The next model, Model 2, tests the interacting effect of firm-specific reporting 
characteristics and is an extension of Model 1.  
FRQit = αit + β1 FRQt−1 + β2POSTit + β3POSTABNAFit + β4POSTPOLIit + β5POSTOVERLAPit
+ β6ABNRAFit + β7POLIit + β8OVERLAPit + β9BIG4it + β10CFFO2TAit
+ β11RLAGit + β12SALESGit + β13LEVERAGEit + β14LAGROAit + β15BUSISEGit
+ β16ACCRUALTAit+β17LOGTAit + β18TEMPLOYit + β19BSIZEit
+ β20NONEXC_it + β21INDP_it + β22FDIRit + β23FSHRit + β24INSTITSHRit
+ β25YEAREFFECTit + β26INDUSTRYEFFCTit
+ μRQ … … … … … … … … … … … … … … . . 𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 2 
Where:  









Explanation of Variables 
Variable Description 
Α An intercept term, a constant 




FRQ FRQ represent audit quality, which is the 
absolute discretionary accruals, calculated using 
Kothari, Leone, and Wasley’s (2005) cross-
sectional modified Jones model with ROA 
estimated by year and industry. 
 
FRQt-1 FRQt-1 is a lagged dependent variable. The lag 
dependent variable is added to account for any 




POST Post is a dichotomous variable with a value of 1 
for the regulatory changes period 2011-2013 
and 0 if otherwise. (H1) 
POSTABNAF POSTABNAF is an interacting variable. 
POST*ABNRAF is used to capture the 
incremental abnormal fees increase for post 
regulatory changes. (H2)   
 
POSTPOLI POSTPOLI is an interacting variable 
(POST*POLI) used to capture the effect of 
politically connected firms for post regulatory 
changes. (H3)  
 
POSTOVERLAP POSTOVERLAP is an interacting variable 
(POST* OVERLAP) used to capture the effect 
of a board member serving on two audit 
committees for post regulatory changes. (H4)  
 
ABNRAF ABNRAF is a continuous variable that captures 
the abnormal portion of total audit fees paid to 
auditor. 
 
POLI POLI is a dichotomous variable with a value of 











OVERLAP OVERLAP is an indicator variable with a value 
of 1 if a board member serves on the both the 
audit committee and the compensation 
committee simultaneously and 0 if otherwise. 
 
BIG4 BIG4 is a measure of firm’s auditor coded 1 if 
the client is audited by a BIG 4 firm and 0 if 
otherwise. 
 
CFFO2TA CFFO2TA is cash flow from operations divided 
by total assets. 
 
RLAG RLAG is the length of time between a 
company’s financial year-end and the date of 
auditor’s report. 
 
SALESG SALESG is calculated as the change in sales 
revenue. 
 
LEVERAGE LEVERAGE is measured as total debt to total 
equity. 
 
LAGROA LAGROA measures the lag of return on assets 
measuring client performance. 
 
BUSISEG BUSISEG is the number of business segments. 
 
ACCRUALTA ACCRUAL is calculated as net income less 
operating cash flow scaled by total assets. 
 
LOGTA LOGTA represents the log of total assets. 
 
TEMPLOY TEMPLOY is the total number of employees a 
company has. 
 
BSIZE BSIZE is the total number of directors serving on 











NONEXC_ NONEXC_ is the total number of non-executive 
directors divided by total number of directors. 
 
INDP_ INDP_ is the total number of independent non-
executive directors divided by the total number 
of directors. 
 
FDIR FDIR is the total number of foreign directors on 
the board divided by the total number of 
directors. 
 
FSHR FSHR is the percentage of a firm’s outstanding 
shares held by foreign institutional investors. 
 
INSTITSHR INSTITSHR is the percentage of a firm’s 
outstanding shares held by local institutional 
investors. 
 
YEAREFFECT Control for year effect 
 
INDUSTRYEFFECT Control for industry effect 
 
μ_RQ Error term 
 
4.2.2 Audit Fees Model  
Consistent with Simunic (1980) as modified by Kim, Liu & Zheng (2012), the current 
study develops the following multivariate panel data regression model to test the 
hypothesis on the effect of regulatory change on audit fees.   
LOGAFit = αit + β1LOGAFt−1 + β2POSTit + β2FRQit + β3POLI + β4OVERLAPit + β5LOGTAit
+ β6LOSSit + β7CRATIOit + β7DRit + β8QUICKit + β9INVT2TAit
+ β10BUSISEGit + β11LAGROAit + β12BIG4it + β13BUSYit + β14RLAGit
+ β15INSTITSHRit + β16FSHRit + β17BSIZEit + β18EXC_it + β19NONEXC_it
+ β20INDP_it + β21YEAREFFECTit






Next, Model 4 tests the interacting effect of a firm’s specific reporting characteristics 
and is an extension of Model 3.  
LOGAFit = αit + β1LOGAFt−1 + β2POSTit + β3POSTFRQit + β4POSTPOLIit + β5POSTOVERLAPit
+ β6FRQit + β7POLI + β8OVERLAPit + β9LOGTAit + β10LOSSit + β11CRATIOit
+ β12DRit + β13QUICKit + β14INVT2TAit + β15BUSSEGit + β16LAGROAit
+ β17BIG4it + β18BUSYit + β19RLAGit + β20INSTITISHRit + β21FSHRit
+ β22BSIZEit + β23EXC_it + β24NONEXC_it + β25INDP_it + β26YEAREFFECTit
+ β27INDUSTRYEFFECTit +μAF … … … … … … … . . Model 4 
Where:   




Specification for Model 4 
Variable  Description  
Α An intercept term, a constant 
 
Β A regression slope coefficient  
 
Dependent Variable  
LOGAF LOGAF represents natural logarithms of audit 
fees (Naira).  
 
LOGAF(t-1) Lag of the dependent variable. The lag 
dependent variable is added to account for any 
dynamic endogeneity present in the relationship. 
Hypothesis Variable  
POST Post is a dichotomous variable with a value of 1 
for the regulatory changes periods 2011-2013 







Table 4.2 (continued) 
POSTFRQ POSTFRQ is an interacting variable 
(POST*FRQ) used to capture the effect of 
financial reporting quality for regulatory 
changes.  
POSTOVERLAP POSTOVERLAP is an interacting variable 
(POST* OVERLAP) used to capture the effect 
of a board member serving on two audit 
committees for regulatory changes.  (8) 
 
Control Variable   
FRQ FRQ is absolute discretionary accrual.  
 
POLI POLI is a dichotomous variable with a value of 
1 for firms that are politically connected and 0 if 
otherwise. 
 
OVERLAP OVERLAP is an indicator variable with a value 
of 1 if a board member serves on both the audit 
committee and compensation committees 
simultaneously and 0 if otherwise.  
  
LOGTA  LOGTA represents a log of total assets.  
 
LOSS  LOSS takes a value of 1 when a firm reports a 
net loss and 0 if otherwise.  
 
CRATIO CRATIO represents current assets divided by 
current liabilities.  
 
DR DR represents the ratio of long-term debt to 
closing total assets.  
 
QUICK  QUICK is the ratio of current asset less 
inventory divide current liabilities.  
 
INVT2TA INVT2TA represents inventory to total assets.  
 
BUSISEG BUSSEG is the number of business segments. 
 
LAGROA LAGROA measures the lag of return on assets 





POSTPOLI POSTPOLI is an interacting variable 
(POST*POLI) used to capture the effect of 











BIG4 BIG4 is a measure of a firm’s auditor coded 1 if 
the client is audited by a Big 4 firm and 0 if 
otherwise.   
 
BUSY  BUSY is an indicator variable equal to 1 for a 
firm with a December year-end and 0 if 
otherwise.  
 
RLAG RLAG represents the number of days taken from 
account year-end to the date of the auditor’s 
report.  
 
INSTITSHR  INSTITSHR is the percentage of a firm’s 
outstanding shares held by local institutional 
investors. 
 
FSHR  FSHR is the percentage of a firm’s outstanding 
shares held by foreign institutional investors. 
 
BSIZE BSIZE is the total number of directors serving 
on the board of directors of a company. 
 
EXC_ EXC_ is the total number of non-executive 
directors divided by board size. 
 
NONEXC_ NONEXC_ is the total number of non-executive 
directors divided by board size. 
 
INDP_ INDP_ is the total number of independent non-
executive directors divided by the total number 
of directors. 
 
YEAREFFECT  Control for year effect 
 
INDUSTRYEFFECT  Control for industry effect  
 
μ_RQ Error term 
 
 
4.3 Measurement of Variables 
4.3.1 Dependent Variables 
Due to the nature of this study, two dependent variables are tested. The dependent 






4.3.1.1 Financial reporting quality  
The dependent variable in the financial reporting quality model is audit quality. 
Following prior empirical studies (Ashbaugh, LaFond & Mayhew 2003; Choi, Kim & 
Zang 2010; Eshleman & Guo 2014), financial reporting quality is measured by accrual 
earnings management. The incentives to engage in aggressive earnings management 
vary according to a manager’s motives. Often, financial statements are window 
dressed to mislead users of financial statements or to meet the expected outcomes of 
contractual relationships tied to performance (Chen, Tang, Jiang, & Lin 2010).  
 
 Regardless of the specific motive, earnings management introduces some level of bias 
in financial reporting (Mitra, Deis & Hossain 2009). A common proxy used to capture 
this opportunistic behaviour of management is discretionary accruals earnings 
management (Tsipouridou & Spathis 2012). The extant literature argues that financial 
reporting quality is high when the magnitude of discretionary accrual is low. 
 
For the purposes of this study, the absolute19 value of discretionary accrual instead of 
signed accrual is used. Absolute discretionary accrual is estimated using Kothari, 
Leone and Wasley’s (2005) cross-sectional modified Jones model with ROA20 as 
adopted and modified by Ashbaugh, LaFond and Mayhew (2003) and Mitra, Deis and 
Hossain (2009). The reasons for using the cross-sectional21 modified Jones model is 
                                                     
19, According to Francis et al., (1999), Chung & Kallapur (2003), and Larcker and Richardson (2004), 
absolute value of discretionary accrual is suitable when no specific motivation exists for using either 
income-increasing or income-decreasing accrual earnings management.  
20 This is necessary because of firms with extreme performance and the implication of obtaining a biased 
estimate for discretionary accruals in the presence of such firms in the sampled companies. 
21 A cross-sectional model enables researchers to detect earnings management beyond the average 






that the model is effective when examining changes in economic conditions that affect 
total accruals across different industries (DeFond & Jiambavlo 1994; Kasznik 1999; 
Cohen & Zarowin 2010). Overall, the study controls industry-wide changes in 
economic conditions that affect total accruals. Accordingly, a well-specified model 
and a powerful test are achieved (Kothari, Leone & Wasley 2005). 
 
The following cross-sectional regression model for each industry and year for the 












+ ∂ROAt−1 + εit      Equation...….5 
Where: TA equal to total accruals scaled by assets. Total accruals equal net income 
before extraordinary plus depreciation and amortization items minus cash flows from 
operations scaled by total asset (Ashbaugh, LaFond and Mayhew, 2003). Like the prior 
empirical studies of Cohen and Zarowin (2010), Ashbaugh, LaFond and Mayhew 
(2003), and Mitra, Deis and Hossain (2009), the current study uses operating cash flow 
to estimate accrual measures. The benefit of using operating cash flow is that it 
captures all forms of accrual manipulations be they current accruals or non-current 
accruals (Cohen and Zarowin 2010). 
  
Assett-1 is the lagged value of total assets for firms. The reason for scaling some of the 
variables is to control for heteroscedasticity.  ∆REV is changes in revenue, i.e., sales, 
scaled by lagged total assets. ROAt-1 is the lagged return on assets measured by 
earnings before an extraordinary as pointed out by Ashbaugh, LaFond, and Mayhew 





and accruals across industries. PPE is the gross value of property, plant, and 
equipment.  Consistent with prior studies, the coefficient estimates obtained from 
equation 5 serve as the discretionary accrual.  
4.3.1.2 Audit Fees 
The dependent variable in the audit fees model is the audit fee (LOGAF). Audit fees 
are the monetary incentives received by external auditors for audit-related services 
rendered. For the purposes of this study, the audit fee is the Naira value of the fees 
paid by publicly listed companies to their external auditor in Nigeria. In Nigeria, the 
statutes require that the amount paid to auditors be disclosed under notes to the account 
in the annual report of listed companies. Consistent with other extant studies, for 
example, Chan, Ezzamel and Gwilliam (1993) and Firth (1985), the current study uses 
the log transformation of audit fees. One reason for the log transformation of audit fees 
is to address the non-normal distribution of audit fees and remove outliers. In addition, 
the non-linear relationship between auditee size and audit fees requires that log 
transformation of audit fee should be used.  
 
4.3.2 Independent Variables 
4.3.2.1 Post-Regulatory Period 
The post-regulatory period variable (POST) is set to 1 for periods that fall between the 
years 2011, 2012, and 2013 and 0 if otherwise. The various regulatory changes started 
with the review of the code of corporate governance in 2011. The provisions of the 
new code of corporate governance are more comprehensive when compared to the 





Financial Reporting Council of Nigeria (FRCN) followed by the convergence of local 
accounting standards with the provisions of IFRS in 2012. 
4.3.2.2 Abnormal Audit Fees  
Consistent with Blankley, Hurtt and MacGregor (2012) abnormal audit fees are 
estimated as the residual from the below clustered robust regression22 after controlling 
for industry and year effect. Log of audit fees (LOGAF) is regressed on variables 
controlling for risk, auditor’s effort and industry following Blankley, Hurtt and 
MacGregor (2012), Choi, Kim and Zang (2010) and Eshleman and Guo (2014) 
respectively.  
LOGAFit = αi + β1LOGTAit + β2DRit + β3TEMPLOYit + β4QUICKit +  β5INVT2TAit +
 β6RECTAit  + β7ROAit + β8BUSYit + β9LEVERAGEit + β10BUSISEGit + β11BIG4it +








                                                     
22 This study controlled for within-firm correlation of residuals and heteroscedasticity using the robust 






Specification of equation 8 
Variable Description 
𝛼 An intercept term, a constant 
 




LOGAF LOGAF represents natural logarithms of 
audit fees.  
LOGTA  LOGTA represents the log of total assets.  
 
DR DR represents the ratio of long-term debt to 
closing total assets. 
TEMPLOY TEMPLOY measures the total number of 
employees that an organisation has.  
 
QUICK  QUICK is the ratio of current assets less 
inventory divided by current liabilities.  
INVT2TA INVT2TA represents inventory to total 
assets.  
 
RECTA RECTA represents the total receivables to 
total assets. 
 
ROA ROA is the ratio of net profit after tax 
divided by total assets.  
 
BUSY  BUSY is an indicator variable equal to 1 for 
a firm with a December year-end, and 0 if 
otherwise.  
 
LEVERAGE LEVERAGE is total debt scaled by total 
equity. 
 
BUSISEG BUSSEG is the number of business 
segments plus 1. 
 
BIG4 BIG4 is a measure of firm’s auditor coded 1 
if a client is audited by a BIG 4 firm and 0 if 
otherwise.   
 
SALESG SALESG measures sales growth.  
 
RLAG RLAG represents the number of days taken 
from account year-end to the date of the 
auditor’s report.  
 
CFFO2TA CFFO2TA is cash flow from operating 
activities scaled by total assets. 
 
YEAR EFFECT  Control for year effect 
 
INDUSTRY EFFECT  Control for industry effect  
 






4.3.2.3 Interaction Term 
Previous research on regulatory changes concentrated on the direct effects of 
regulatory change on financial reporting quality. Ball (2006) theorised that the 
outcome of regulatory change (herein financial reporting quality and audit fees) is 
contingent on firm-specific financial reporting incentives. Building on Ball (2006) 
argument, this current study develops and tests some moderating variables. This study 
created the interacted variables by first multiplying each of the moderating variables 
by the regulatory changes variable. 
 
 However, because this approach might lead to multicollinearity between the original 
term and the moderated variables (Darlington 1990 as cited in Azman-Saini, 
Baharumshah & Law 2010), the present study alleviates the problem of 
multicollinearity following the approach of Azman-Saini, Baharumshah and Law 
(2010). In line with their approach, the study orthogonalized the interaction term. This 
means that the interacted variables were regressed on the moderator variables and the 
residuals from the regression now represent the interaction term. Following this 
approach, this study created the POSTABNAF, POSTPOLI, POSTOVERLAP, and 
POSTABDDAC variables.  
 
4.3.2.4 Politically Connected Firms 
In Nigeria, available evidence suggests that retired Army Generals, ex-ministers, close 





a substantial percentage of the chairs of the boards of directors of publicly listed 
companies (Ujunwa, Salami & Umar 2013). 
 
 Accordingly, to measure politically connected firms, the study defined politically 
connected companies as those companies having at least one of its largest shareholders 
or member of its board of directors closely related to high-ranking military officers 
(i.e., head of state) or President, member of parliament, or a key executive cabinet 
member in either a past or present regime. Similarly, through the annual reports, the 
study identified a number of board members and major shareholders who are 
politically linked through being a recipient of national merit award23 supposedly given 
to deserving Nigerian citizens. The study’s definition of a politically connected firm is 
partly consistent with those that Boubakri, Cosset and Saffar (2008), Faccio (2006) 
and Gul (2006) have given. The variable was set to 1 if the firm was one of those 
identified as being connected and 0 if otherwise.  
4.3.2.5 Overlapping Directors  
For measuring overlap, the study defined an overlapping director as a board member 
who served simultaneously on both the audit committee and compensation committee. 
Consistent with Hoitash and Hoitash (2009), board members who served on both 
committees were first identified; then an indicator variable was equal to 1 if the board 
member served on both committees and 0 if otherwise.  
                                                     
23 The national merit award has received much criticism from political observers on the grounds that 





4.3.3 Control Variables 
Prior studies included variables in both the financial reporting quality model and audit 
fees model to control for cross-sectional variations in firm characteristics. These 
control variables have significant explanatory power and provide a robust estimate 
irrespective of country, sector, or year. Hence, omission of these variables from the 
model would result in model misspecification, which might lead to incorrect inferences 
(Bartov, Gul & Tsui 2000). In order to identify the control variables, this study refers 
to prior studies. Therefore, similar to prior studies, this current study controls for both 
client and audit firm characteristics.  
 
With respect to client size, commonly used proxies include total assets, total sales, and 
number of employees (Chan, Ezzamel & Gwilliam 1993; Firth 1997). For the purpose 
of this study, total assets is used as a proxy for client size.  Total assets are the sum of 
non-current assets and current assets disclosed in the balance sheet. This figure was 
retrieved from the Consolidated Balance Sheet (CBS) of the annual reports. In line 
with past studies (Chan, Ezzamel & Gwilliam 1993; Francis 1985; Simunic 1980), the 
current study uses the log transformation of total assets to take care of the curvilinear 
relationship between the dependent variables and asset fees (Chung & Lindsay 1988).  
 
Prior studies of the financial reporting model argue that large firms have stable 
operations (Dechow & Dichev 2002) and strong internal controls (Richardson et al. 
2002; Blankley, Hurtt & MacGregor 2012) and thus have a low level of discretionary 





size and audit fees are positively related (Francis 1984; Francis & Stoke 1986; 
Palmrose 1986).  
 
The current study also controlled for client complexity. For the financial reporting 
quality model, previous studies have linked clients with a complex operational 
structure with a high level of information asymmetry (Wan-Hussain & Bamahros 
2012). A high information asymmetry provides incentives for managers to engage in 
earnings management. The number of business segments (BUSSEG) measures the 
extent of client complexity in the financial reporting model. Under the audit fees 
model, client complexity measures include the ratio of inventories to total assets, the 
number of business segment, and Return on Assets. The inventories figure were as 
disclosed in the annual reports in the current asset section under the consolidated 
balance sheet (Simunic 1980). The numbers of business segments operated by the 
client company are disclosed in the notes to the accounts. Finally, the ratio of Return 
on Assets, which is net profit after tax scaled by total assets, was computed based on 
the relevant figures drawn from the annual reports. The study anticipates a positive 
relationship between client complexity and audit fees.  
 
Similarly, the variables used in controlling client’s risk are loss in the current year 
(LOSS), current ratio (CRATIO) and debt ratio (DR). A company’s income statement 
was examined and a client with a loss in the income statement was coded 1 if there 
was a loss and 0 if there was no loss. The current ratio was calculated as the proportion 
of current assets divided by current liabilities (Francis 1984). Debt ratio is the ratio of 





documented that risky firms are more likely to engage in earnings management (Wan-
Hussain & Bamahros 2012). Likewise, auditors charge risky firms more than non-risky 
firms, and this charge serves as a risk premium in the event of future litigation.  
 
Further, the current study controls for firm performance in the financial reporting 
model, and prior studies have suggested that discretionary accrual is positively 
correlated with firm performance (Kothari 2005). Accordingly, the study includes cash 
flow from operating activities (CFFTO2TA), accrual (ACCRUAL), and sales growth 
(SALESG). Previous researchers such as Frankel et al. (2002) and Chung, and 
Kallapur (2003) have found a negative association between discretionary accruals and 
CFFO2TA. Ashbaugh et al. (2003) and Asthana and Boone (2012) documented that 
SALESG is positively related to discretionary accrual, suggesting that firms 
experiencing growth in sales are more likely to engage in discretionary accrual. 
Consistent with Choi, Kim and Zang (2010) accrual is included to control for 
variations in the reversal of accrual over time, and it should have a positive coefficient.  
 
In addition, the study controls for auditor-related attributes, which include auditor size 
(BIG4), accounting year-end (BUSY) and reporting lag (RLAG). Prior studies 
observed that big international audit firms receive fee premiums due to product-
differentiated audits (De-Angelo, 1986; Craswell, Francis & Taylor 1995; Francis 
1984; Francis & Stoke 1986; Simunic & Stein 1996; Palmrose 1986). Because of 
perceived high quality, Big 4 audit firms charge high audit fees as a sign of the high 
financial reporting quality they render to clients. To capture the Big 4 effect resulting 





of a Big 4 firm and 0 if otherwise. In the financial reporting model, the level of accrual 
earnings management should decrease for firms using a Big 4 audit firm (Ashbaugh et 
al. 2003; Asthana & Boone 2012). Audit fees should increase for firms using a Big 4 
audit firm due to product differentiation (Simunic 1980; Yaacob & Che-Ahmad 2012). 
BUSY represents companies with December as their fiscal year-end and indicates the 
peak season (Chan et al. 1993; Che-Ahmed 2011). This is an indicator variable, which 
is 1 for firms with a December year-end and 0 if otherwise. The RLAG variable 
captures the number of days taken between accounting year-end and the date of the 
auditor’s report (Che-Ahmed 2011). 
  
Finally, ownership structure and corporate governance variables are included as 
control variables. These corporate governance variables are local institutional 
ownership, foreign institutional ownership, board size, number of executive directors, 
number of non-executive non-independent directors, and number of independent 
directors. Generally, this study retrieved corporate governance data based on the 
information disclosed in the corporate governance section of the annual report. Local 
institutional ownership is the percentage of shares held by local institutional investors 
while foreign institutional investors represent the percentage of shares held by foreign 
institutional investors. Board size captures the number of directors sitting on board in 
a financial year. Non-independent directors are the number of independent non-






4.4 Population and Research Data 
4.4.1 Population 
In any empirical study, the identification of the study’s population remains the first 
priority of the researcher. Shekaran and Bougie (2009) refer to population as all 
conceivable elements within the geographical boundary of a researcher’s interest at a 
particular point in time. The population of interest for this study includes all companies 
listed on the main board of the Nigerian Stock Exchange. However, banks and other 
financial institutions were excluded from this study because of the uniqueness in their 
reporting structure as well as other stringent regulations to which they are often 
subjected. Figures obtained from the Nigerian Stock Exchange website and the World 
Bank show that 181 companies in 2013, 192 companies in 2012, 196 companies in 
2011, 215 companies in 2010, and 214 companies in 2009 were listed on the Nigerian 
stock exchange. (See Table 4.4 below.) 
 
Table 4.4  
Number of Listed Companies on the Nigerian Stock Exchange  








Note: Source, Word Bank Statistics24 and the Nigerian Stock Exchange Website25 
 
The choice of publicly listed companies as unit of analysis is informed by the fact that 
these companies are statutorily required to file a copy of their annual reports with the 
                                                     
24 World Bank indicator: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LDOM.NO. 






Nigerian Stock Exchange. As a result, the annual reports of publicly listed companies 
are publicly available, and all information needed for the purpose of this study could 
be retrieved without duress.  In addition, the regulatory changes being investigated 
only concerned the publicly listed companies.  
4.4.2 Sample Selection 
Scheaffer, Mendenhall and Ott (2006) defined a sample as a collection of sampling 
elements drawn from a frame. A sample is a subset of all elements that make up an 
entire population. However, for a valid statistical generalization and conclusion, the 
sample must fully represent all the units contained in the population (Sekaran & 
Bougie 2010). Hence, to draw a valid sample representation, the study obtained the 
names of all publicly listed companies as at the time of data collection in 2014 from 
the Nigerian Stock Exchange website26. The names form the study’s sampling frame. 
In all, one hundred and eighty-one companies were listed on the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange at the time of data collection.  
 
However, from the outset, the study excluded 56 financial companies due to their 
financial reporting characteristics and the additional regulations imposed on 
companies operating in this sector. In addition, estimating discretionary accruals for 
firm in this sector is quite difficult (DeFond & Subramanyam 1998). The exclusion of 
a firm in financial sector category is consistent with the practice of prior studies 
(Blankley, Hurtt & MacGregor 2012; Hossain & Mohd Hanefah 2013; Mitra, Deis & 
Hossain 2009). Likewise, due to the requirements of the financial reporting proxy 
                                                     






adopted in this study, all listed companies operating in sectors with less than ten 
companies were excluded. Therefore, the study excluded five companies operating in 
the agricultural sectors, and the study merged companies operating in the different 
sectors but with similar operating characteristics to complete the required number of 
companies. The study also excluded thirty companies with missing annual reports 
along with those that switched auditors during the study’s sample period to avoid 
issues regarding lowballing and auditor responses to different financial reporting 








Initial sample of firms with sectors reported by 
(NSE) for the year 2014 
181 
Less: firms operating in the financial sector 56 
Less: firms in agriculture sector  5 
Less: firms with missing annual reports  30 
Final sample  90 
 
 
4.5 Data Analysis 
The research models express the relationship between the independent variable(s) and 
the dependent variable(s) using a linear regression model that is presented in an 
equation form. Functionally, a regression line that best fits the data is obtained through 
the regression model.  That is, the line that minimizes the sum of squares error between 
Yt and the predicted Yt. This line connects the mean value of the dependent variable 






The most commonly used method to obtain a line of best fits is the Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS) estimator. Five basic assumptions guide OLS estimation; these are: 1) 
the linearity assumption, 2) the exogeneity assumption, 3) the homoscedasticity and 
non-autocorrelation assumption, 4) the fixed value of X in the repeated sampling 
assumption, and 5) the multicollinearity assumption (Gujarati, 2006). Because the 
study’s data is panel in nature, the issue of heterogeneity is pertinent, and this issue 
violates the one assumption of OLS. The presence of a heterogeneity problem makes 
an OLS estimator not the best, linear, and unbiased estimator for this current study.  
 
Accordingly, the panel-data regression method becomes more appropriate (Asteriou 
& Hall 2007). Therefore, this study exploits the nature of its data to estimate the panel 
regression method in order to test the relationship among and between the identified 
variables. Some benefits of the panel data regression model are that it controls for 
individual heterogeneity, data are more informative and more variable, have less 
correlation among variables, more degrees of freedom, and are more efficiency 
(Baltagi 2005). Other benefits of panel data as Baltagi (2005) noted are that panel data 
are more efficient in studying the dynamic of changes and have a better ability to 
identify and measure effects that are not easily detectable in pure cross-sectional or 
pure time-series data.  
 
In addition, panel data tests more complicated behavioural models compared to pure 
cross-sectional or pure time-series data.  Finally, panel data regression reduces or 





and Hall (2007), the pooling effect assumption makes it possible to obtain a good 
estimate in panel data and the omitted variables, which may result in biased estimates 
in a single regression. Therefore, this study employed both the static and the dynamic 
panel estimation methods.  
 
4.5.1 Static Panel Data Estimations Model 
Three main regression models exist under static panel data econometric analysis. 
These are 1) the pooled model, 2) the fixed effects (FE) model and 3) the random 
effects (RE) model. The main difference between the three models lies in the treatment 
of the individual effect (Gujarati, 2006). The individual effect is observed, and its 
captures heterogeneity among individuals. The pooled effect model ignores the 
individual effect, thus it treats all observations as homogenous and assumes that the 
error term is identical and independently distributed. In the FE model, the individual 
is time invariant and assumed under the intercept. Thus, ui correlates with other 
regressors. On the other hand, the RE model assumes that the individual effect is 
independent of the regressors and that the intercept and slopes of the regressors are 
constant across individuals. Therefore, the individual effect is always included in the 
composite error term.  
4.5.2 Pooled Effects vs. RE/FE 
The first decision of panel regression model is to determine whether either the pool 
regression model or the FE/RE model is appropriate for estimation purposes. In order 
to determine the appropriate model, this study used F-test for FE and the Lagrange 
Multiplier Test that Breusch and Pagan (1980) introduced to choose between the pool 





unobserved effect in the effect models. The decision criterion is that, when the 
calculated value is greater than the critical value, the null hypothesis is rejected. In 
which case, the FE/RE model is more appropriate.  
 
4.5.3 FE Model vs. RE Model 
In a situation in which the pool effect model is inappropriate, then a decision needs to 
be made on the choice between the RE and the FE models. In order to know the 
appropriate model, a need exists to test whether the individual effect correlates with 
the independent variables. Hausman’s (1978) specification test observes the difference 
between random effects and fixed effects estimates. According to the null hypothesis, 
the error terms does not correlate with the explanatory variables. The rejection of the 
null hypothesis means that the FE model is appropriate. 
 
4.5.4 Diagnostic Test of Panel Data Analysis 
Despite the acclaimed benefits of panel data, the method is also subject to its own 
problems. Therefore, to avoid spurious results, a diagnostic test must be performed to 
check for the absence of the entire likely experimental problem. The two basic tests 
are the heteroscedasticity test and the autocorrelation test.  
 
4.5.4.1 Heteroscedasticity  
Heterogeneity is an important issue in panel data. Many ways exist to check for the 
presence of heteroscedasticity, and rules are present guiding its detection (Gujarati, 
2006). The various methods include the Park test, the Glejser test, Spearman’s rank 





White general heteroscedasticity test. The choice of which test to use depends on the 
statistical package employed for analysis. Because this study will run a panel data 
analysis using Stata Statistical software, the modified Wald test for groupwise 
heteroscedasticity is more appropriate (Greene, 2003). In the presence of a 
heteroscedasticity issue, a corrective action using the White heteroscedasticity-
corrected standard errors, otherwise called robust standard error, will be employed 
(Pong & Whittington 1994; Gujarati & Porter 2009). 
 
4.5.4.2 Autocorrelation 
Another issue peculiar to panel data analysis is the issue of the correlation between the 
disturbance term and the observation in time and space (Gujarati & Porter 2009). The 
presence of autocorrelation will result in consistent but inefficient estimates of the 
regression coefficients and biased standard error. The method that is available for 
detecting autocorrelation is the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation. This test involves 
ascertaining the significance of the null hypothesis showing that no idiosyncratic error 
of the linear panel data model is present. A significant F-value signifies the presence 
of autocorrelation. An autocorrelation error can be corrected using a random effect 
model; meanwhile, because the current study is a short panel, the issue of 
autocorrelation might not constitute a threat (Gujarati & Porter 2009). 
 
4.5.4.4 Multicollinearity  
In a panel data model, the data multicollinearity problem is not a serious threat as the 
model itself is capable of reducing its effect (Baltagi 2005). However, a common 





consequence of high correlation between two regressors is that this correlation causes 
bias variance leading to unreliable estimates (Gujarati & Porter 2009). Common 
diagnostic tests employed to test for the presence of multicollinearity are the Variance 
Inflation factor (VIF) and the Correlation Matrix.  
 
4.5.5 Endogeneity Issue  
In the financial reporting quality (herein referred to as financial reporting quality) and 
audit fees models, the dependent variable financial reporting quality is also an 
independent variable in the audit fee model and vice versa (Antle et al. 2006). There 
are two basic issues. First is the basic econometric issue that is called the simultaneity 
problem and it introduces bias into the error term because the study proxy for financial 
reporting quality and audit fees are simultaneously determined and thus not exogenous. 
Second, the two models potentially could suffer from unobserved heterogeneity.  
 
For instance, Asthana and Boone (2012) noted several other factors could possibly 
explain the variation in financial reporting quality and audit fees but could not be 
investigated due to data limitations. These factors include: audit team composition, 
audit work allocation between the interim and year-end audits, the influence of internal 
audit assistance, the quality of the financial reporting system and individual audit firm 
production. Last, extant studies on corporate governance have also noted the 
possibility of the current value of governance variables to be a function of a firm’s past 
performance and ignoring this relationship could also have consequences for statistical 
inferences (Wintoki, Linck & Netter 2012). Wintoki, Linck and Netter (2012) posited 





heterogeneity; however, these models do so under a strong exogeneity assumption 
ignoring the possibilities of past performance influencing the company’s current 
performance. Accordingly, this current study will proceed further after running the 
static effect models (FE and RE) to estimate a dynamic panel model, the General 
Method of Moments (GMM), to control for unobservable heterogeneity, simultaneity 
and the likely influence of past performance on a firm’s current performance as 
Wintoki, Linck and Netter (2012) suggested. 
 
4.6.1 GMM Estimator   
The standard error that GMM estimation produces is robust to autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity of unknown form. Basically, under panel data application, the 
unobserved heterogeneity correlates with the observed covariate, which is then 
corrected for using the fixed effect or within the estimator. The fixed effect estimator 
assumes that the time varying errors have zero means, constant variance and zero 
correlation (i.e., exogeneity assumption). In the case of a failure to meet the exogeneity 
assumption due to the presence of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, the GMM 
can produce a more efficient result than the fixed effect (Wooldridge, 2001).  
 
The GMM estimation technique Hansen (1982) introduced is a non-parametric 
approach used to estimate model parameters with no data distributional assumptions, 
which is an important assumption under the Two-Stage Least Squares regression 
analysis. Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998)27 developed a 
system dynamic model that incorporates simultaneous difference and level equations. 
                                                     





Under some conditions, this system of equations produces an efficient estimator even 
when compared with GMM because the differenced and lagged variables remove the 
unobservable effect and are orthogonal to the error terms.  Arellano and Bond (1991) 
proposed two estimators, which are the one-step and the two-step. The weighing 
matrix used in obtaining the estimates explains the differences between the two 
estimates; however, the two-step is optimal28 (Gyimah-Brempong & Traynor 1999). 
The dynamic GMM is consistent and efficient in the absence of second order serial 
correlation between error terms of the first differenced equation.  
4.6.2 GMM Specification Tests  
4.6.2.1 Endogeneity Test  
Before proceeding with GMM, checking for the presence of endogeneity in the 
regressors is imperative, otherwise the GMM parameters estimates will be inefficient. 
In this study, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) test for endogeneity was used to access 
the necessity of using the dynamic GMM model in both the financial reporting quality 
model and the audit fees model. The DWH test compares the estimated parameters of 
the OLS and GMM and calculates the difference between the coefficients of the two 
techniques. In the absence of endogeneity, the two techniques will produce estimates 
that are similar. The null hypothesis states that the variables are exogenous. 
 
                                                     
28 GMM is estimated by taking the first-difference of the dependent variable and the independent 
variables. This cancels out the company fixed effect, and the lagged dependent variable is correlated 
with the error term. The result is that further lags of the dependent variable and first difference of the 
exogenous explanatory variable serve as the instrument. Hence, Arellano and Bonds’s (1991) one-step 
estimator with robust standard error is inefficient and marked with a high standard error (Dietz, 





4.6.2.2 Testing the Validity of the Instruments 
Two conditions are required for an instrument to be valid. The two conditions are 
these. First, it must be significantly correlated with the endogenous variable, and it is 
tested under first stage regression of the endogenous variable on the instrument. 
According to Hahn and Hausman (2002), if the first condition is weakly satisfied the 
GMM coefficient estimate might be biased. Second, it must be orthogonal to the error 
process; this condition is tested in the GMM.  
 
For the first condition, the partial R2 that Shea (1997) developed and the F-statistic for 
the goodness of fit are employed. The partial R2 measures the degree of variance 
between the endogenous variables based on the variation in the instruments. The 
fulfilment of the second condition is tested using the Hansen/Sargan test of over-
identifying restrictions that examine the null hypothesis so that orthogonality 
conditions are correctly specified. Another specification test in relationship to the error 
term is the Arellano and Bond (1991) test for autocorrelation in error terms. After 
taking considering the unobservable firm fixed-effects, any residual autocorrelation in 
the errors will violate the second condition for some of the instruments.  
 
4.7 Summary  
This chapter discusses the overall research approach adopted to accomplish the 
research objectives. Consistent with prior studies both the financial reporting model 
and audit fees model were developed to test all the hypotheses variables. Measurement 
of each variable and the expected directions were duly discussed, which was followed 





the dependent variables and the independent variables, the panel data technique was 
adopted, specifically these were the static fixed effect and the dynamic GMM, which 









5.1 Introduction   
This chapter presents the study’s empirical results. The first part of the chapter presents 
the descriptive statistics and the univariate analysis of the variables employed in the 
study’s regression analysis. Next, the second part presents the Pearson correlation 
matrix for the variables used in the study’s regression analysis. The third part presents 
the results of the various diagnostic tests of panel data analysis. The fourth part reports 
the validity test results from the static and dynamic panel regression results according 
to the hypotheses outlined in Chapter Three. The final part of the chapter provides 
additional analyses and the sensitivity analysis.  
 
5.2 Industry Classification  
The final sample comprised 90 firms having the necessary data for analysis over the 
6-year period (2008-2013) resulting into 409 observations (unbalanced panel). As 
shown in Table 5.1 below, the majority of the sampled companies were from the 
consumer sector (30.81%), followed by the service sector (26.65%), conglomerates 




Industry Classification  
Distribution of sample firms 
by industry 
Number Percent 
Consumer  126 30.81 
Services  109 26.65 
Conglomerate  65 15.89 
Industrial goods  65 15.89 
Natural Resources  44 10.76 
Total number of 
observations  







5.3 Descriptive Statistics  
Table 5.2 below presents the descriptive statistics for all the variables used in the 
financial reporting quality model and audit fees model. Panel A of Table 5.2 provides 
the univariate analysis of the dependent variables showing the magnitude and level of 
change in financial reporting quality proxies and audit fees. Panel B of Table 5.2 
presents the mean, minimum, maximum and standard deviation of the independent 
variables of the two models.  
 
5.3.1 Dependent Variables  
The Financial Reporting Quality (FRQ) for the full sample period averaged about 
10.26. FRQ exhibited an increase from 2.9083 in the pre-regulatory changes period to 
16.8203 in the post-regulatory changes period. The t-test revealed a significant 
difference in the mean FRQ between the pre-regulatory changes period and the post-
regulatory changes period (t-value -2.4452). The mean value is consistent with 
previous studies like Krishnan (2003) that reported a mean value of 0.08 for absolute 
discretionary accruals for non-specialist audit and Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo and 
Subramanyam (1998) that reported a mean value as high as 0.129 in their studies.  
 
Likewise, the magnitude and level of changes in audit fees (AF) in the pre-regulatory 
changes period and the post-regulatory changes period were significant (t-value -
2.5975). On average, audit fees increased from 13,941.84 Naira in the pre-regulatory 





of about 52% (21,208.46 - - 13,941.84)/13,941.84. The increase provided directional 
support for Hypothesis 3. Abnormal audit fees (ABNRAF) increased from -0.0526 in 
the pre-regulatory changes period to 0.0449 in the post-regulatory changes period; this 
represented a slight increase of 0.019%.  
 
5.3.2 Explanatory Variables  
Panel B Table 5.2 gives the descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables used in 
the study. In sum, 52.81% of the firm-year observations were from the regulatory 
changes period sample, and 47.19% were from the pre-regulatory period sample. The 
percentage of politically connected firm (POLI) was 60.64% while the percentage of 
firms having an audit committee member overlap in the remuneration/compensation 
committee was 39.25%. 
   
5.3.3 Control Variables  
The average total assets (TA) of the companies in the sample was N27, 400 billion 
($144,687,265 at $1 = 199.05). The average turnover was larger than in Adelopo 
(2011), which reported a mean turnover of N19 Billion. The average ratio of current 
assets to current liabilities (CRATIO) was 1.77 times (3.92 times the standard 
deviation) with a minimum of 0.00 times and a maximum of 74.65 times. For the ratio 
of inventory to total assets, the mean variable was 0.18 times and the standard 
deviation was 0.15 times. On average, the inventory to total assets (INVT2TA) was 






The mean ratio of receivables to total assets (RECTA) was 0.15 with a standard 
deviation of 0.16 ranging from of 0 to 0.93%. The mean ratio of return on assets (ROA) 
was 0.05, the standard deviation was 0.28, and the range was from a -1.72 minimum 
to a 3.41 maximum. The mean of leverage was 1.12, standard deviation was 1.39 and 
it ranged from a -0.36 minimum to a 15.94 maximum. The average number of business 
segments (BUSSEG) was 2.87 with a minimum of 1 and a maximum of 7. Sales 
growth had a mean of 0.01 with a minimum value of -1.21 and a maximum value of 
0.75. The mean reported lag (RLAG) was 119 days with a standard deviation of 25 
days. The length of audit period ranged from a minimum of 36 days to a maximum of 
369 days. The mean cash flow from operating activities scaled by total (CFFO2TA) 
was 1.73 while the standard deviation was 22.94 and the range was a 0.5 minimum 
and a 348.89 maximum.  
 
For ownership structure proxies, the average local institutional shareholding 
(INSTITSHR) was 46.43% with a standard deviation of 27.92 and a minimum value 
of 0% and a maximum of 98%. With respect to foreign institution share ownership, 
the mean value was 23.86%, and the standard deviation was 29.65. The average board 
size (BSIZE) was 8.48; the standard deviation was 2.27 with a minimum number of 
four directors and maximum of twenty directors. The number of foreign directors 
(FDIR_) ranged from zero to eight. On average, 2.33% of the directors were executive 
(EXC_), 5.74% were non-executive directors (NONEXC_) and 0.35% were 
independent directors (IND_).  The mean of DR is 0.15 with an average profitability 






On the average, 68.46% of the firm-year observations had an accounting year-end of 
31st December (BUSY). On average, Big 4 audit firms audited 66.99% of the 
observations, while the remaining 33.01% were non-Big 4 audit firms. The result 
shows that the Big 4 audit firms dominated the Nigerian audit market. About 60.64% 
of the firm observations were politically connected, and the remaining 39.36% were 
not politically connected. 39.25% of the companies in the study’s observations had 
directors who were members of both the audit committee and the remuneration 




Descriptive Statistics of the Regression Variables for the Financial Reporting 
Quality Model and Audit Fees Model 
Panel A: Univariate Analysis of the Dependent Variable from 2008 to 2013 







































Note: Pre stands for the pre-regulatory period and post stands for the post-regulatory periods. 







TA(Naira) 27,400,000 61,900,000 68,953 843,000,000  
TEMPLOY 53.70 157 3 1454  
CRATIO 1.77 3.92 0.00 74.65  
INVT2TA 0.18 0.16 0 1.56  
RECTA 0.14 0.15 0 0.93  
ACCRUAL -10,66,844 11,900,000 -105,000,000 22,400,000  
DR 0.15 0.16 0 1.12  
ROA 0.05 0.28 -1.72 3.41  
LEVERAGE 1.12 1.39 -0.36 15.95  
BUSISEG 2.87 1.65 1 7  
SALESG 0.00 0.12 -1.21 0.75  
RLAG 119.04 64.19 36 369  
CFFO2TA 1.73 22.94 -0.58 349  
INSTITSHR 46.43 27.92 0 98  












BSIZE 8.38 2.27 4 20  
FDIR (n) 1.71 1.89 0 8  
QUICK 1.32 3.91 -2.00 74.32  
EXC_(n) 2.33 1.43 0 9  
INDP_ (n) 0.35 1.23 0 10  
NONEXC_ (n) 5.74 2.13 0 13  
Dichotomous       
BUSY     68.46   
BIG4     66.99 
POST     52.81 
POLI     60.64     
OVERLAP     39.25 
LOSS     15.00 
Note: TA (Naira) in the naira value of total asset; TEMPLOY is the total number of employees a 
company has; CRATIO represents current assets divided by current liabilities; INVT2TA represents 
inventory to total assets; RECTA is total receivable to total assets; ACCRUAL is calculated as net 
income less operating cash flow scaled by total assets; DR represents the ratio of long-term debt to 
closing total assets; ROA IS net income divided by total assets; LEVERAGE is measured as total debt 
to total equity; BUSISEG is the number of business segments; SALESG is calculated as the change in 
sales revenue; RLAG is the length of time between a company’s financial year-end and the date of 
auditor’s report; CFFO2TA is cash flow from operations divided by total assets; INSTITSHR is the 
percentage of a firm’s outstanding shares held by local institutional investors; FSHR is the percentage 
of a firm’s outstanding shares held by foreign institutional investors; BSIZE is the total number of 
directors serving on the board of directors of a company; FDIR(n) is the total number of foreign directors 
on the board; QUICK is the ratio of current asset less inventory divide current liabilities; INDP_ (n) is 
the number of independent directors on board, NONEXC_ (n) is the number of non-executive non-
independent directors on board, and EXC_ (n) number of executive directors on board; BUSY is an 
indicator variable equal to 1 for a firm with a December year-end and 0 if otherwise; BIG4 is a measure 
of firm’s auditor coded 1 if the client is audited by a BIG 4 firm and 0 if otherwise; POST is a 
dichotomous variable with a value of 1 for the regulatory changes period 2011-2013 and 0 POLI is a 
dichotomous variable with a value of 1 for firms that are politically connected and 0 if otherwise; 
OVERLAP is an indicator variable with a value of 1 if a board member serves on the both the audit 
committee and the compensation committee simultaneously and 0 if otherwise; ; LOSS takes a value of 
1 when a firm reports a net loss and 0 if otherwise. 
 
5.4 Analysis of Pearson Correlation Matrix 
Table 5.3 below presents the Pearson correlation matrix for the research variables 





bivariate correlation among independent, control and interacting variables. The post-
regulatory period variable (POST) had a small correlation with a positive relationship 
with FRQ (r = 0.14, p < 0.01) and OVERLAP (r = 0.26, p < 0.01). The correlation 
between FRQ and these variables indicated that they move in the same direction. 
Abnormal audit fees (ABNRAF) was statistically significant with POLI (r = 0.20, p < 
0.01), LOGTA (r = 0.87, p < 0.01) and BIG4 (r = 0.68, p < 0.01). Firm size LOGTA 
had a significant correlation with BIG4 (r = 0.35, p < 0.01). This suggests that big size 
companies are more likely going to engage one of the Big 4 auditors and have less 
cash flow from operations compared with small size companies. Overall, the 
explanatory and control variables revealed a weak correlation with FRQ.  
 
As shown in Table 5.4 below, a positive correlation existed between audit fees and 
POST (r = 0.1233, p < 0.01); ABDAC (r = 0.068, p > 0.10); OVERLAP (r = 0.2081, 
p < 0.01) and POLI (r = 0.1855, p < 0.01). This shows a positive relationship between 
the audit fees and these variables. A significant relationship existed between audit fees 
and the total assets (TA) measure of size; the relationship was positive and the 
correlation was high (r = 0.7444, p < 0.01). The high correlation between audit fees 
and turnover indicates that large total assets were associated with higher audit fees, 
which is consistent with prior studies like Firth (1985) and Chan et al. (1993). The 
number of business segments variable shows a weak positive correlation (r = 0.2570, 
p < 0.01) with audit fees. The variables used in the audit fees model were not highly 





Table 5.3  
 
Correlation Coefficient of the Financial Reporting Quality Model and Independent Variables   
FRQ POLI OVERLAP ABNRAF POSTPOL
I 
POSTOVERLAP POSTABNAF 
FRQ 1.00        
POLI 0.05 1.00      
OVERLAP ***0.12 *0.12 1.00     
ABNRAF 0.07 ***0.21 0.14 1.00    
POSTPOLI ***0.19 ***0.55 ***0.21 ***0.13 1.00   
POSTOVERLAP 0.12 -0.02 -0.00 -0.02 ***0.52 1.00  
POSTABNAF 0.03 -0.00 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 1.00  
POST  ***0.14 0.00 ***0.26 0.03 ***0.65 ***0.85 ***0.11 
LOGTA **0.09 ***0.33 ***0.16 ***0.87 ***0.24 0.01 *0.12 
TEMPLOY **-0.09 ***-0.12 0.08 0.02 -0.08 0.01 -0.01  
BIG4  -0.03 -0.03 0.02 ***0.68 -0.05 -0.02 0.04  
SALESG 0.03 0.05 0.03 ***0.20 0.02 -0.03 0.06 
LEVERAGE 0.02 0.07 0.03 ***-0.15 0.00 0.01 0.04  
ACCRUALTA 0.08 -0.03 0.05 ***0.15 -0.08 ***-0.11 ***0.17 
LAGROA 0.04 0.09 -0.05 0.01 -0.03 **-0.10 -0.01  
BUSISEG 0.01 ***0.13 ***0.17 ***0.27 0.08 -0.05 -0.03  
CFFO2TA ***0.10 **-0.09 -0.06 ***-0.22 -0.05 **0.10 -0.01 
RLAG ***-0.14 **-0.10 ***-0.12 -0.08 ***-0.19 ***-0.21 -0.03  
INSTITSHR 0.05 0.01 ***-0.12 ***0.25 0.04 ***0.12 0.06  
FDIR ***0.11 0.06 ***-0.10 ***0.39 0.02 0.03 0.01 
BSIZE ***0.11 ***0.26 **0.09 ***0.21 0.06 ***-0.12 ***0.15 
INDP_ 0.02 -0.06 0.06 **0.14 ***0.10 ***0.17 ***0.11 
NONEXC_ -0.03 0.12 ***-0.19 ***-0.23 0.02 -0.06 -0.08  
FSHR **0.09 -0.14*** -0.04 ***0.37 -0.05  0.07  0.01  






Table 5.3 (continued) 
 
 POST LOGTA TEMPLOY BIG4 SALESG LEVERAGE ACCRUALTA 
POST 1.00       
LOGTA *0.09 1.00      
TEMPLOY 0.01 -0.02 1.00      
BIG4 -0.05 ***0.35 0.08 1.00    
SALESG -0.03 ***0.22 0.02 0.04 1.00    
LEVERAGE -0.01 -0.07 -0.01 -0.06 0.03 1.00   
ACCRUALTA -0.08 *0.17 0.03 *0.11 0.03 0.03 1.00 
LAGROA ***-0.12 0.08 -0.06 0.02 **-0.09 0.06 -0.02  
BUSISEG 0.02 *0.10 *0.12 *0.08 0.04 -0.04 0.05  
CFFO2TA 0.07 *-0.13 0.00 ***-0.09 0.01 0.03 0.03  
RLAG ***-0.24 *-0.15 -0.01 -0.00 -0.07 -0.07 -0.00  
INSTITSHR **0.09 ***0.28 **-0.09 **0.09 0.08 ***-0.17 *0.10 
FDIR  -0.01 ***0.44 **-0.09 ***0.16 *0.13 ***-0.16 0.07  
BSIZE **-0.08 ***0.35 *-0.12 -0.03 0.03 0.01 0.08  
INDP_ ***0.18 ***0.14 0.01 *0.12 0.00 -0.05 0.01  
NONEXC_ -0.07 ***-0.26 -0.03 **-0.09 -0.05 0.07 *-0.10 
FSHR 0.06 ***0.35 **-0.09 ***0.22 ***0.08 ***-0.15 0.06  








Table 5.3 (continued) 
 
 
 LAGROA BUSISEG CFFO2TA RLAG INSTITSHR FDIR BSIZE INDP_ NONEXC_ FSHR 
LAGROA 1.00          
BUSISEG ***-0.11 1.00          
CFFO2TA -0.00 -0.08 1.00         
RLAG ***-0.20 0.02 **-0.09 1.00        
INSTITSHR 0.03 -0.08 -0.05 0.04 1.00       
FDIR -0.00 **-0.09 -0.06 ***-0.13 ***0.49 1.00      
BSIZE ***0.12 0.03 **-0.09 ***-0.09 0.08 *0.25 1.00     
INDP_ **0.10 -0.01 -0.02 ***-0.13 0.03 ***0.17 ***0.14 1.00   
 NONEXC_ -0.01 -0.01 0.05 -0.00 -0.02 -0.08 ***-0.10 *-0.52   1.00  
FSHR 0.06 -0.04 -0.06 *-0.14 *0.46 *0.63 0.03 *0.14  *-0.16   1.00 
Note: * = p ≤ 0.10,** = p ≤ 0.05, and *** p = ≤. 0.01. FRQ is the absolute discretionary accruals, calculated using Kothari, Leone, and Wasley’s (2005) cross-sectional modified Jones 
model with ROA estimated by year and industry; POST is a dichotomous variable with a value of 1 for the regulatory changes period 2011-2013 and 0 if otherwise; POSTABNAF is 
an interacting variable. POST*ABNRAF is used to capture the incremental abnormal fees increase for post regulatory changes; POSTPOLI is an interacting variable (POST*POLI) 
used to capture the effect of politically connected firms for post regulatory changes; POSTOVERLAP is an interacting variable (POST* OVERLAP) used to capture the effect of a 
board member serving on two audit committees for post regulatory changes; ABNRAF is a continuous variable that captures the abnormal portion of total audit fees paid to auditor; 
POLI is a dichotomous variable with a value of 1 for firms that are politically connected and 0 if otherwise; OVERLAP is an indicator variable with a value of 1 if a board member 
serves on the both the audit committee and the compensation committee simultaneously and 0 if otherwise; BIG4 is a measure of firm’s auditor coded 1 if the client is audited by a BIG 
4 firm and 0 if otherwise; CFFO2TA is cash flow from operations divided by total assets; RLAG is the length of time between a company’s financial year-end and the date of auditor’s 
report; SALESG is calculated as the change in sales revenue; LEVERAGE is measured as total debt to total equity; LAGROA measures the lag of return on assets measuring client 
performance; BUSISEG is the number of business segments; ACCRUAL is calculated as net income less operating cash flow scaled by total assets; LOGTA represents the log of total 
assets; TEMPLOY is the total number of employees a company has; BSIZE is the total number of directors serving on the board of directors of a company; NONEXC_ is the total 
number of non-executive directors divided by total number of directors; INDP_ is the total number of independent non-executive directors divided by the total number of directors; 
FDIR is the total number of foreign directors on the board divided by the total number of directors; FSHR is the percentage of a firm’s outstanding shares held by foreign institutional 









Correlation Coefficient of the Audit Fees Model and Independent Variables   
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 LOGAF 1.00          
2 POSTFRQ ***0.09  1.00         
3 POSTPOLI **0.10  ***0.63   1.00        
4 POSTOVERLAP 0.07 ***0.83  ***0.56  1.00       
5 POST ***0.12   ***0.98   ***0.63 ***0.85 1.00      
6 FRQ 0.07    ***0.11 -0.01  ***0.12   ***0.14  1.00     
7 POLI ***0.19  -0.02   -0.00   -0.01  0.00    0.05    1.00    
8 OVERLAP ***0.21 ***0.26 ***0.16  -0.00  ***0.26   ***0.12   *0.08 1.00   
9 LOGTA ***0.74  0.07 0.06 0.01 **0.09   **0.09   ***0.33 ***0.16 1.00   
10 BIG4 ***0.56  -0.06 -0.03 -0.02 -0.05 -0.03 -0.03 0.02 *0.35  1.00 
11 LOSS  -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 0.05 -0.06 0.00 **-0.14  0.02 
12 CRATIO 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.01 -0.05 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.01 
13 QUICK -0.01 0.04 -0.01 0.06 0.03 -0.04 0.07 -0.02 0.01 -0.08 
14 DR -0.03 -0.05 0.00 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 0.04 -0.04 -0.02 -0.07 
15 INVREC_TA **-0.13 -0.05 -0.03 -0.02 -0.05 -0.03 ***-0.16 -0.02 ***-0.16 -0.01 
16 BUSSEG ***0.26  0.01 0.02 -0.05 0.03 -0.02 ***0.11 ***0.22 ***0.14 0.07 
17 ROA 0.05 -0.07 -0.05 -0.03 -0.06 0.03 0.06 -0.01 ***0.10  0.05 
18 BUSY  *0.08 -0.01 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 *0.08  0.02 **0.09  0.02 *0.08 
19 RLAG *-0.08 ***-0.22 *-0.17 *-0.21  *-0.24 *-0.17  -0.08 ***-0.11  ***-0.18  0.02 
20 INSTITSHR ***0.24 0.08 *0.10  *0.12   *0.09   0.05 0.01 *-0.12   *0.28  *0.09 
21 FSHR  ***0.34   0.05 0.06 0.07 0.06 **0.09 **-0.14 -0.04 ***0.35 ***0.22 
22 BSIZE ***0.30 ***-0.10 -0.01 ***-0.11 -0.08 **0.09 ***0.23 **0.09   *0.31  -0.03 
23 EXC_ ***0.19  -0.03 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 **0.09 ***-0.18 ***0.23 ***0.20 ***0.13 
24 NONEXC_ ***-0.23 -0.07 -0.04 -0.06 -0.07 -0.03 ***0.12 ***-0.19 ***-0.26  *-0.09 
25 INDP_ ***0.17  ***0.18  **0.09   ***0.17 ***0.18 0.02 -0.06 0.06 ***0.14 ***0.11 






Table 5.4 (continued) 
  
 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
11 LOSS  1.00          
12 CRATIO **0.10  1.00         
13 QUICK 0.06 ***0.43 1.00        
14 DR -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 1.00       
15 INVREC_TA -0.07 ***0.16 -0.02 0.00 1.00      
16 BUSSEG 0.07 0.06 0.00 0.08 0.05 1.00     
17 ROA 0.02 *0.13 -0.06 -0.01 0.03 0.00 1.00    
18 BUSY  -0.03 0.07 0.06 0.04 **-0.09 0.07 0.02 1.00   
19 RLAG ***0.20  -0.06 ***0.13 -0.03 -0.01 *0.12 ***-0.10  **-0.09 1.00  
20 INSTITSHR 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 0.03 -0.07 -0.02 **0.09 0.07 0.02 1.00 
21 FSHR ***-0.11 0.05 -0.06 0.06 0.08 -0.05 ***0.13 -0.01 ***-0.17  ***0.46 
22 BSIZE -0.02 0.00 -0.08 -0.03 -0.01 0.05 0.06 -0.03 -0.08 0.08 
23 EXC_ 0.04 0.04 -0.08 0.00 *0.12  0.06 0.00 *-0.17 -0.06 0.02 
24 NONEXC_ 0.02 ***-0.12 ***-0.20  0.01 **-0.09 -0.03 -0.01 ***0.19 0.05 -0.02 
25 INDP_ -0.06 -0.01 -0.04 -0.01 0.06 -0.02 0.05 -0.16* *-0.14  0.03 
Note: * = p ≤ 0.10,** = p ≤ 0.05, and *** p = ≤. 0.01 
 
Table 5.4 (continued) 
  
 21 22 23 24 25 
21 FSHR 1.00     
22 BSIZE 0.03 1.00    
23 EXC_ ***0.16 0.05 1.00   
24 NONEXC_ ***-0.16 *-0.10 *-0.66   1.00  
25 INDP_ ***0.14 *0.12  0.04 *-0.52   1.00 
Note: * = p ≤ 0.10,** = p ≤ 0.05, and *** p = ≤. 0.01. LOGAF represents natural logarithms of audit fees (Naira); LOGAF(t-1) Lag of the dependent variable. The lag dependent 
variable is added to account for any dynamic endogeneity present in the relationship; POST is a dichotomous variable with a value of 1 for the regulatory changes periods 2011-2013 
and 0 if otherwise; POSTPOLI is an interacting variable (POST*POLI) used to capture the effect of politically connected firms for regulatory changes. (7); POSTFRQ is an interacting 
variable (POST*FRQ) used to capture the effect of financial reporting quality for regulatory changes; POSTOVERLAP is an interacting variable (POST* OVERLAP) used to capture 
the effect of a board member serving on two audit committees for regulatory changes; FRQ is absolute discretionary accrual; POLI is a dichotomous variable with a value of 1 for firms 
that are politically connected and 0 if otherwise; OVERLAP is an indicator variable with a value of 1 if a board member serves on both the audit committee and compensation committees 
simultaneously and 0 if otherwise; LOGTA represents a log of total assets; LOSS takes a value of 1 when a firm reports a net loss and 0 if otherwise; CRATIO represents current assets 





represents inventory to total assets; BUSSEG is the number of business segments; ROA IS net income divided by total assets; BIG4 is a measure of a firm’s auditor coded 1 if the client 
is audited by a Big 4 firm and 0 if otherwise; BUSY is an indicator variable equal to 1 for a firm with a December year-end and 0 if otherwise; RLAG represents the number of days 
taken from account year-end to the date of the auditor’s report; INSTITSHR is the percentage of a firm’s outstanding shares held by local institutional investors; FSHR is the percentage 
of a firm’s outstanding shares held by foreign institutional investors; BSIZE is the total number of directors serving on the board of directors of a company; EXC_ is the total number 
of non-executive directors divided by board size; NONEXC_ is the total number of non-executive directors divided by board size; INDP_ is the total number of independent non-
executive directors divided by the total number of directors.
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5.5 Diagnostic Test Results  
Like other estimation methods, this study diagnosed for the presence of a number of 
econometric issues associated with panel data. As noted in Chapter 4, panel data model 
assumes that the disturbance terms have homoscedastic variances and constant serial 
correlations through random individual effects (Baltagi 2005). Section 5.5.1 below 
presents a discussion of the results of the panel diagnostic tests on the residuals of the 
panel regression model29.  
5.5.1 Heteroscedasticity Results  
The assumption in this current study is that the disturbance terms of the variables 
should be constant across the panel. According to Baltagi (2005), panel data assumes 
that the regression disturbances are homoscedastic with the same variance across time 
and individuals. The Wald test for groupwise heteroscedasticity that tests for the 
presence of heteroscedasticity for residuals of random effect regression was performed 
on the both the financial reporting quality and audit fees models. The financial 
reporting quality model without interaction and with interaction resulted in X2 = 
2.3e+32 and X2 = 6.9e+33 respectively, both were significant at the 0.01 level. The 
null hypothesis states homoscedasticity (or constant variance), and the results indicate 
the presence of heteroscedasticity.  
 
                                                     
29 Normality test was not conducted because under panel data analysis normality and linearity are not a 
major concerns because the standard least squares assumption is not applicable in panel data (Gujarati 






For the audit fees model, the same modified Wald test for groupwise heteroscedasticity 
in the residual of a fixed effect regression model was conducted on both the without 
interaction model and with interaction model. The audit fees model both without 
interaction and with interaction resulted in X2 = 1.2e+31 and X2 = 1.0e+31 
respectively, and both were significant at the 0.01 level. Thus, the results indicated the 
presence of heteroscedasticity.  
5.5.2 Autocorrelation Results  
In addition, the study uses the Lagran Multiplier test for serial correlation in STATA 
using the xtserial command for autocorrelation in panel data. The null hypothesis 
assumes no first order serial correlation. For the financial reporting quality model, the 
test of autocorrelation resulted in F (1, 53) = 19.932 and for the interacting model F 
(1, 53) = 38.367. Both models were significant at the 0.000 significant levels. Based 
on the results, this study rejects the null hypothesis of no correlation between error 
terms. The result suggests the presence of first order autocorrelation in the financial 
reporting quality model. The autocorrelation result for audit fees model was F (1, 54) 
= 146.986 and F (1, 54) = 150.495 for the two models. The two models are both 
significant at the 0.0000 level.  
 
The null hypothesis of no correlation between error terms is accepted indicating that 






5.5.3 Multicollinearity Results  
Although multicollinearity is not a serious threat for panel data (Baltagi 2005), 
nevertheless, to further examine the nature of the study’s panel data analysis, the 
correlation coefficient between independent variables was computed. Tables 5.3 and 
5.4 present the results of the tests of multicollinearity between the variables. Coakes 
and Ong (2011) and Hair et al. (2010) suggested that multicollinearity exists between 
variables when the correlation between variables is more than 0.7. Gujarati and Porter 
(2009) provided a threshold more than 0.80 as a sign of serious correlation. Overall, 
the variables of this study fall within the acceptable range, and thus multicollinearity 
does not constitute a serious threat.    
 
To further test for the presence of multicollinearity among variables, the Variance 
Inflation Factor (VIF) test was conducted. The figures as displayed in Appendices 1A 
and 1B show that multicollinearity was not a serious threat because the VIF did not 
exceed 10, which falls below the threshold of 10 suggested in Kennedy (1992) as, cited 
in Eshleman and Guo (2014). Moreover, multicollinearity is not a serious issue under 
panel methodology as panel methodology serves as a remedial method for 
multicollinearity (Baltagi 2005; Gujarati & Portal 2009).  
5.5.4 Testing for Endogeneity in the Regressors   
A major contribution of this study is the application of the dynamic GMM estimation 






technique eliminates biases that dynamic endogeneity, simultaneity and unobservable 
heterogeneity introduce. The test for endogeneity is important because if the right-
hand variables are exogenous, then pooled OLS will more appropriate as it produce 
unbiased and efficient results. By implication, GMM can only be applied when 
unobserved heterogeneity, simultaneity and dynamic endogeneity are actually proven 
to be present. Because the estimates from pooled OLS and the fixed effects panel will 
be biased, it is therefore important to ascertain the presence of endogeneity in the audit 
fees and financial reporting relationship using the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for 
endogeneity before applying the dynamic GMM specification.  
 
The results of the tests for the two models are presented in Table 5.5 below. The null 
hypothesis of exogeneity in the financial reporting quality and audit fees model is 
strongly rejected at 1 percent for the two models. The implication of this result is that 
regression fitted on model assuming exogeneity in the regressors will be severely 
biased.  
Table 5.5  
 
The Durbin-Wu-Hausman Test for Endogeneity of Regressors   
H0: Regressors are exogenous 
 Financial Reporting Quality model  Audit fees 
DHW Test statistic  ***17.17589 ***8.41330 
P-value          0.00003       0.03820 







5.6 Inferential Statistics and Measurements of Relationships   
In order to examine the research questions, eight hypotheses were tested using multiple 
regressions in order to use inferential statistic. Hypotheses 1 and 3 test the direct 
relationship between regulatory changes and the dependent variables (financial 
reporting quality and audit fees respectively). Hypotheses 2, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 test the 
interacting effect of firm-specific reporting characteristics. The research hypotheses 
tested are presented below:  
 
H1: Regulatory changes will positively affect financial reporting quality.   
H2: The interaction of regulatory changes with abnormal audit fees will negatively 
affect financial reporting quality.  
H3: The interaction of regulatory changes with politically connected firms will 
negatively affect financial reporting quality.  
H4: The interaction of overlapping directorships with regulatory changes will 
negatively affect financial reporting quality.  
H5: Regulatory changes will lead to increased audit fees. 
H6: The interaction of regulatory changes with financial reporting quality will 
positively affect audit fees. 
H7: The interaction of regulatory changes with politically connected firms will 
positively affect audit fees. 
H8: The interaction of overlapping directorships and regulatory changes will 






5.7 Estimation of Abnormal Audit Fees 
One variable of interest is abnormal audit fees. According to Eshleman and Guo 
(2014), abnormal audit fees are audit fees not explained by the size, complexity, or 
risk of the client. The first stage in the study’s panel multivariate analysis was to 
generate the residuals representing abnormal audit fees from audit fee model. Table 
5.6 below reports the regression results of the audit fees model used in predicting the 
abnormal audit fees.  
 
As shown in Table 5.6, the explanatory power of the model is about 68.3%, suggesting 
that the audit fees model determinants explained a significant portion of the variation 
in audit fees. The explanatory power of the study’s audit fees determinant was below 
the 72% Ashbaugh et al. (2003) reported and slightly above the 67.9% reported that 
Mitra et al. (2009) reported. All the coefficients of the variables used in this current 
study for audit fees determinants in equation 8, except for sales changes (SALESG), 
busy season (BUSY) and (RLAG) reporting lag, were highly significant. Arguably, 












Table 5.6  
Estimation of Abnormal Audit fees  
Variable Robust Std. Err. t-stat. 
INTERCEPT 1.417 ***9.60 
LOGTA 0.347 ***9.61 
DR -0.001 ***-2.82 
TEMPLOY 0.000 ***0.008 
QUICK 0.003 **1.81 
INVT2TA -0.228 ***-2.06 
RECTA -0.415 -***4.29 
ROA -0.113 **-1.75 
BUSY 0.022 0.68 
LEVERAGE -0.017 **-1.96 
BUSISEG 0.038 ***2.72 
BIG4  0.318 ***7.48 
SALESG 0.000 1.11 
RLAG -0.001 -0.02 
CFFO2TA -0.002 ***6.90 
Year and Industry controls included            Yes     Yes 
R2              68.3%  
N            382  
Notes: * = significant at 10%,  ** = significant at 5%, and  *** = significant at 1%. All variables  
are as described in Table 4.2. DR represents the ratio of long-term debt to closing total assets; TEMPLOY measures 
the total number of employees that an organisation has; QUICK is the ratio of current assets less inventory divided 
by current liabilities; INVT2TA represents inventory to total assets; RECTA represents the total receivables to total 
assets; ROA is the ratio of net profit after tax divided by total assets; BUSY is an indicator variable equal to 1 for 
a firm with a December year-end, and 0 if otherwise; LEVERAGE is total debt scaled by total equity; BUSSEG is 
the number of business segments plus 1; BIG4 is a measure of firm’s auditor coded 1 if a client is audited by a BIG 
4 firm and 0 if otherwise; SALESG measures sales growth; RLAG represents the number of days taken from 




5.8 Panel Regression Results for Financial Reporting and Audit Fees Model  
In line with the explanations given in Chapter 3, Section 4.3, static panel data and the 
dynamic panel data estimation techniques were used to estimate the financial reporting 
quality model and the audit fees model. Consistent with the static model assumption, 
which states that an individual effect is presence and correlated with one or more 
regressors, the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test was used to determine the 







For the financial reporting model, both the without interaction model and the 
interaction model tests of Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier failed to reject the null 
hypothesis and the conclusion that individual heterogeneity was present, thus the 
random effect was appropriate. Likewise, the audit fees model for both the without 
interaction model and for interaction model tests of the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange 
Multiplier rejected the null hypothesis and the conclusion that random effect is present 
is appropriate.  
 
Because the unobserved effect is present, the next step was to run the Hausman 
specification test (Hausman 1978) to check whether the errors (ui) were correlated 
with the regressors. The null hypothesis stated that they are not. The Hausman 
specification test for the financial reporting quality model (interaction and without 
interaction) indicated that the fixed effect model was appropriate, as the null 
hypothesis was rejected (see Appendices 4A and 4B). Similarly, the Hausman 
specification test for the audit fees model (interaction and without interaction) 
indicated that the fixed effect was appropriate suggesting the rejection of the null 
hypothesis. (See Appendices 4C and 4D.) 
5.8.1 Model Estimation Results for Financial Reporting Quality  
All the t-values were robust for heteroscedasticity. The R2 for Model 1 (static panel) 
was 0.23%. The results indicate that the variation in the financial reporting quality 






variables. The low R2s are consistent with those of past studies. Choi, Kim and Zang 
(2010) and Asthana and Boone (2012) reported 0.148 and 0.20 respectively.  
 
As suggested earlier, this study controlled for endogeneity issue using the GMM 
estimation technique. The GMM technique mitigates the biases of the static panel. The 
current study reports the results of two-specification test in Table 5.7, the AR2 second 
order correlation, and Hansen/Sagan J-statistic test of the over-identifying restriction. 
The AR2 test for the two models yields a p-value of 0.70 and 0.73 respectively. Thus, 
the study cannot reject the null hypothesis of no second order correlation. The null 
hypothesis for second order correlation states that no second order correlation exists. 
The Arellano Bond test statistic for the two models indicated that no autocorrelation 
exists in the errors of the two GMM models.  
 
The Hansen/Sargan J-statistic displayed in Table 5.7 for the two models reveals a p-
value of 0.213 and 0.063. The null hypothesis for the Hansen/Sargan J statistic states 
that the instrument used in the model was valid. Therefore, the results indicated that 
the moment condition is correctly specified at the 5% level of significance for the 
GMM model. 
  
Based on the above discussion, the study examined the results from estimating the 
relationship between financial reporting quality, the main effect variables, the 






This study estimates the fixed effects model and the system GMM. Table 5.7 below 
reports the significant effect of Hypotheses 1, 2, 3, and 4 as restated herein H1: 
Regulatory changes will positively affect financial reporting quality. H2: The 
interaction of regulatory changes with abnormal audit fees will negatively affect 
financial reporting quality. H3: The interaction of regulatory changes with politically 
connected firms will negatively affect financial reporting quality and H4: The 
interaction of overlapping directorships with regulatory changes will negatively affect 
financial reporting quality. 
 
 Note that the difference in the results of the two model specifications (GMM and fixed 
effect model) as presented in Table 5.7 arises from how individual estimation 
techniques account for the endogeneity issue. The fixed effects panel model accounts 
for any endogeneity introduced by unobserved heterogeneity across firms and assumes 
that all the regressors are fully exogenous. Therefore, the effect of dynamic 
endogeneity and simultaneity were not considered. However, for the GMM model 
specification, the parameter estimates are more efficient under the conditions stated in 
Section 4.1.2 above as they address all the sources of endogeneity that might affect the 
financial reporting model. For the purposes of this study, the main findings are 
interpreted based on the estimates of the second stage GMM; the results of the first 








Results for H1 
Both the static fixed effect model and the dynamic panel estimate in Model 1 suggest 
a negative relationship between the regulatory changes effects (POST) on Financial 
Reporting Quality (FRQ). The coefficient for the regulatory changes periods was 
significant and negative -1.116 (t = -1.35) using the static model and had a weak but 
significant negative relationship -0.53216 (t = -1.23) using the dynamic panel data that 
included the lag of FRQ. The significance of lagged FRQ could be noticed in the 
increment in the magnitude of the estimated coefficients on the regulatory changes 
variable when the dynamic panel estimation technique was employed. Thus, the result 
suggests that the various regulatory changes have significantly reduced the magnitude 
of absolute discretionary accrual and hence improve financial reporting quality. This 
finding supported Hypothesis 1. 
 
Results for H2 
The coefficient on POSTABNAF was negative but insignificant -0.3799 (t = -0.31) 
using the static FE but was significant and positive in the dynamic panel that included 
the lagged FRQ (2.6421, t = 2.06) in Model 2. This result supported H2.  Again, the 
difference in the magnitude of the estimated coefficients on the regulatory changes 
abnormal audit fees variable was present when the dynamic panel estimates were later 
employed. This signals the potential presence of an endogeneity issue that arises from 
the relationship between abnormal audit fees and the earning management proxy of 






discretionary accrual did not reduce during the regulatory changes periods due to 
abnormal audit fees being paid by the client. This result indicates that the issue of 
impairment of the auditor’s independence remains in the post-regulatory period and 
dampens financial reporting quality.  
 
Results for H3 
Both the static fixed effect model and the dynamic panel estimate in Model 2 suggest 
a positive relationship between regulatory changes effect interactions with politically 
connected firms (POSTPOLI) on FRQ. The coefficient for POSTPOLI was significant 
and positive 1.7403 (t = 2.73) using the static FE and was significant and positive 
2.79485 (t = -4.18) using dynamic panel data that included the lag of FRQ. The 
significance of lagged FRQ could be noticed in the increment in the magnitude of the 
estimated coefficients of the POSTPOLI variable when the dynamic panel estimation 
technique was employed. Thus, the result suggests that the various regulatory changes 
did not lead to a reduction in the magnitude of absolute discretionary in accrual for 
politically connected firms in post-regulatory period. Hence, no improvement in the 
financial reporting quality of politically connected firms existed; this finding 
supported Hypothesis 5. 
 
Results for H4 
Both the static fixed effect model and the dynamic panel estimate in Model 2 suggest 






overlapping directorship (POSTOVERLAP) on Financial Reporting Quality (FRQ). 
The coefficient on POSTOVERLAP was significant and positive 1.3521 (t = 1.82) 
using the static model and was significant and positive 1.8702 (t = -2.78) using 
dynamic panel data that included the lag of FRQ. The significance of the lagged 
ABDAC could be noticed in the decrease in the magnitude of the estimated 
coefficients on the POSTPOLI variable when the dynamic panel estimation technique 
was employed. Thus, the results suggest that the various regulatory changes did not 
lead to a reduction in the magnitude of absolute discretionary accrual for firm with 
directors whose functions overlapped in the post-regulatory period. Hence, no 
improvement in financial reporting quality of politically connected firms was seen; 
this finding supported Hypothesis 5. 
 
Results for Control Variables 
Fifteen control variables were included in the financial reporting quality model, which 
represented the financial attribute of the companies and corporate governance attribute 
that are associated with financial reporting quality. As expected, the control variable 
to measure auditor size, BIG4, significantly influenced FRQ in both the fixed effect 
model and the dynamic panel model.  The coefficient for BIG4 was significant and 
negative -1.5742 (t = -2.34) using static FE and was significant and positive -1.9180 (t 
= -7.74). The coefficient for CFFO2TA was significant and negative -0.0064 (t = -
1.81) using static FE and was positive and significant -0.0058 (t = -1.68) in the 






(0.0047, t = 1.21) in the FE model; however, it turned negative and significant (-
0.0027, t = -3.68) when the dynamic panel technique was employed.  
 
The coefficient for sales growth (SALESG) was negative and insignificant in the static 
model (-2.918, t = -1.00); however, it became significant and positive in the dynamic 
model (16.1568, t = 6.59). Likewise, the coefficient for LEVERAGE was significant 
and positive in both static model (0.2340, t = 2.51) and dynamic panel model (0.30225, 
t = 3.60). While the coefficient of LAGROA also was positive and insignificant in the 
static FE model (0.2197, t = 0.63) and the coefficient became significant and positive 
in the dynamic panel model (0.4698, t = 1.78).  The coefficient for the business 
segment (BUSISEG) was negative and significantly affected FRQ (-0.2501, t = -1.24) 
in the static model; however, it became insignificant in the dynamic panel model. 
 
In addition, the coefficient of LOGTA was positive in both the static FE (1.3913, t = 
.21) and dynamic panel model (2.6814, t = 2.27), although the coefficient was only 
significant in the dynamic model. The coefficient of ACCRUALTA was positive and 
not significant in the static model FE (0.0005, t = 0.06) and significant and positive in 
the dynamic panel model (0.0172, t = 7.62).  
 
Six control variables represent the corporate governance attributes of the listed 
companies. Board size (BSIZE), which is measured by the number of directors on the 






model; however, it turned insignificant in the dynamic model. The coefficient of the 
proportion of non-executive directors scaled by board size (NONEXC_) was 
significant and negative in the FE model (-0.5286, t = -2.42) and significant and 
positive in the dynamic effect model (0.2917, t = 1.92). Likewise, the proportion of 
independent directors scaled by board size was negative and insignificant in the FE 
model (-0.0075, t = -0.05) and significant and positive in the dynamic effect model 
(0.2468, t = .37). The proportion of foreign directors on the board scaled by board size 
(FDIR) was significant and positive (0.4877, t = 2.14) in the FE model; however FDIR 
was significant and negative (-0.1739, t = -1.30) in the dynamic model. The association 
between FRQ and percentage of institutional foreign share (FSHR) was insignificant 
(-0.0066, t = -0.35) in the static model and was also insignificant (-0.0016, t = -0.14) 
in the dynamic model. The percentage of local institutional shares (INSTITSHR) had 
















Financial Reporting Quality Regression Model  
Variable Model 1  Model 2  
 Static panel Dynamic panel Static panel Dynamic Panel 
FE  RE  
    
L1.FRQ   0.14  0.35 
 (5.05***)  (7.41***) 
POST -1.11 -0.53 -3.58 -2.34 
      (-1.35**) (-1.23*) (-3.33***) (-3.31***) 
POSTABNAF 




   (-0.31) (2.06***) 
 
POSTPOLI 




   (2.73***) (4.18***) 
POSTOVERLAP 















































































 (-1.00) (6.59***) (-0.54) (3.83***) 
LEVERAGE  0.23 0.30 0.04 0.13 








Table 5.7 (continued) 
Variable Model 1  Model 2  
 Static panel Dynamic Panel Static panel Dynamic Panel 















































































































































Table 5.7 (continued) 
Variable Model 1  Model 2  
 Static panel Dynamic Panel Static panel Dynamic Panel 
 FE  RE  
Year & Industry 
Effect 





   
R2 0.23  0.17  
Diff in R2     
Significant F 0.00  0.00  
Hausman test 0.01  0.26  
AR1  0.01  0.01 
AR2  0.70  0.73 
Hansen J  0.05  1.00 
Number 409 211 409 211 
Notes: * p < .05, ** p < .01, and *** p < .001 indicate significance levels using a one-tailed test. Figures in 
parenthesis are the t-statistics. Number = number of observations. FRQ represent audit quality, which is the absolute 
discretionary accruals, calculated using Kothari, Leone, and Wasley’s (2005) cross-sectional modified Jones model 
with ROA estimated by year and industry; FRQt-1 is a lagged dependent variable. The lag dependent variable is 
added to account for any dynamic endogeneity present in the relationship; POST is a dichotomous variable with a 
value of 1 for the regulatory changes period 2011-2013 and 0 if otherwise; POSTABNAF is an interacting variable. 
POST*ABNRAF is used to capture the incremental abnormal fees increase for post regulatory changes; POSTPOLI 
is an interacting variable (POST*POLI) used to capture the effect of politically connected firms for post regulatory 
changes; POSTOVERLAP is an interacting variable (POST* OVERLAP) used to capture the effect of a board 
member serving on two audit committees for post regulatory changes; ABNRAF is a continuous variable that 
captures the abnormal portion of total audit fees paid to auditor; POLI is a dichotomous variable with a value of 1 
for firms that are politically connected and 0 if otherwise; OVERLAP is an indicator variable with a value of 1 if a 
board member serves on the both the audit committee and the compensation committee simultaneously and 0 if 
otherwise; BIG4 is a measure of firm’s auditor coded 1 if the client is audited by a BIG 4 firm and 0 if otherwise; 
CFFO2TA is cash flow from operations divided by total assets; RLAG is the length of time between a company’s 
financial year-end and the date of auditor’s report; SALESG is calculated as the change in sales revenue; 
LEVERAGE is measured as total debt to total equity; LAGROA measures the lag of return on assets measuring 
client performance; BUSISEG is the number of business segments; ACCRUAL is calculated as net income less 
operating cash flow scaled by total assets; LOGTA represents the log of total assets; TEMPLOY is the total number 
of employees a company has; BSIZE is the total number of directors serving on the board of directors of a company; 
NONEXC_ is the total number of non-executive directors divided by total number of directors; INDP_ is the total 
number of independent non-executive directors divided by the total number of directors; FDIR is the total number 
of foreign directors on the board divided by the total number of directors; FSHR is the percentage of a firm’s 
outstanding shares held by foreign institutional investors; INSTITSHR is the percentage of a firm’s outstanding 
shares held by local institutional investors. 
 
5.8.2 Model Estimation Results for Audit Fees  
Similar to the financial reporting quality model, this study posits that the cost of 






preposition a set of moderating hypotheses were developed and tested with respect to 
the impact of auditor’s client reporting incentive on the cost associated with regulatory 
changes. The independent variable, moderators, and control variables serve as the main 
predictors of audit fees (see Model 4 of Table 5.8). Table 5.8 below contains the result 
of the main effect model using both static and dynamic panel model.  
In the second model, the interacted variables were introduced into the main effect 
model. Darlington (1990) as cited in Saini, Baharumshah and Law (2010) suggested 
this procedure, which was followed in order to alleviate the problem of 
multicollinearity. The interaction term was orthogonalized as the interacted variables 
were regressed on the moderator variables and the residuals from the regression were 
used to represent the interaction term. The estimation result of the interacted model 
using both static and dynamic estimation techniques are displayed in columns six and 
seven of Table 5.8. The interaction term captures the incremental increase in mean 
audit fees in the post-regulatory period for politically connected firms and those firms 
whose directors served on more than one board committee.  
 
All the t-values are robust for heteroscedasticity. The R2 for Model 1 (static panel) was 
0.89% while for Model 2 the R2 increased to 90%. The R2 indicates that the 
independent variables explained the variation in audit fees. The result of the R2 
obtained was higher compared with some of the literature on regulatory change. De 






Zealand and Kim et al. (2012) 85% in Europe. The results also show a significant F 
statistic (0.000) for both models. This also confirms the fact that the independent 
variable reliably predicts the dependent variable. 
 
Next, the study controlled for the endogeneity problem by employing the GMM 
estimation method (dynamic panel). The advantage of dynamic panel over the static 
panel is that it mitigates the biases in static panel. The results of the two specifications, 
AR2 second order correlation and the Hansen J test of over-identifying restriction, are 
reported in Table 5.8. The AR2 test for the two-models yielded p-values of 0.097 and 
0.761 respectively; therefore, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected as the null 
hypothesis for second order (AR2) states that no second order correlation is present. 
With respect to the Hansen J test, the null hypothesis states that the instruments used 
in the study were valid. Because the Hansen J test for the two models had p-values of 
0.136 and 0.983 respectively, the study concluded that the null hypothesis could not 
be rejected.  
 
Table 5.8 reports the significant effect of the hypotheses variables on audit fees using 
both the static panel and GMM (dynamic panel). The hypotheses developed in Chapter 
Four restated here: H5: Regulatory changes will lead to increased audit fees, H6: The 
interaction of regulatory changes with financial reporting quality will positively affect 






will positively affect audit fees, H8: The interaction of overlapping directorships and 
regulatory changes will positively affect audit fees.  
 
Results for H5 
The findings of this study show that POST regulatory changes variable was significant 
at the 1% level of significance in the static model and significant at the 10% level in 
the dynamic model, thus Hypothesis 5 is supported. The results indicated that the 
various regulatory changes embarked upon increased the amount of audit fees by 
8.6%30 under the static model; however, when the effect of past performance was 
considered and the endogeneity issue controlled for in the dynamic panel the 
percentage increase was just 2%.  
Results for H6 
Both the static effect estimates and the dynamic effect estimates in Model 2 suggest a 
negative relationship between regulatory changes effect interactions with FRQ 
(POSTFRQ) on audit fees. The coefficient on POSTFRQ was negative but not 
significant -0.05897 (t = -1.17) using the static effect model; however, it was 
significant and negative -0.1389 (t = -2.12) using the dynamic model that utilized the 
                                                     
30 The magnitude of audit fees change was calculated using the conversion formula that Simon and 







lagged value of audit fees. The result indicated a decrease in audit fees in the regulatory 
changes periods due to the low risk assessment of client financial reporting risks.  
Hence, the finding supported Hypothesis 6. 
 
 
Results for H7 
 
The coefficient of POSTPOLI was not significant in either model at -0.0137 (t-value, 
0.25) in static model and 0.0306 (t-value, 0.76) in the dynamic model. The results 
indicated no significant difference in the perceived risk assessment by auditors of 
politically connected firms in the regulatory changes periods.  
 
Results for H8 
The finding of this study showed that the POSTOVERLAP variable was positive and 
significant in both the static and dynamic panel models. The coefficient of 
POSTOVERLAP was significant and at 0.1001 (t = 1.32) using the static effect model 
and was significant and positive at 0.1675 (t = 3.01) using the dynamic model that 
utilizing the lagged value of audit fees. The findings of the study supported Hypothesis 
8 and implied that firms having directors with multiple committee memberships were 
charged more in the post-regulatory period. This result suggested differences in 
auditor’s risk preference in accordance with client reporting incentives.  
 






There were 17 control variables for the audit fees model, and these control variables 
represented client size, risks, complexity, and other variables that previous studies 
have empirically proven to be associated with audit fees. The results for Model 1, 
which is the main effect model, were used to interpret the control variables31. As 
expected, the natural log of total asset (LOGTA) proxy for client size significantly 
influenced audit fees. The variable had a significant and positive relationship with 
audit pricing at the 1% level of significance in the two estimation methods (static and 
dynamic panels). This result is interpreted to mean that big sized companies pay higher 
audit fees.  
 
Likewise, the results for the risk component of the audit pricing model proxy by 
current year loss (LOSS), current ratio (CRATIO), debt ratio (DR) and client’s 
liquidity (QUICK) are reported. Loss was positive but not significant in the static 
model while it was significant and positive in the dynamic effect model at the 1% level 
of significance. CRATIO was significant and positive in the static model at the 5% 
level of significance and at the 1% level in the dynamic effect model. Debt ratio (DR) 
was negative and insignificant in the static model; however, its coefficient turned 
positive and significant at the 1% level in the dynamic effect model. The coefficient 
of QUICK was positive and significant at 5% in the static effect model and 1% in the 
                                                     
31 According to Tarling (2009) “the main effects … are needed to estimate predicted values” (p. 36). By 
implication, the inclusion of other variables in the interaction should not be given much consideration 






dynamic effect model. Overall, the results suggest that the higher the risk is, the higher 
are the audit fees auditors charge.  
 
The third element of audit pricing was complexity measured by the ratio of inventories 
to total assets (INVT2TA), number of business segments (BUSSEG) and the lagged 
ratio of earnings before interest and tax to assets (LAGROA). While the ratio of 
inventory and receivable to total assets and the number of business segments were not 
significant in the static model, both variables were positive and significant at 1% in 
the dynamic model. With respect to ROA, the coefficient was negative although not 
significant in the static model; however, it was significant at 1% in the dynamic effect 
model. Thus, the results showed that as the level of complexity increased, the price of 
the audit increased as well.  
Another control variable introduced was related to auditor characteristics. Financial 
reporting quality as measured by Big 4 firms (BIG4) was significant and positive at 
the 1% level of significance (p = 0000). The coefficient of the BUSY, the measure of 
accounting year-end, was not significant. The coefficient of RLAG, the number of 
days taken to audit a client’s account, was negative but insignificant in the static model 
and was also negative but significant at the 1% in the dynamic effect model.  
The results for five corporate governance related variables are thus. The coefficient for 






models. The percentage of foreign institutional ownership (FSHR) was negative but 
only significant in the dynamic effect model (-0.00253, t = -1.70). Board size (BSIZE) 
had a significant and positive relationship with audit fees for the two models at 1%. 
The proportion of executive directors on a board (EXC_) was negative and significant 
in the static model (-0.3549, t = 1.49) while it was positive and significant (0.8298, t 
= 2.02) in the dynamic effect model. The proportion of non-executive directors on a 
board (NONEXC_) was negative and significant in the static model (-0.5179, t = - 
2.19) while it was positive and significant in the dynamic effect model (0.8298, t = 
1.69). The proportion of independent directors on a board (INDP_) was significant and 
positive in the static model (0.0731, t =-1.26) while it was significant and positive in 
the dynamic effect model (0.7131, t = 1.41). 
Table 5.8 
Audit Fees Regression Model  
Variable Model 3   Model 4 






LAGAF L1. 0.33 
 





















   (-1.17) (-2.12***) 
 
POSTPOLI 














Variable Model 3  Model 4  
     
 Static Panel Dynamic Panel Static Panel Dynamic Panel 
 
FE  FE 
 
POSTOVERLAP   0.10 0 .1675 
   (1.32*) (3.01***) 
     

































 (1.28*) (-0.70) (1.42**) -0.30 
LOGTA 0.29 0.27 0.23 0.14 















































































































Table 5.8 (continued) 
Variable Model 3  Model 4  
 Static Panel Dynamic Panel Static Panel Dynamic Panel 

























































NONEXC_ 0.52 0.76 -0.42 0.35 






















 (2.85***) (-0.48) (3.55***) (-0.69) 
 
Year & 
industry effect  
 
Yes 








0.89  0.90  
 
Significant F 
0.00  0.00  
 
Hausman test  
0.00  0.00  
AR1  0.03  0.04 
AR2  0.10  0.76 
Hansen J  0.14  0.98 
Number 409 244 409 244 
Note: * p <. 05, ** p < .01, and *** p <. 001 indicates significance levels using a one-tailed test. Figures in 
parenthesis are the t-statistics. Number = number of observations. LOGAF represents natural logarithms of audit 
fees (Naira); LOGAF(t-1) Lag of the dependent variable. The lag dependent variable is added to account for any 
dynamic endogeneity present in the relationship; POST is a dichotomous variable with a value of 1 for the 
regulatory changes periods 2011-2013 and 0 if otherwise; POSTPOLI is an interacting variable (POST*POLI) used 
to capture the effect of politically connected firms for regulatory changes. (7); POSTFRQ is an interacting variable 
(POST*FRQ) used to capture the effect of financial reporting quality for regulatory changes; POSTOVERLAP is 
an interacting variable (POST* OVERLAP) used to capture the effect of a board member serving on two audit 
committees for regulatory changes; FRQ is absolute discretionary accrual; POLI is a dichotomous variable with a 
value of 1 for firms that are politically connected and 0 if otherwise; OVERLAP is an indicator variable with a 
value of 1 if a board member serves on both the audit committee and compensation committees simultaneously and 
0 if otherwise; LOGTA represents a log of total assets; LOSS takes a value of 1 when a firm reports a net loss and 






term debt to closing total assets; QUICK is the ratio of current asset less inventory divide current liabilities; 
INVT2TA represents inventory to total assets; BUSSEG is the number of business segments; ROA IS net income 
divided by total assets; BIG4 is a measure of a firm’s auditor coded 1 if the client is audited by a Big 4 firm and 0 
if otherwise; BUSY is an indicator variable equal to 1 for a firm with a December year-end and 0 if otherwise; 
RLAG represents the number of days taken from account year-end to the date of the auditor’s report; INSTITSHR 
is the percentage of a firm’s outstanding shares held by local institutional investors; FSHR is the percentage of a 
firm’s outstanding shares held by foreign institutional investors; BSIZE is the total number of directors serving on 
the board of directors of a company; EXC_ is the total number of non-executive directors divided by board size; 
NONEXC_ is the total number of non-executive directors divided by board size; INDP_ is the total number of 
independent non-executive directors divided by the total number of directors. 
 
 
5.9 Additional Analysis for Financial Reporting Quality Model  
A number of sensitivity analyses were performed to examine the robustness of the 
findings. First, the regression in Table 5.6 was re-estimated by replacing hypothesis 
variable POSTABNAF with POSTPABNRAF_ and POSTNABNRAF_ consistent 
with Asthana and Boone (2012) and Eshleman and Guo (2014).  Asthana and Boone 
(2012), Choi, Kim and Zang (2010), and Eshleman and Guo (2014) reported that 
abnormal audit fees and financial reporting quality (i.e., herein known as financial 
reporting quality) had an asymmetric nonlinear relationship. Because of the non-linear 
relationship, additional variables were created conditioned on the signs of abnormal 
audit fees (Choi, Kim & Zang 2010).  
 
Table 5.9 reports the results of the financial reporting regression model32. The 
coefficient for POSTPABNRAF_ was significant 100.3658 (t = 1.74), suggesting that 
                                                     
32 All variables are as defined in Table 4.2 with the exception of PABNRAF, NABNRAF, 
POSTPABNRAF_, and POSTNABNRAF_. PABNRAF is equal to one if abnormal audit fees estimated 
from equation (8) if abnormal audit fees are positive and 0 if otherwise and NABNRAF is the value of 
abnormal audit fees estimated from equation (8) set to one if abnormal audit fees are negative and zero 
if otherwise. POSTPABNRAF_ and POSTNABNRAF_ are interacting variables created using the same 






auditors receiving abnormally high audit fees were likely to tolerate earnings 
management from clients. The coefficient of POSTNABNRAF_ was insignificant (-
1.7918, t = -0.73), indicating that the effect of abnormal audit fees on absolute 
discretionary accrual was insignificant for firms with negative abnormal audit fees. 
 
Table 5.9 
Financial Reporting Quality Regression Model  
Variable GMM 
 Step two 
ABDACL1 0.69  
(4.20***)   
 
POST -48.64  
(-2.00**) 
 
POSTPABNRAF_ 100.37  
(1.74***) 
 





Notes: * p <. 05, ** p <. 01, and *** p < .001 indicate significance levels using a one-tailed test. Figures in 
parenthesis are the t-statistics. POSTPABNRAF_, and POSTNABNRAF_ are interacting variables created using 
the same procedure discussed in Section 5.7.1. 
 
 
Roychowdhury (2006) found evidence that managers employ real earnings 
management to manipulate earnings to avoid reporting loses. Moreover, empirical 
evidence exists that manager’s switch between accrual and real earnings management 
when their ability to engage in accrual earnings management new regulatory initiatives 
constrains them (Cohen, Dey, & Lys, 2008). Accordingly, to have a complete picture 






financial reporting quality model using real earnings management must be re-
examined.  
 
The commonly used model as evidenced in prior studies (Cohen, Dey & Lys 2008; 
Cohen & Zarowin 2010; Roychowdhury 2006) to measure real earnings management 
activities includes the discretionary expensed-based model, sales–based model and 
production-based model. For the purposes of this study, two real earnings management 
activities were considered: 1) sales’ based manipulation and 2) reduction in 
discretionary expanses manipulation. Production-based manipulation is excluded due 
to the small number of manufacturing companies in the sample. As Roychowdhury 
(2006) pointed out, manufacturing industries fully employ overproduction as an 
earnings management strategy. 
 
Discretionary expenses manipulation is divided into Research and Development 
(R&D) expenses, advertising expenses, and general and distribution expenses. 
Earnings manipulation through a reduction in discretionary expenses in the current 
period leads to an increase in reported earnings in the same period. Cohen and Zarowin 
(2010) asserted that, when such expenses are paid for in cash, a reduction in any of 
these expenses would increase cash flow during that period. Following Roychowdhury 
(2006), the normal level of cash flow from operation was arrived at in this study using 



















Where; CFOit is flow from operations for firm i at period t. The abnormal CFO for 
sampled companies is calculated as actual CFO minus the normal level of CFO using 
the coefficient parameter from equation 8. Normal level of discretionary accrual is 
obtained as follows: 
The normal level of discretionary expenses is expressed as a linear function of sales 
consistent with Roychowdhury (2006): 
DISCt
Asset t−1







Table 5.10 below reports the results where R_CFO is equal to the level of abnormal 
cash flow from operation, and R_DISX is equal to the level of abnormal discretionary 
expenses. The findings as reported in Table 5.10 reveal that the results of the 
hypotheses remained unchanged. Overall, the results suggest that the level of real 
earnings management decreased in the post-regulatory period consistent with the 













Financial Reporting Quality Regression Model (Real Earnings Management) 
Variable R_CFO R_DISX 
 GMM GMM 
 Step two Step two 
R_CFO/R_DISX 0.32 0.25 

















   
POSTPOLI 1.49 1.38 







 (1.47**) (3.67***) 
 































Notes: ABDAC was replaced with R_CFO and R_DISX respectively to proxy for real earnings management as 
Roychowdhury (2006) defined. All independent variables are as defined in Table 4.2. p <. 05, ** p < .01, and *** 
p < .001 indicates significance levels using a one-tailed test. Figures in parenthesis are the t-statistics. Number = 
number of observations. 
 
Next, according to the Product Differentiation Theory, the quality of audit service 
provided by an audit firm varies. The literature generally argues that Big 4 audit firms 






firms have a greater advantage with respect to in-house experience and expertise in the 
audit procedures of listed companies. Accordingly, the majority of extant studies 
examine audit quality variation among the two market segments (i.e., Big 4 and non-
Big 4 audit firms).  
 
As a further additional test, and based on the fact that most reported accounting 
scandals often involve auditors in the Big 4 market segment, this study examines 
whether a variation in earnings management tolerance existed among the auditors, 
hence in the quality of reported figures. From the results presented in Table 5.11, the 
coefficient of the Big 4 audit firms (Ernst Young, Akintola Williams Deloitte, PWC 
and KPMG) was negative while the coefficient sign for the local audit firm was 
positive, thus supporting the product differentiation theory. However, variations exist 
in the coefficients of the Big 4 audit firms, which indicate a difference in the level of 
earnings management tolerance of firms in this market segment. For instance, the 
coefficient sign for Ernst Young (EY) was -0.23, Akintola Williams Deloitte was -
0.48, PWC was -2.70 and KPMG was -4.05. The implication is that the level of 
earnings management tolerance was very low for PWC and KPMG suggesting that 
clients of these two audit firms were more likely to produce higher quality reported 
figures compared to those of Ernst Young and Akintola Williams Deloitte.  
Lastly, previous studies have raised concerns that the estimation results of financial 
reporting model are sensitive to the audit fees model specification. As much as the 






from the alternative audit fees model. Interestingly, the results of hypothesis variables 
remained unaffected.  
Table 5.11  
 
Financial Reporting Quality Based on the Big 4 Audit Market Segment  

















0.14   
(4.62***) 
0.14   
(4.62***) 




L1.       
POST -0.38 -0.22 -0.08 -0.08 0.10 -0.53 
  (-0.92)  (-0.44) (-0.17) (-0.17) -0.21 (-1.23*) 






- - - - - 







- - - - 
       
PWC - - -2.70 - - - 
    (-8.6***)    
KPMG - - - - -4.05 - 
     (-3.20***)  

























(-1.61***)    
  
   
Year and  
Industry Effect  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AR1 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 
AR2 0.87 0.93 0.99 0.99 0.84 0.70 
Hansen J 0.97 0.98 0.86 0.86 1.00 0.94 
Number 211 211 211 211 211 211 
Notes: * p < .05, ** p <. 01, and *** p < . 001 indicate significance levels using a one-tailed test. Figures in 






5.10 Additional Analysis for Audit Fees Model  
To further test the potential effects of regulatory change on audit fees, the study 
included an indicator variable for the year immediately before regulatory change, the 
year of regulatory change, and each of the subsequent years. Modelling the specific 
years gives the opportunity to access how regulatory events that changed the audit 
environment correspond with individual year. In Model 2 of audit fees, consistent with 
Griffin, Lont and Sun (2009), the POSTREG variable was replaced with YR2010 (the 
year prior to regulatory change), YR2011 (review of code of corporate governance and 
establishment of FRCN year), YR2012 (IFRS implementation year and post-CG and 
FRCN year), and YR2013 (post-regulatory period).   
Table 5.11 
 
Audit Fees Regression Model 
Variable GMM 
Step two 

















Control variables included  Yes 
 








Table 5.11 (continued) 
 
 














Hansen j 0.876 
 
Number 211 
Notes: * p < .05, ** p < .01, and *** p < .001 indicate significance levels using a one-tailed test.  
Figures in parenthesis are the t-statistics. Number = number of observations. 
 
Table 5.11 above documents the results. The audit fees model reflects a positive and 
significant coefficient for YR2010, YR2011, YR2012, and YR2013, indicating a 
significant increase in audit fees. The coefficient for YR2011 (0.076) indicates that 
audit fees were significantly higher in the prior year. Audit fees increased from 4.3% 
in YR2010 to 7.4% in YR2011. Likewise, the coefficient estimates for YR2012 
(0.129) indicated an increase in audit fees, increasing from 7.4% in 2011 to 12.1% in 
2012. The coefficient estimates for YR2013 (0.072) indicated a decrease in audit fees, 
declining from 12.1% in 2012 to 7% in 2013. This result suggested that the observed 
increase in audit fees in the regulatory change period was reversed. The decrease might 








DISCUSSION OF RESULTS AND CONCLUSION   
6.1 Introduction  
This chapter recapitulates discussions in the previous chapters. The chapter begins 
with an overview of the research objectives, the hypotheses development, the method 
adopted in meeting the research objectives and the results of the study’s empirical 
analysis. The chapter then gives a detailed discussion of the results and the 
contributions of the present study. The last section outlines the study’s limitations and 
makes suggestions for future research that would extend the body of knowledge in 
financial reporting quality and audit pricing literature.  
 
6.2 Overview of the Study  
The recent comprehensive financial regulatory reform in Nigeria33 occasioned by 
weaknesses in previous financial reporting regime redefined Nigeria’s financial 
reporting architecture. The essence of the reform was to enhance accounting 
transparency and promote sound financial reporting quality. However, issues arise 
about the about limitations imposed by international regulatory reform approaches that 
did not consider formal local institutions settings, most especially, firm characteristic 
in a weak institutional context (i.e. abnormal audit fees, political connection and 
overlapping directorships). Arguably, the benefits and costs of such regulatory reform 
                                                     
33 These were the review of Nigerian Code of Corporate Governance, the establishment of a financial 






will likely vary in accordance with each institutional setting and an individual firm’s 
financial reporting incentives (Ball 2006). This is because regulatory reforms in less-
developed economy like Nigeria imitate those of developed nations.  
 
The differences in financial reporting incentives at the firm level motivated the 
objective of this study. Mainly, the study sought to examine how financial reporting 
incentives at the firm level affected financial reporting quality and audit fees in Nigeria 
in the new regulatory regime. The main objective was divided into eight specific 
objectives, which were to examine: 1) To examine whether regulatory changes  affect 
financial reporting quality; 2) To examine whether regulatory changes and its interaction 
with abnormal audit fees affect financial reporting quality; 3) To examine whether regulatory 
changes and its interaction with politically connected firms affect financial reporting quality; 
4) To examine whether regulatory changes and its interaction with overlapping directorship 
affect financial reporting quality; 5) To examine whether regulatory changes affects audit fees; 
6) To examine whether regulatory changes and its interaction with financial reporting quality 
affect audit fees; 7) To examine whether regulatory changes and its interaction with politically 
connected firms affect audit fees; and 8) To examine whether regulatory changes and its 
interaction with overlapping directorship affect audit fees. 
 
Past studies have documented that regulatory reform affects financial reporting quality 
and audit fees. For instance, studies have documented that Sarbanes Oxley Act 2002 






2004; Engel, Hayes & Wang 2006; Jain & Rezaee 2006). Other studies also have 
provided evidence that the recent global transition to IFRS has affected the accounting 
profession (Ahmed, Neel & Wang 2013; Atwood et al. 2011; Dimitropoulos et al. 
2013; Yi Lin, Chee Seng & Graeme 2012; Liu, Yao, Hu & Liu 2011; Kim, Liu & 
Zheng 2012; Griffin, Lont & Sun 2009; De George, Ferguson & Spear 2013). For this 
reason, Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 5 tested the preposition that regulatory changes 
improved financial reporting quality and increased audit fees. Based on the conjecture 
that the effect of the regulatory change would likely vary with a firm’s financial 
reporting incentives, the remaining six hypotheses tested whether abnormally high 
audit fees, politically connected firms and firms with overlapping directorships 
exhibited behaviour different from other firms in the post-regulatory period in the 
financial reporting quality model and the audit fees model.  
The explanatory variables used in this study were selected based on prior literature for 
financial reporting quality and audit fees. Two models were adapted and modified. 
These were the financial reporting quality model of Ashbaugh, LaFond and Mayhew 
(2003), Antle et al. (2006) and the audit fees model of Simunic and Stein (1996) as 
modified in Kim, Liu and Zheng (2012). Fifteen and seventeen control variables were 
used for the financial reporting quality model and the audit fees model respectively. 
Both financial data and non-financial data were hand collected from the annual reports 
of companies listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange. The annual reports were obtained 






observations for the six-year period from 2008 to 2013. The panel data analytical 
technique was then employed using Stata 11.2 statistical software. The analysis 
involved both the static and dynamic panel models. Both the pre- and post-estimation 
tests confirmed the appropriateness of the techniques employed for the financial 
reporting model and audit fees model as displayed in table 6.1 below.  
Table 6.1 
Summary of Model Selection 
 
6.3 Discussion of results  
6.3.1 Overview of Results   
Table 6.2 below presents the summary of results of the study’s hypotheses and as 
indicated in the table seven hypotheses are supported. First, Hypothesis 1 was 
supported suggesting an increase in financial reporting quality in the post-regulatory 
period. Second, Hypothesis 2 was supported, indicating that payment of abnormal 
audit fees deteriorate the beneficial effects of the various regulatory changes. Third, 
Hypothesis 5 showed a negative association between political connections and 
financial reporting quality, thus supporting Hypothesis 3. Fourth, Hypothesis 4 was 
Static Model  Pool OLS Fix Effect  Random Effect  Diagnostic Test  
FRQ Model  Not appropriate  Appropriate  Not appropriate  Endogeneity= YES 
Heteroscedasticity=YES 







also supported, which shows that overlapping directorship deteriorate the beneficial 
effect of regulatory changes. Fifth, Hypothesis revealed a positive relationship 
between the regulatory change period and audit fees; hence, Hypothesis 3 was 
supported. Sixth, the results for Hypothesis 4 revealed that audit fees were reduced 
with the magnitude of discretionary accrual in the post-regulatory period; hence, the 
hypothesis was supported. Seventh, Hypothesis 6 was not supported, which indicated 
that the pricing behaviour of auditors toward the riskiness of politically connected 
firms in the post-regulatory did not change. Lastly, Hypothesis 8, which posited a 
positive association between the effect of overlapping directorships and audit fees due 




Summary of Panel Regression Results  
Objective Hypothesis p-value Sign Result 
1 H1 p < 0.10 + Supported 
2 H2 p < 0.01 - Supported 
3 H3 p < 0.01 - Supported 
4 H4 p < 0.01 - Supported 
5 H5 p < 0.01 - Supported 
6 H6 p < 0.01 + Supported  
7 H7 p > 0.10 - Not supported 
8 H8 p < 0.01 + Supported  
 
6.3.2 The Effect of Regulatory Change on Financial Reporting Quality 
(Hypothesis 1) 
Hypothesis 1 predicted a significant improvement in financial reporting quality after 






regression results supported Hypothesis 1 that the regulatory changes periods would 
have a significant effect on financial reporting quality. The coefficient for the 
regulatory changes periods was significant negative relationship -0.53216 (t = -1.23) 
using the dynamic panel data that included the lag of FRQ. The results suggest that the 
various regulatory changes significantly improved the financial reporting quality after 
the regulatory changes.  
The result support the process accountability theory that was discussed in section 2.8.2. 
According to the theory of process accountability, the expectation of being held 
accountable encourages subjects to consider carefully the alternatives and employ 
more analytical techniques (Kennedy 1993). Therefore, an auditor’s decisions are 
reached with a preconceived mind-set of being second guessed by others and being 
able to make appropriate justifications for their reporting decisions (Kaplan & Johnson 
1991).  
 
Kennedy (1993) asserted that process accountability promoted cognitive effort. 
Therefore, process accountability enhances performance and improves judgement 
consistency and consensus. Consistent with this argument, Emby and Gibbins (1988) 
observed that process accountability improved an auditor’s evaluation of a situation, 
which in turn led to good judgement. Johnson and Kaplan’s (1991) findings are 
consistent with those of Emby and Gibbins (1988). Specifically, Peecher, Solomon 







Similarly, the result for Hypothesis 1 is consistent with several previous studies that 
investigated the impact of regulatory changes on financial reporting quality for 
example, Aubert & Grudnitski 2012, Agoglia, Doupnik & Tsakumis 2011, Barth 
Konchitchki & Landsman 2013, Cohen, Krisnamoorthy & Wright 2012; Ge & McVay 
2005, Doyle et al. 2007, Bedard 2006, and Nagy 2010). Many studies have investigated 
the impacts of the passage of SOX in the United States. Cohen, Dey, and Lys (2008) 
investigated the prevalence of accrual-based earnings management in the period after 
the passage of SOX. The regression results for eighteen years revealed that accrual 
earnings management was reduced in the post-SOX period.  
 
Krishnan, Lixin, and Yinqi (2011) also reported that the prohibition of non-audit 
services improved the quality of financial reports. Further, Lobo and Zhou (2006) 
found that SOX increased the conservativeness of earnings-related statements. In the 
context of IFRS adoption, the results of previous studies revealed the positive effect 
of IFRS. Aubert and Grudnitski (2012) and Daske and Gebhart (2006) documented 
that IFRS adoption improved accounting quality.  
 
The results of this current study taken together with evidence from prior studies 
confirm that financial reforms improve financial reporting quality. Most often, 
regulatory reforms linked to corporate governance extend to management 
responsibilities and the scope and nature of audit procedures. Increased oversight and 






associated with corporate governance (Lobo & Zhou 2006; Zhang 2007; Mitchell 
2003). The argument has been made that principle-based regimes such as IFRS 
generally limit transaction structuring (Schipper 2003) because they have few 
implementation guidelines and few bright lines (Jamal & Tan 2010). Leuz (2010) 
contended that the use of professional judgement enables managers to convey 
economic information in the best possible way (Leuz 2010). The following discussion 
explains the reasons behind the improvement in financial reporting quality brought 
that regulatory reforms brought about.  
 
6.3.3 The Effect of Regulatory Changes and its Interaction with Abnormal 
Audit Fees on Financial Reporting Quality (Hypothesis 2) 
Hypothesis 2 predicted that abnormal audit fees would negatively affect financial 
reporting quality in the regulatory changes periods. The dynamic panel model results 
(i.e. 2.6421, t = 2.06) support Hypothesis H2, which indicates that abnormal audit fees 
would have a significant negative effect on financial reporting quality in the regulatory 
changes periods. In line with the economic bonding theory, the result suggest that the 
impairment of an auditor’s independence through abnormal audit fees negatively 
affects the quality of a financial statement (Antle et al. 2006). According to Antle et 
al. (2006) excessive fees from audit-related services can weaken the negotiation 
strength of an auditor because auditors feel threatened by possible future revenue loss 







Thus, the results of this study support prior studies concerning the effect of abnormal 
audit fee in the regulatory changes periods as discussed in Chapter Three, which 
included Asthana and Boone’s (2012) study. In their study, Asthana and Boone (2012) 
examined the relationship between financial reporting quality and abnormal audit fees 
change following the passage of SOX. Their initial finding suggested that the 
management of absolute discretionary accrual would be reduced in post-SOX. 
However, the effects were not completely offset because of SOX, which is consistent 
with the Economic Bonding Theory. However, Asthana and Boone’s findings 
contradicted Mitra, Deis and Hossain’s (2009) study, which revealed that unexpected 
audit fees were associated with an increase in earnings quality in the post-SOX 
consistent with the Auditor’s Effort Theory. The difference in impact on earning 
management in Mitra, Deis and Hossain’s (2009) study was due to the earnings 
management proxy because they used signed discretionary accrual. 
 
The reason for the weak reporting quality is consistent with the theoretical preposition 
that abnormal audit fees, even in the presence of the quality of accounting standards 
and codes of corporate governance, if not adequately addressed will lead to the 
impairment of the auditor’s independence and lower the quality of financial reports. 
Burghstahler, Hail and Leuz (2006), Ball (2006), and Jeanjean and Stolowy (2008) 
opined that, in the absence of concurrent reforms on other issues affecting financial 








6.3.4 The Effect of Regulatory Changes and its Interaction with Politically 
Connected on Financial Reporting Quality (Hypothesis 3) 
Hypothesis 3 predicted a significant negative relationship between the interaction of 
politically connected firm with regulatory changes and financial reporting quality. The 
coefficient for POSTPOLI was significant and positive 2.79485 (t = -4.18) using 
dynamic panel data that included the lag of FRQ. The results support the hypothesis 
that a politically connected firm would have reduced financial reporting quality in the 
regulatory changes periods. The present study went further to test whether the 
reporting incentives of politically connected firms changed in the post-regulatory 
period. Based on the findings, the incentives of connected firms negatively affected 
financial reporting quality. The result is consistent with earlier theoretical postulation 
and empirical studies that examined the financial reporting incentives of politically 
connected firms.  
 
It is theoretically argued that politically connected firms exhibit high agency problem 
as evidenced in lower quality of accounting earnings reported by politically connected 
firms (Guedhami, Pittman & Saffar, 2014). This is because of their rent seeking 
behaviour of the controlling insiders. According to Chaney, Faccio and Parsley (2006) 
the controlling insiders have the incentive to reap benefits that far exceed the cost of 






financial figures. Moreover, because politicians offer protection to connected firms, 
the management of connected firms is less concerned with the quality of their earnings.  
 
In addition, the results of this current study lend support to past theoretical postulations 
(Ball 2006), which suggested that the variation in financial reporting incentives across 
countries and that firm-level factors challenge the efforts of any new regulatory 
initiative aimed at improving financial reporting quality. The result of this study is in 
line with the cross-country findings of Jeanjean and Stolowy (2008) who reported that 
IFRS adoption did not deter earnings pervasiveness. Rather management reporting 
incentives and national institutional factors are essential in shaping a firm’s financial 
reporting characteristics. Similarly, Soderstrom and Sun (2007) noted that financial 
reporting quality is a function of a firm’s overall institutional setting comprising the 
legal and political systems of that firm’s country.  
 
6.3.5 The Effect of Regulatory Changes and its Interaction with Overlapping 
Directorships on Financial Reporting Quality (Hypothesis 4) 
Hypothesis 4 predicted a significant negative relationship between the interaction of 
overlapping directorships with regulatory changes and financial reporting quality. The 
coefficient on POSTOVERLAP was significant and positive 1.8702 (t = -2.78) using 
dynamic panel data that included the lag of FRQ. The result supports the hypothesis 






compensation committee and audit committee exhibit poor financial reporting quality 
in the regulatory changes periods.  
 
The results of this study lend support to the theoretical view that, when members serve 
simultaneously on two board committees with conflicting interests, committee 
independence and objectivity in decision making are compromised and this heighten 
agency cost (Laux & Laux 2009). Ferris, Jagannathan and Pritchard (2003) asserted 
that directors holding common memberships have less time for any of the committees, 
thus shrinking their ability to meet their responsibilities. As a result, the monitoring 
effectiveness of an independent director with common memberships is negatively 
affected. 
 
 Liao and Hsu (2012) examined the factors associated with the presence of same 
director serving on both the audit committee and compensation committees and the 
effect of such memberships on corporate effectiveness. Findings from their study 
linked firms with weak corporate governance and firms that lacked financial and 
committee resources to having common board membership. As a result, such firms 
have poor earnings quality. The findings resonate with the argument that variation in 
financial reporting incentives across countries exist and that firm-level factors 
challenge the efforts of any new regulatory initiatives aimed at improving financial 







6.3.6 The Effect of Regulatory Changes on Audit fees (Hypothesis 5) 
Hypothesis 5 predicted a positive relationship between audit fees and the regulatory 
changes periods. The coefficient of POST regulatory changes is (0.02, t = 1.11). The 
regression results supported Hypothesis 5 that the regulatory changes periods would 
have a significant effect on audit fees. Consistent with the audit fee model as explained 
by the agency theory the result indicated that the various regulatory changes upon 
which the Nigerian government embarked significantly increased the amount paid as 
audit fees in the regulatory changes periods.  
 
In line with the traditional audit fees model developed by Simunic (1980), auditors 
incorporates an expected cost component representing the level of audit risk and the 
expected audit effort in their pricing decision. Thus, any changes in the client-reporting 
environment resulting from financial and corporate regulatory reforms will increase 
an auditor’s detection risks as well as effort that will consequently result in an increase 
in audit fees (Yaacob & Che-Ahmad 2012). This is because regulatory reform comes 
at a cost to an auditor. Auditors will put in more effort to reduce the possibility of 
detection risk and future litigation costs (Ghosh & Pawlewicz 2009). 
 
The current study’s result aligns with several previous studies that examined the effect 
of regulatory changes on audit fees such as Kim, Liu and Zheng (2012), George, 
Ferguson, and Spear (2013), Griffin, Lont and Sun (2009) and Yaacob and Che-






found a significant increase in audit fees due to IFRS adoption. DeGeorge, Ferguson 
and Spear (2013) reported a 23.7% mean increase in audit fees in the year; while small 
firms were much more affected in the transition period with a mean increase of 30% 
compared to a mean increase of 19.8% for large firms. Kim, Liu and Zhang (2012) 
went further to investigate the channel through which IFRS adoption affected audit 
fees for selected countries in Europe. Their findings revealed that audit fees increased 
with the complexity brought about by IFRS adoption and decreased with 
improvements brought by IFRS adoption. Using Australian data, Griffin, David and 
Sun (2009) reported a decline in non-audit related fees and an increase in audit-related 
fees due to stringent rules imposed by the New Zealand Stock Exchange’s governance 
rules in 2004 and the subsequent adoption of IFRS.  
 
The findings of the current study are as well consistent with other studies that have 
investigated the effects of new corporate governance initiatives. In the United States, 
many studies have examined the impact of the passage of SOX in 2002. Ghosh and 
Pawlewicz (2009) reported an increase in audit fees as high as 74% in the compliance 
period of SOX, and Consgrove and Niederjohn (2008) reported audit fee increases of 
51% in first year of compliance. In another context, Jeong et al. (2005) investigated 
the impact of the revised Act on External Audit of Stock Companies in Korea in 1989 







On the overall, regulatory studies have provided evidence of an increase in audit fees 
arising from complicated rules in new reporting regimes and stringent monitoring. For 
example, Yaacob and Che-Ahmad (2012) noted the impact of ambiguousness in 
measurement and recognition attributable to IFRS. In addition, Schipper (2003) 
observed that are more auditors are exposed to litigation in a less precise reporting 
environment. As a result, auditors undergo extra burdens to train personnel, perform 
additional audit procedures or even seek expert opinions. The sum of all the costs 
results in the increased audit fees reported in most studies.  
 
6.3.7 The Effect of Regulatory Changes and its Interaction with Financial 
Reporting Quality on Audit Fees (Hypothesis 6) 
The study predicted a significant negative relationship between the effect of regulatory 
changes and its interaction with financial reporting quality on audit fees. The 
coefficient on POSTFRQ was significant and negative -0.1389 (t = -2.12) using the 
dynamic model that utilized the lagged value of audit fees The result supports the 
hypothesis that financial reporting quality would decrease audit fees due to regulatory 
changes.  
 
Previous studies such as that of Kim, Liu and Zheng (2012) supported the finding that 
improvement in financial reporting quality would decrease audit fees. The result of 
this current study is consistent with the view that audit fees decrease with the improved 






due to the reduced likelihood of financial misstatements that lower auditors’ risks, 
which, in turn, leads to reduced audit fees. As the study’s Hypothesis 1 suggests, the 
various regulatory changes would improve the quality of financial reports, which by 
implication would lead to a reduction in auditing risks as suggested in Hypothesis 6. 
Some widely touted benefits of a principle-based regime are that it offers few bright 
lines (Jamal & Tan 2010), limits transaction structuring (Schipper 2003) and permits 
more accountability through the use of professional judgement (Leuz 2010). Thus, this 
regime limits opportunistic management reporting discretion in arriving at accounting 
figures; hence, limiting misstatements (Barth et al. 2008). 
 
6.3.8 The Effect of Regulatory Changes and Its Interaction with Politically 
Connected Firms on Audit Fees (Hypothesis 7) 
Hypothesis 7 predicted a positive relationship between politically connected firms and 
regulatory audit fees due to regulatory changes. The regression results (0.0306, t-value, 
-0.76) revealed an insignificant association between the interactions of regulatory 
changes with politically connected firms on audit fees. Thus, the results indicate that 
politically connected firms did not significantly affect audit fees in the post-regulatory 
period. The insignificant negative relationship between politically connected firms and 
audit fees in the regulatory changes periods could present a case for audit fees 
lowballing for politically connected firms in Nigeria. This is could be possibly so 






government which create an incentive for auditors of connected firm to lowball in 
consideration for future lucrative audit engagement referrals.  
 
6.3.9 The Effect of Regulatory Changes and its Interaction with Overlapping 
Directorships on Audit Fees (Hypothesis 8) 
Hypothesis 8 predicted a positive association between the effect of regulatory changes 
and its interaction with overlapping directorships on audit fees. The coefficient of 
POSTOVERLAP was significant and positive at 0.1675 (t = 3.01) using the dynamic 
model that utilized the lagged value of audit fees.  The regression results had a 
significant and positive coefficient; thus, the result supported the hypothesis and 
suggested that overlapping directorships significantly increase audit pricing in the 
regulatory changes periods.  
 
The results of this study support the theoretical view that overlapping directorships 
weaken a director’s monitoring ability because directors are overloaded with work and 
are also subject to severe time pressure. As a result, financial reporting quality is 
adversely affected. The literature that has examined firms with busy directors have 
reported that such firms have weak corporate governance and have poor operating 
performance (Fich & Shivdasani 2006). In the empirical evidence that Mendez, 
Pathan, and Garcia (2015) reported, firms with busy directors have CEOs with high 
remuneration pay and experience low CEO pay-performance with CEO turnover-






board and its committees. On the overall, the structure of such firms portends high 
financial reporting risks.  
 
The high financial reporting risks associated with overlapping directorships justifies 
the increase in audit pricing experienced by such firms in the post-regulatory period. 
Moreover, the Insurance Hypothesis posits that auditors charge a risk premium in an 
uncertain audit risk environment to cover potential future litigation costs in case of any 
litigation claims. Thus, the insurance is necessitated due to the inherent risks associated 
with firms that have overlapping directorships (Fich & Shivdasani 2006; Mendez, 
Pathan & Garcia 2015), which have weak corporate governance and poor operating 
performance. As a result, an auditor will charge a sufficient audit fee premium to offset 
potential claims resulting from audit failure. The above argument shows that auditors 
consider the risk nature of firms with overlapping directorships.  
 
6.3.10 Control Variables for the Financial Reporting Quality Model 
The results of the dynamic effect regression model (GMM) indicate a significant 
relationship between financial reporting quality (i.e., absolute discretionary accrual) 
and twelve of the 15 control variables (excluding time invariant variables34). As 
expected, the coefficient of Big 4 auditors are negatively associated with FRQ (-1.9180 
t = -7.74). The significant result implies that Big 4 audit firms provide high-quality 
                                                     






audit services in order to guard against audit failure and its negative consequences on 
their brand names in the capital market (DeAngelo 1981; Francis & Krishnan 1999). 
This finding is consistent with several other previous studies. For example, those of 
Ashbaugh, LaFond, and Mayhew (2003) and Mitra, Deis and Hossain (2009) that 
documented that high-quality auditors constrain accrual-based earnings management.  
 
Next, all the variables used for the measurement of firm specific operating 
characteristics significantly explain FRQ. These variables include cash flow from 
operating activities (CFFO2TA), sales growth (SALESG), debt effect (LEVERAGE), 
previous year return on assets (LAGROA), and business segments (BUSISEG), 
absolute value of total accrual scaled by total assets (ACCRUAL_TA), total assets 
(LOGTA), and number of total employees (TEMPLOY). CFFO2TA (-0.0058, t = -
1.68), SALESG (16.1568, t = 6.59), LEVERAGE (0.30225, t = 3.60), LAGROA 
(0.4698, t = 1.78), and ACCRUAL_TA (0.0172, t = 7.62) have a positive and 
significant relationship with FRQ as indicated in the parenthesis following the names 
of each variables.  
 
This finding is consistent with prior studies such as those of Eshleman and Guo (2014), 
Mitra, Deis, and Hossain (2009) and Asthana and Boone (2012). The result indicates 
that firms with poor performance are likely to engage in earnings manipulation and 
this manipulation reduces earnings quality (Doyle et al. 2007). Likewise, highly 






companies will likely violate their debt covenants, they engage in earnings 
manipulation in order not to violate those debt covenants (Dechow, Ge, & Schrand 
2010). LOGTA (2.6814, t = 2.27), is positively associated with absolute discretionary 
accrual, suggesting that big companies manage earnings. This finding is in contrast to 
previous studies. However, this finding can be justified based on the accounting 
methods used and the sample setting (Dechow, Ge, & Schrand 2010). Ball and Foster 
(1982) as documented in Dechow, Ge, & Schrand (2010) reported that size might have 
a positive relationship with earnings quality, which is attributable to “the fixed costs 
associated with maintaining internal control procedures over financial reporting,” (p. 
380). 
 
Lastly, for the corporate governance attributes, only the coefficient of NONEXC 
(0.2917, t = 1.92), INDP_ (-0.0075, t = -0.05), and FDIR (-0.1739, t = -1.30) were 
significant determinants of FRQ in the dynamic panel model. First, the proportion of 
non-executive directors (NONEXC) had a positive impact on FRQ, and this finding 
indicates that non-executive directors are ineffective in their monitoring functions. 
This finding supports the contention that the social ties between directors and the firm 
dampen the monitoring effectiveness of non-executive directors as this leads to a 
conflict of interest with shareholders (Hsu & Wu 2013). 
 
 Second, the proportion of independent directors (INDP_) on a board has a positive 






Noguer (2007) and Abdullah and Nasira (2004) who documented that independent 
directors are ineffective in constraining earnings management. In that study’s context, 
a contributory factor to the positive relationship was the strong dominance of the board 
activities by the chairperson. Anecdotal evidence has it that in Nigeria most chairmen 
of companies had once served as the company’s CEO (Adegbite 2014). 
 
 Meanwhile, in some cases the CEOs also have a substantial share interest in the 
company. Hence, CEOs dominance often overrides the monitoring efficiency of the 
independent directors as in most cases the controlling shareholders recommend the 
appointment of the independent directors. However, in this current study, foreign 
independent directors (FDIR) negatively and significantly affected earnings 
management. This result is consistent with recent evidence suggesting that foreign 
directors have better incentives to monitor, as their appointment is not likely to be 
influenced locally. Likewise, due to their exposure to foreign markets, independent 
foreign directors have increased monitoring mechanisms skills.    
 
6.3.11 Control Variables for the Audit Fees Model  
The results of the dynamic effect regression model (GMM) indicate a significant 
relationship between audit fees and fifteen of the seventeen control variables 
(excluding time invariant variables35). Total assets (LOGTA) was highly significant in 
                                                     






at the 1 percent level of significance with a coefficient value of 0.14 (2.98). The result 
indicates that audit fees increase in proportion to client size as measured by LOGTA. 
That is, the larger the client company, the more audit fees the auditor charges. The 
result of this current research is consistent with several other studies like De George, 
Ferguson and Spear (2013), Griffin, Lont and Sun (2009); Gul and Tsui (2001),  Kim, 
Liu and Zheng (2012), Naser and Nusiebeh (2008), and Yaacob and Che-Ahmad 
(2012) that used the natural log of total assets. These studies show that auditor’s 
carryout substantive compliance tests as client size increases. 
 
Again, all the variables used as risk measurement were significant in explaining audit 
fees. These variables included current year loss (LOSS), current ratio (CRATIO), and 
debt ratio (DR) and quick ratio (QUICK). The coefficient of Loss was significant and 
positive in the dynamic effect model at the 1% level of significance. The coefficient 
of CRATIO was positive at the 1% level of significance in the dynamic effect model. 
DR coefficient is positive and significant at the 1% level in the dynamic effect model 
while the coefficient of QUICK was positive and significant at 1% in the dynamic 
effect model.  
 
The positive relationship between audit fees and risk variables signifies that client 
riskiness, as identified in previous literature, is an important factor in the current study 
that influences audit-pricing decisions. This aligns with the theoretical argument that 






audit failure (Matthews & Peel, 2003). Therefore, an auditor adds an insurance 
premium to his charges to cover possible future litigation claims. In addition to this, 
auditors respond to client risk by increasing audit effort or purchasing insurance 
premium covers (Chan et al. 1993; Jones & Raghunandan 1998). Alternatively, the 
pre-engagement evaluation of a client’s inherent and control risks could result in the 
rejection of a client that falls above the audit firm’s risk tolerance level (Jones & 
Raghunandan 1998). 
 
The next factor is client complexity measured by the sum of inventory scaled by total 
assets (INVT2TA) and number of client business segments (BUSISEG). The two 
measures have a significant relationship with audit fees and the coefficient signs (i.e. 
0.09, t=3.43; 0.14, t= 3.43 respectively) are consistent with prior studies suggesting 
that companies having complex operating structures pay higher audit fees. Inventories 
and account receivables are complex items that management can easily manipulate and 
therefore very difficult to audit (Matthews & Peel 2003). Thus, auditors need 
additional hours and skilled personnel to evaluate a client (Pong & Whittington 1994). 
The result of this current study aligned with many other studies like those of Francis 
and Stokes (1986) and Kim, Liu and Zheng (2012). This finding suggests that audit 
hours and expertise requirements increase with the level of complexity, which in turn 







The study as well controlled for auditor-related factors and, as expected, the result 
showed that Big 4 firms (BIG4) was significant and positive at the 1% level of 
significance (p = 0000). The result indicates that Big 4 auditors charge higher prices 
than their counterparts do. Prior studies have revealed that the extra charges indicate 
audit fees premiums, which reflect brand name reputational concerns (Moizer et al. 
2004), product differentiation (DeAngelo 1981), and audit staff skill and experience 
(Chan et al. 1993). The current study also reported the relationship between corporate 
year-end and the time lag taken between year-end and audit report. 
 
 The relationship was not significant, although previous studies such as Che-Ahmed 
and Houghton (1996) and Ezzamel et al. (1996) reported that both variables were 
significant determinants of audit fees. In contrast, however, and consistent with the 
findings of the present study, Naser and Nuseibeh (2007) found both variables to be 
insignificant. Two reasons help explain the insignificant relationship. First is the 
instance in which an audit firm contracts out an audit engagement to another firm with 
a less busy schedule to reduce work pressure. Second, the substantial audit work done 
during an interim audit will reduce the audit tasks for the final audit stage. This reduces 
audit workload during the peak period; hence, the number of days taken does not affect 
the audit fees. 
 
With respect to corporate governance attributes, only local institutional share 






institutional ownership (FSHR) had a negative significant (-0.00253, t = -1.70) impact 
on audit fees. The result suggests monitoring effectiveness of foreign institutional 
shareholders. Previous studies have demonstrated that concentrated shareholders 
improve corporate governance through the ability of these owners to remove non-
performing managers (Kaplan & Minton, 1994) and to obtain information on 
managers’ performance (Berle & Means 1932). Accordingly, their effectiveness could 
lead to a reduction in auditing procedures, hence to a reduction in audit fees.  The 
results of this current study are consistent with those that Mitra, Hossain and Dies 
(2007), Khan, Hossain, and Siddiqui (2011), and Zaman, Hudaib and Haniffa (2011) 
documented with respect to concentrated ownership 
 
The next discussion is on factors related to the board characteristic. Board size 
(BSIZE) had a significant and positive relationship with audit fees at 1% in this current 
study, suggesting that auditors assess the control environment of firms with a large 
board seen as being weak. Therefore, this weakness requires the auditor to perform 
more extensive audit procedures. The finding is consistent with that of Yatim, Kent 
and Clarkson (2006). The proportion of executive directors on a board (EXC_) was 
positive and significant (0.8298, t = 2.02) in the dynamic effect model suggesting that 
auditors charge more as the proportion of executive directors’ increases. Similarly, the 
proportion of non-executive directors on a board (NONEXC_) was positive and 






independent directors on a board (INDP_) was significant and positive in the dynamic 
effect model (0.7131, t = 1.41).  
The result is consistent with Carcello et al. (2002), O’Sullivan (2000), and Godwin-
Stewart and Kent (2006). According to O’Sullivan (2000), when a board is free from 
management influence, external auditors can freely discuss issues that arise during 
their audit. Likewise, an independent board values quality more than cost; therefore 
they are more likely to demand more from auditors, and this will increase the amount 
charged as audit fees.  
6.4 Comparison of the Financial Reporting Quality Model and Audit Fees.  
The essence of estimating both the financial reporting quality model and the audit fees 
model is to weigh the benefit and cost of the various regulatory changes that was 
embarked upon the government and how its varies with firm characteristics. On the 
overall, the improvement in the financial reporting quality as evidenced in section 
6.3.2 led to a subsequent increase in audit fees consistent with the expected increase 
in the complexity in section 6.3.6. However, the increase in financial reporting quality 
partially offset the risk associated with regulatory changes as evidenced in audit fees 
reduction when financial reporting quality and regulatory changes were interacted as 







 With respect to the firms’ characteristics and their interaction with regulatory changes, 
the result of the interaction of abnormal audit fees with regulatory changes that was 
discussed in section 6.3.3 impairs auditor independence hence deterioration in the 
financial reporting quality of such firms. Furthermore, the interaction of politically 
connected firm with regulatory changes confirms that the financial reporting quality 
of politically connected firms deteriorated in the regulatory changes period as 
explained in section 6.3.4.  
 
However, the interaction of politically connected firm with regulatory changes under 
the audit fees model which was discussed in section 6.3.8 revealed that the relationship 
was negative and insignificant. This raise further research question as the result 
suggest that the deterioration in the financial reporting quality of politically connected 
firms might not necessarily make auditors of politically connected firms to charge high 
audit fees in compensation for the high risk associated with such firms.  
 
The result discussed in section 6.3.8 revealed the poor financial reporting quality of 
connected firms could as well be explained in the context of audit fees lowballing 
which might be due to the auditor incentive to get more referrals from politically 






of overlapping directorship with regulatory changes deteriorate financial reporting 
quality as discussed in section 6.3.5 which implies dual committee membership 
compromise director’s independence and objectivity hence high agency cost.  
Consistent with high agency cost agency cost associated with dual committee 
membership, the interaction of overlapping directorship with regulatory changes in the 
audit fees model discussed in section 6.3.9 increased the amount paid as audit fees by 
firms with dual committee membership.  
6.5 Contributions of the Current Study  
This section discusses the contributions of this study from the theoretical 
methodological and practical perspectives.  
 
6.5.1 Contributions to the Existing Literature  
As discussed in the problem statement, there is a widely held belief that regulatory 
changes influence the quality of financial reports and drive costs, empirical studies 
examining the relationship between regulatory changes, reporting quality and audit 
fees have reported mixed results. 
 
 A possible explanation for the mixed findings arises from the differences in firm 
characteristics and country-specific institutional qualities. In addition, endogeneity 
problem arising from unobserved heterogeneity, simultaneity, and measurement error 






2012). Motivated by the regulatory changes in Nigeria coupled with the mixed findings 
reported by previous studies this study contributes to the body of knowledge by 
investigating the moderating effect of firm characteristics (i.e. abnormal audit fees, 
political connection and overlapping directorship) on the relationship between 
regulatory changes, audit fees and financial reporting quality. 
 
To the best of this researcher’s knowledge, no extant literature examines the effects of 
regulatory changes from an auditing perspective in Nigeria. Even though the literature 
on corporate governance and auditing are budding in Nigeria, this literature 
predominantly focuses on environmental determinants of corporate governance in the 
country. Therefore, an important contribution of this study to the existing literature on 
regulatory changes is that it offers new empirical insights into the benefits and costs 
of regulatory changes using data from a less-studied and less-regulated environment 
vis-à-vis Sub-Saharan African (specifically Nigeria). 
 
Further, while previous studies of (Chi, Lisic & Pevzner 2011, Cohen et al., 2013, 
Jamal & Tan 2013) on regulatory reforms have only established variations of the 
impact of regulatory reforms based on cross country differences, the present study 
established the variations of the impact of regulatory reforms based on firms level by 
introducing firm characteristics like abnormal audit fees, political connection and 
overlapping directorship. Hence by establishing the variation of regulatory impact at 






changes studies by investigating the indirect effect of abnormal audit fees, political 
connection and overlapping directorship which to the best of this researcher’s 
knowledge previous studies had only established their directly effects on financial 
reporting quality and audit fees.  
 
Accordingly, the study provides insights into the limitations of replicating 
international financial regulatory reforms without considering firm behaviour in 
localized, weak regulatory settings. In furtherance to Adegbite’s (2014) call for a 
testable hypothesis on the drivers of sound corporate governance practises at the level 
of the individual firm, this study provides evidence suggesting that, although the 
financial reforms in Nigeria improved financial reporting quality, factors like 
abnormal audit fees, political connection and overlapping directorship impacted the 
process.  
 
The results showed that: 
1. An auditor independent impairment negatively affected financial reporting 
quality in the regulatory changes periods.  
 
2. The quality of financial reports deteriorate in the regulatory changes periods 






3. Dual committee board memberships, which influenced audit committee 
effectiveness in Nigeria negatively and is a bane of Nigerian companies, 
affected financial reporting quality in the regulatory changes periods.  
 
The above findings resonate with previous theoretical arguments that the incentives of 
individual firms for adequate financial reporting are critical to the success of any 
regulatory initiative, most especially when applying an international regulatory reform 
model in a less-regulated environment (Ball 2006; Adegbite 2014).  
 
Likewise the study contributes theoretically to financial reporting and audit fees 
literature by investigating how directors’ “busyness” affects their monitoring role, 
hence the quality of financial report and audit pricing. Prior studies of busy directors 
examined busyness from the perspective of interlocking directorships that is directors 
appointed on the board of directors of more than one company. However, director 
busyness in this current study was proxied by dual board committee membership on 
the compensation and audit committees. The finding of the current study gives further 
theoretical insights suggesting that overlapping directorships weaken financial 
reporting quality and lead to increased prices by auditors. 
6.5.2 Methodological Contributions  
Finally, this study makes an interesting methodological contribution with respect to 






problem statement. A major concern in corporate governance studies is the 
endogeneity problem, which may arise because of several characteristics of firms that 
are unobservable. A second source of endogeneity is the issue of simultaneity, i.e., the 
problem of independent variables that are not fully exogenous. Last, is the possibility 
of current governance variable performance being a function of past firm performance.  
Most past studies such as those of Antle et al. (2006) and Asthana and Boone (2012) 
utilized Two-Stage Least Squares analysis for the endogenous variables of the 
financial reporting quality model and the audit model. However, the limitation of 
adopting the Two-Stage Least Squares is that it only alleviates endogeneity concerns 
arising from simultaneity and unobserved firm characteristics in a regression model.  
 
Previous studies (Antle et al. 2006; Asthana & Boone 2012) that proved the existence 
of an endogeneity problem between the endogenous audit fees variables and stochastic 
error terms of financial reporting quality model, this study alleviated endogeneity 
concerns arising from the correlation between past performance and presence 
performance in addition to endogeneity issues arising from unobserved firm 
characteristics and simultaneity issues which previous studies have mostly addressed 
using the Arellano Bond linear dynamic panel estimator (Arellano & Bond 1991). To 
the best of the author’s knowledge, the study will be the first to investigate how firm 






fees taking into consideration the likely endogeneity issue that might arise from the 
effect of past performance on current firm performance.  
The GMM estimation approach is more efficient than 2SLS when the problem of 
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation in the error terms is presence (Arellano-Bond 
1991; Wooldridge 2001). Basically, under panel data application, the unobserved 
heterogeneity correlates with the observed covariate, which is then corrected for using 
the fixed effect or within the estimator. The fixed effect estimator assumes that the 
time varying errors have zero means, constant variance and zero correlation (i.e., 
exogeneity assumption).  
The GMM estimation technique that Hansen (1982) introduced is a non-parametric 
approach used to estimate model parameters with no data distributional assumptions, 
which is an important assumption under the Two-Stage Least Squares regression 
analysis. Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) developed a 
system dynamic model that incorporates simultaneous difference and level equations. 
Arellano and Bond (1991) proposed two estimators, which are the one-step and the 
two-step. The weighing matrix used in obtaining the estimates explains the differences 
between the two estimates; however, the two-step is optimal (Gyimah-Brempong & 
Traynor 1999). The dynamic GMM is consistent and efficient in the absence of second 






6.5.3 Practical Contributions  
The findings of this study could serve as recommendations especially to FRCN, ICAN 
and other policymakers and regulatory authorities such as NSE. From a policy 
perspective, the study’s empirical results revealed that abnormally high audit fees have 
a negative effect on financial reporting quality, as evidenced by the increase in the 
level of accrual and real earnings management. High audit fees compromise the 
objectivity of auditors as they lead to an undesirable auditor-client economic bond.  
  
Both FRCN and ICAN have roles to play in stopping the menace of high fees that lead 
to an undesirable auditor-client economic bond First, FRCN, in its capacity as a 
regulatory authority, should mandate the proper disclosure of audit-related and non-
audit related fees and prohibit non-audit related services deemed to likely compromise 
auditor independence.  Second, this study’s findings serve as a wakeup call for the 
audit inspection units of professional bodies like ICAN whose members are engaged 
in audits to intensify efforts to counter check the quality of audit services rendered by 
its members. If possible, regulatory authorities can further encourage external peer 
review of an auditor’s work, whereby firm B should review the work of audit firm A. 
Such peer review will facilitate higher-quality financial reporting.  
 
Again, constant review of audit fees received by audit firms should be encouraged and 
clear criteria should be set for audit fee charges in order to prevent excessive charges. 






wanting and the actions taken should be made public. However, until the date of study, 
despite the indictment of auditors, no news exists of any successful litigation against 
an auditor that might serve as a deterrent.   
 
Next, the study demonstrated that firm-specific reporting incentives impede the quality 
of financial reports in some companies; therefore, future regulatory efforts should 
consider examining pronounced reporting peculiarities of individual firms.  For 
instance, the weakness of the audit committee stemming from its composition, 
structure, and independence is an area that needs future regulatory intervention. To 
enhance the independence of the board audit committee, dual committee membership 
should be discouraged, and the promotion of a CEO to chairman status in companies 
should be avoided. As evidenced in this study’s findings, political patronage 
negatively affects financial reporting quality, requiring special regulatory attention. It 
has become imperative for regulatory authorities to fashion ways in which to make 
politically linked companies more accountable, for instance, through shareholder 
enlightenment programs on shareholder activism.  
 
With respect to the complexity of the new regulations, ICAN should provide detailed 
guidelines to educate members on the complex aspects of new regulations. This will 
facilitate auditing pricing negotiations between the auditors and their clients in order 








6.6 Limitations of the Study  
Like any other research, this study possesses a number of limitations that must be 
highlighted. The limitations of this research are discussed below: 
1. The data used for this study were collected in the early part of 2014. First, due 
to the timing of data collection, only a few observations were available for 
2013, which covers the IFRS period. Second, only a few short time frames 
existed between the review of 2003 code of corporate governance, the 
establishment of FRCN and the adoption of IFRS making it a bit difficult to 
disentangle the effects of each particular regulatory initiative. Because of these 
two limitations, this study jointly examined the effects of all regulatory changes 
on financial reporting quality and audit fees. Therefore, the interpretation of 
the study findings is a limitation.   
 
2. Because the annual reports from whence the data used results from a joint effort 
of both the management and the external auditor, the financial reporting quality 
proxy (i.e., earning management) best captures the level of earnings 
management tolerated by external auditors. Hence, the financial reporting bias 








3. The choice of earnings management proxy and its ability to accurately measure 
audit quality limits the strength of the evidence provided in this study. Hitherto, 
no consensus has existed on the measurement of the various earnings 
management proxies, and thus the measurements have the potential to exhibit 
high measurement errors. However, the study adopts other measures of 
earnings management, and the results remain unchanged.  
 
4. Likewise, non-audit fees are lumped together with audit fees in the annual 
report and consequently the study used auditor’s remuneration. However, the 
study does not expect the aggregation of audit and non-audit fees to affect the 
findings of the study because non-audit services are rarely provided in Nigeria.  
 
 
5. Lastly, although this study estimates several audit fees models to re-estimate 
the main model and test for the validity of the findings.  The results, however, 
are still subject to how well the audit fees model accurately predicts abnormal 
audit fees.  
 
6.7 Future Research  
All the limitations highlighted in the preceding section serve as an opportunity for 






1. As discussed in the limitations section, few observations exist in the post-IFRS 
adoption period. Future studies can extend the number of years to examine the 
regulatory effect over a longer period.  
 
2. Annual data were used in the estimation of earning management, which as 
discussed earlier, best capture an auditor’s tolerance for deceptive accounting 
of managers. Future studies could instead employ quarterly data in their 
estimations of earning management. Introducing quarterly data would provide 
insights into management-induced earnings management and the auditor’s 
response thereto.    
 
 
3. Another limitation observed is an inherent one imposed by the choice of 
earnings management. As DeFond and Zheng (2014) suggested, future studies 
could consider the triangulation of some of the available proxies that capture 
audit quality/financial reporting quality. This approach would provide an in-
depth insight into what constitutes financial reporting quality, as no single 
proxy is capable of giving a complete insight.  
 
4. The insignificant negative relationship between the interactions of politically 






opportunity for future study. Prior studies showed that politically connected 
firms are associated with high agency cost which implied that politically 
connected firms are priced high by auditors due to the associated risk. 
However, the insignificant relationship reported in this study could possibly 
have presented a case for auditor’s fees low balling in consideration for future 
referrals. Future studies could possibly consider the issue of lowballing in 
political connected firm and its impact on the reporting quality of connected 
firms.  
 
6.8 Conclusions  
This chapter provides a detailed summary of all chapters in this thesis starting from 
the introductory part in Chapter One to the research methodology aspect in Chapter 
Three and the results of hypothesis testing in Chapter Four. In line with previous 
studies, this research demonstrates that the various regulatory changes embarked upon 
by the Nigerian government have had significant impacts on both financial reporting 
quality and audit fees and that financial reporting incentives at the firm level further 
affect this relationship.  
 
The results of this study contribute to the budding literature on the audit market, 
specifically financial reporting quality, and audit fees. Because these two elements 
proxy the benefits and costs of regulatory reforms, any significant impact on financial 






reform. Overall, seven out of the eight hypotheses were supported. From a theoretical 
perspective, the results indicate that regulatory changes introduce some amount of 
complexity into the financial process and, in return, improve financial reporting quality 
and increase the audit costs. Further still, the results reveal that excessive audit fees, 
politically connected firms and overlapping directorships moderate the effect of 
regulatory reform on financial reporting quality and audit fees. In a practical sense, 
this study provides useful insights to the parties involved in the financial reporting 
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Variance Inflation Factor For Financial Reporting Quality Mode 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 
 VIF VIF 
POST 1.46 7.29 
ABNRAF 1.20 2.65 
POLI 1.48 2.77 
OVERLAP 1.25 1.58 
POSTABNAF  2.45 
POSTPOLI  4.13 
POSTOVERLAP  4.87 
BIG4 1.39 1.42 
SALESG 1.10 1.08 
GEARING  1.12 1.12 
ACCRUAL_TA 1.21 1.15 
LOGROA 1.12 1.21 
BUSSEG 1.13 1.14 
CFFO2TA 1.10 1.11 
LOGTA 2.18 2.26 
TEMPLOY 1.09 1.10 
RLAG 1.32 1.33 
BSIZE 1.85 1.89 
NONEXC_ 1.95 1.99 
IND_ 1.84 1.86 
FDIR  2.49 2.52 
FSHR 2.12 2.14 











Variance Inflation Factor for Audit Fees Model 
Variable Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 VIF VIF 
 
POSTABDDAC  1.28 
POSTPOLI  3.89 
POSTOVERLAP  2.57 
POST  2.99 
ABDAC 1.07 1.30 
POLI 1.45   2.66 
OVERLAP 1.23 2.24 
LOGTA 2.18 2.04 
BIG4 1.38 1.39 
LOSS  1.11 1.15 
CRATIO 1.58 2.13 
QUICK 2.23 1.92 
DR 1.04 1.05 
INVREC_TA 1.22 1.29 
BUSSEG 1.16 1.16 
ROA 1.31 1.28 
BUSY  1.16 1.14 
RLAG 1.23 1.29 
INSTITSHR 1.46 1.51 
FSHR 1.58 1.58   
BSIZE 1.39 2.03 
EXC_ 5.26 1.09 
NONEXC_ 7.84 1.68 
INDP_ 3.05  1.17 











GMM Step One Result for Financial Reporting Model 
Variable FRQ   Without 
interaction 
(Step one) 



















































































Appendix 4C (continued) 
 
  
Variable FRQ  Without 
interaction 
(Step one) 




































IND_ Yes -0.2675 
(-0.12) 
 
NONEXC_  1.4093 
(0.75) 
FSHR  0.0253 
(1.47) 























Hansen j  0.063 
 
N  211 







GMM Step One Result For Audit Fees Model 











 (6.36***)  










0.0597    




0.2667    
(1.87***) 
 
POST 0.0070    
(0.20) 
-0.3353    
(-1.43**) 
 
ABDAC 0.0006    
(1.95***) 
 










0.0868    
(1.05)   
LOGTA 0.2291    
(4.80***) 
0.1612    
(1.50**) 
 







Appendix 4D (continued) 
 
  








BIG4 0.2782        
(3.79***) 
0.0442    
(0.49) 
 
Loss  0.2280 
 (2.91***) 







0.0139    
(0.23) 
 
Quick 0.0211        
(1.67***)   
0.0031    
(0.25) 
 
DR 0.2028   
 (1.41**) 





0.0794    
(1.84***) 





0.1159        
(1.92***) 





0.1193    
(0.53) 
 
BUSY  -0.0072 
(-0.09) 





-0.0606        
(-1.24*) 
0.0404    
(0.54) 
 
INSTITSHR 0.0019  
(1.70 **) 





0.0010   
(0.36) 
 

















BSIZE 0.0012   
(1.39**)  
0.0002    
(0.20) 
EXC_ 0.8352         
(1.06) 
-0.1986    
(-0.40) 
NONEXC_ 0.9548    
(1.16) 
-0.1134    
(-0.24) 
INDP_ 1.3142    
(1.57**) 
-0.1484    
(-0.54) 







Hansen j 0.118 0.575 
No of observations 244 244 
 
